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ABSTRACT 
Reyes Yanira. Ph.D., Purdue University, December, 2002. Law, Media and Political 
Dissent: The Case of the F ALN. Major Professor: Robert Perrucci, Dept. of 
Sociology and Anthropology. 
Inspired on the works of scholars and activists that had denounced state 
repression ofpolitical activists in the United States, this research explores the 
theoretical proposal about the criminalization ofpolitical dissidence. The proposal of 
the criminalization ofpolitical dissidence is analyzed through the study of the case of 
Puerto Rican pro-independence organization Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n 
Nacional, F.A.L.N. 
The subjects of this research were charged with seditious conspiracy and other 
charges. They claimed the status ofprisoners ofwar and deny the jurisdiction ofUS 
courts over them. Affirming their right to fight for the independence ofPuerto Rico, 
these individuals were treated by the state and the media as criminals and terrorists, as 
a menace to society at large. The clash ofvisions and discourses inspires this 
research. Moreover, the contribution and role of the media to the criminalization 
process is explored. 
The methodology used is Altheide's ethnographic content analysis. By this 
documents are analyzed in a qualitative, deep manner, taking into consideration the 
whole spectrum of social and historical factors that defines the conjuncture. Court 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
Vlll 
decisions, trial transcripts, and other legal documents are studied in order to 
understand the legal treatment of the case. Furthermore, the coverage by the New 
York Time and the Chicago Tribune of the violent incidents and the arrests is also 
studied to explore media's treatment to the same issue. 
This research revealed that the F ALN members were the subjects of a process 
ofcriminalization. Their case further demonstrates that the criminalzaition ofpolitical 
dissidence comprises three main elements. First, the characterization or stigmatization 
ofpolitical dissident groups as criminals and terrorist-the law and the media present 
images of the political groups and its members as criminal and terrorists. Second, the 
law and the media in its treatment to the dissident groups de-politicize their activities 
by negating importance or criticizing their political motivations or goals. The third 
element is the use of fear to justify social control, in other words the law and the 
media present images ofpossible danger to the public in order to justify mechanisms 
of social control. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
"And we know that a country which drops an atomic bomb on Hiroshima; which finance 
terrorism and supports the Contras who are trying to overthrow the Nicaraguan 
government by destroying child cares centers, schools and entire villages ... will get out of 
Puerto Rico only when it is forced to ... Finally, what our government attempts to label as 
terrorism is really resistance. Our prisoners are subjected to psychological and physical 
torture. If they didn't resist they would die. Ifwe don't resist U.S. military and corporate 
plans for our nation, we will die. Resistance is our means of survival." 
Alejandrina Torres 
Puerto Rican Political Prisoner 
The history ofPuerto Rico has been the history ofcolonial domination. Four 
hundred years under the domination of Spain ended with the Spanish-American War. 
After four centuries ofmilitary domination, the Spanish Empire began to crack. The 
Cuban independence movement and the Puerto Rican autonomist movement obligated 
Spain to confer Autonomic Statutes to both islands on 1897 (Scarano, 1993). Soon 
afterwards, in 1898, Spain lost the Spanish-American War, losing in this way its colonies. 
The United States acquired Puerto Rico as a part of the war resolution treaty. 
From the first moment, the United States imposed its interests on the island. A military 
regime was installed immediately. Two years later, in 1900, the United States established 
a civil government, with a governor that was appointed directly by the President of the 
United States. The Puerto Rican people could not elect their own government until 1947 
(Scarano, 1993). 
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After the 1940's decade the ''New Deal" was brought to Puerto Rico. This ''new" 
project attempted to develop the economy after the Great Depression of the '30s. The 
development strategy was based on the implantation ofdiverse mechanisms of social aid, 
including unemployment benefits, social security, food stamps, and other forms of 
welfare (Dietz, 1989). In addition, an industrialization project directed toward foreign 
companies was imposed. This project required the Puerto Rican Government to offer tax 
exemption as incentive to encourage investments on the island. All these programs 
caused a growing dependence on federal funds and foreign investment. 
The Congress of the United States approved in 1948 the 600 Statute, which 
allowed Puerto Rico to create its own Constitution. However, Congress kept the authority 
to ratify and modify all sections that it considered necessary. Congress exercised its 
power when it eliminated section 20, which established basic human rights under the 
Constitution (Geigel, 1972). This Constitution established a "new" political regime in 
Puerto Rico, which was called "Estado Libre Asociado" or Commonwealth. 
Initially, the United Nations, allowing Puerto Rico to be removed from the list of 
colonial territories accepted this ''new" political status ofPuerto Rico 1, but this 
convenient situation lasted only a short time. The United Nations took back the Puerto 
Rican case during the 1960 to 1980 decades (Scarano, 1993). In fact, over that time 
period the colonial status ofPuerto Rico has been increasingly recognized by 
international organizations (U.N., 1972, 1973, 1989). 
1 Beginning in 1946 Puerto Rico was on this list which obligated the United States to provide annual 
reports of the steps to decolonize Puerto Rico. 
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Many different strategies have been used to solve the colonial situation of the 
island, from official avenues -like raising the case to international forums or proposing 
referendums of status-to illegal tactics. One of the most high profile uses of resistance 
to colonial status involved fifteen Puerto Ricans who call themselves political prisoners 
and prisoners ofwar and who were imprisoned for joining that struggle against 
colonialism. 
Ten men and five women Puerto Ricans workers, professionals, college students, 
teachers, and community organizers, involved in independence movements spent 
approximately two decades in federal prisons. "During the 1970's and the beginning of 
the '80s, the prisoners were involved in community, union, student and political struggles 
in Puerto Rico and one in the United States. They fought for the people's right to high 
quality and free education. They worked to create community institutions such as 
alternative education programs, child-care centers, health centers, housing cooperatives, 
recreational facilities and political organizations ... ln summary they challenged the U.S. 
political system in many ways" (Arm the Spirit, 1995). 
These political activists stated that they have as their major goal the independence 
ofPuerto Rico from the colonial domination of the United States. Their struggle is not a 
new one. Five hundred years of colonialism have been accompanied by five hundred 
years ofresistance by Puerto Ricans, and efforts by the state, from surveillance to 
assassinations, to suppress political opposition. The case under study presents another 
tactic ofrepression: legal persecution/prosecution or criminalization. 
The Puerto Ricans subjects of this research were arrested under charges of 
seditious conspiracy within others charges. This charge was first used against the 
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secessionist movement of the South during the Civil War (Preston, 1994), and during this 
century has almost exclusively been used against Puerto Ricans fighters for the 
independence of the island (Fernandez, 1994). The similarities between these two groups 
are the aim of separation from the federal union, the interest of the state to maintain the 
union at any cost, and the repression ofpolitical opposition. The differences are the 
ethnic composition of the groups involved, a matter ofpower, and the history of 
colonialism relevant to the case ofPuerto Rico. 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
The questions of the origins and nature of the law are ones largely discussed in 
different areas of academic inquiry. Sociologist of law and criminologists2 have studied 
the processes by which crimes arise, how laws are created in response to those crimes, 
and how those laws are applied or enforced. In this research several of these old questions 
are addressed. The case of the Puerto Rican political prisoners gives us the opportunity to 
study the process by which political dissent becomes seen and treated as a crime and the 
role of the law and the media in the process ofcriminalization. 
These Puerto Rican political prisoners were members of a group called Fuerzas 
Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional (F ALN), words that in English mean Armed Forces of 
National Liberation. This group claimed to be acting in support of the independence of 
Puerto Rico and it has to be understood within the history of the political status ofPuerto 
Rico and the independence movement in the island. 
2 See Chapter IL 
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1.1.1 Political Resistance in Puerto Rico 
Throughout the history ofPuerto Rico there have been numerous Puerto Ricans 
who have resisted the colonial situation. The history ofpolitical resistance dates from the 
domination by Spain, when many Puerto Ricans joining Cuban revolutionaries, 
unsuccessfully declared the Republic ofPuerto Rico in what has been called "Grito de 
Lares." Later, in 1922 the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party was founded, which with their 
leader Pedro Albizu Campos guided many political activities against the colonial 
domination. In 1950, an armed uprising by the Nationalist Party, designed to call 
attention to the imminent peril of assimilation and declaring the Second Republic of 
Puerto Rico, was put down only by jailing over 5,000 men, women and children who 
participated in or were suspected of aiding the rebellion (Nieves Falcon, 1995). In 1954, 
five nationalists commanded by a woman, Lolita Lebron, attacked the Congress of the 
United States wounding five Congressmen. These revolutionaries were convicted of 
seditious conspiracy and became the longest held political prisoners in the W estem 
Hemisphere (Churchill and Vander Wall, 1990). President Jimmy Carter released these 
political prisoners in September of 1979. 
After the Nationalists Party's actions and imprisonment of its members, many 
pro-independence groups were created. It was at this juncture that the FBI implemented a 
formal COINTELPRO ( counter intelligence program) with the expressed intent of 
strengthening the U.S. colonial domination ofPuerto Rico through the process of 
destroying the entire spectrum of left opposition on the island (Churchill and Vander 
Wall, 1990). The intervention and surveillance of the FBI in Puerto Rico was 
characterized by the infiltration ofundercover agents in political groups, the circulation 
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of false statements whit the sole purpose of reducing public support for and, to destroy 
any alliance between the different groups inside and outside the island. (Churchill and 
Vander Wall, 1990) 
The intervention of the FBI with political movements in Puerto Rico was 
evidenced in the case of Cerro Maravilla. On July 25, 1978, two young activist students 
were assassinated by the Puerto Rican Police Corp. A police officer, later revealed that 
this murder was planned from high offices of the Puerto Rican government and in 
collaboration with the FBI (Churchill and Vander Wall, 1990). The same year (1978) the 
FBI held an international conference on counter-terrorism on San Juan, Puerto Rico. One 
result of the conference was the designation of a mainland formation of the independence 
movement, the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional (FALN), along with three other 
national liberation organizations as the most significant internal security threat to the 
United States (Churchill and Vander Wall, 1990). 
1.1.2 Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional (FALN) 
After being designated the most significant threat to the U.S. national security, 
between 1980 and 1985 around 30 people were accused ofconspiring against the 
authority of the U.S. government and being members of the FALN. At the time of their 
arrests the accused declared themselves combatants in an anti-colonial conflict to free the 
island from U.S. domination, and thus asked to be treated as Prisoners ofWar. The 
F ALN members refused to recognize the jurisdiction ofU.S. courts, arguing that their 
accusations could only be resolved before an international forum (Cramer, 1993). 
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These F ALN members were accused ofconspiring to overthrow the government 
of the United States. They were charged with seditious conspiracy, a charge that has only 
been applied to Puerto Ricans in most of the twentieth century. Seditious conspiracy is 
defined as the crime by which "two or more persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States to conspire to overthrow or destroy by force the Government of the United 
States...An indictment charging seditious conspiracy must allege that the purpose of the 
conspiracy was the exertion of force against those charged with the duty of executing the 
laws of the United States ... When a seditious conspiracy is shown, the act ofone 
conspirator in furtherance ofa common purpose is admissible evidence against all, even 
though the conspirator committing the act is not being tried" (American Jurisprudence 
70: Sec. 6). 
Over the years, F ALN members and supporters have argued that seditious 
conspiracy in the context of the political situation ofPuerto Rico is an impossible crime. 
The argument is that because Puerto Rico is a colony of the United States, the authority 
of the United States over Puerto Rico is illegal, and therefore the seditious conspiracy 
charge cannot be used against Puerto Ricans activists. Puerto Rican poet, Juan Antonio 
Corretjer, first developed this argument. This Puerto Rican poet, fighter for the 
independence ofPuerto Rico, and once himself charged with conspiring against the 
United States, depicted this as the "imposible crime." His rationale was that Puerto 
Ricans cannot commit this crime because we are not part of the United States, because 
Puerto Rico is a Latin American nation militarily occupied by the United States 
(Corretjer, 1983). Basically the main argument has been that since Puerto Rico is a 
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colony of the United States, pro-independence groups are entitled by International Law to 
fight against the colonial domination. 
Most recently, an activist and scholar has proposed that the United States, in their 
interest ofmaintaining its power over Puerto Rico has engaged in a process of 
criminalization of the independent movements. Richard Dello Buono in his article 
entitled "State Repression and Popular Resistance: The Criminalization ofPuerto Rican 
lndependentistas" argues that the United States has criminalized the Puerto Rican 
independence movement in order to maintain the colonial domination ofPuerto Rico. 
Dello Buono argues that because of the importance of the colonial domination ofPuerto 
Rico, the US has repressed independence movements since the beginning of its 
domination of the island, including the criminalization of the F ALN and Macheteros 
during the 1980's. Criminalization is presented by the author as one of the tools used by 
the state to repress political movements, in this case the Puerto Rican independence 
movement. In his own words: "The process of criminalization is an effective tool 
employed by the state to repress popular social movements. In general terms, 
criminalization can be defined as the process by which behaviors and individuals are 
respectively transformed into crimes and criminals" (Dello Buono, 1991, p. 116). 
Dello Buono argues that the United States in its purpose ofmaintaining control 
over Puerto Rico repressed independence groups by using processes of criminalization, 
manifested in this case with charging independence activists with seditious conspiracy 
and other criminal charges. He explains this process as one in which several branches of 
the government participated, including the courts and law enforcement agencies. Dello 
Buono in addition suggests that the media participates or cooperates in that process of 
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criminalization: "Clearly, the state was engaged in a larger struggle for popular 
perception of the independence movement, taking political aim at independence politics 
in the media while orchestrating legal maneuvering in the courts" (Dello Buono, 1991, p. 
119). 
This research explores this process ofcriminalization as proposed by Dello 
Buono. The law and the media are studied in order to understand the way in which the 
F ALN and their activities became treated and seen as criminal and terrorist. Through the 
analysis of the content oflegal documents and media articles this work studies the way in 
which the actors are characterized and labeled as criminal instead of freedom fighters, 
like the F ALN call themselves. Second, this research explores how different actors (law 
and the media) approach FALN's political goals. Finally, the way in which the law and 
the media utilized elements of fear in order to support their intentions ofprosecution and 
by which it justified the criminalization ofpolitical actions is also analyzed. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL APPROACH 
In this chapter we examine literature on the main topic of this research -the 
criminalization ofPuerto Rican political dissidents-and topics related to the area. 
Included in these are the history of the independence movements in Puerto Rico and the 
repression that these groups have experienced over the years. 
The second part of this chapter is dedicated to a survey of those theoretical 
propositions that have informed the theoretical approach for this study and for use in 
understanding the criminalization ofpolitical movements. 
2.1 Criminalization ofPolitical Dissent in the United States 
The World War I was the stage for the creation of statutes criminalizing political 
dissent in the United States3• Alarmed with the strong anti-war movement the Congress 
3 In Stephen Kohn words: "At the time the United States entered World War I, there was a very large 
American peace movement. Congress, aware of this movement, passed two laws [Espionage and Seditious 
Act] intended to suppress disloyal or anti-war activities" (Kohn, 1994) 
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of the United States passed the Espionage and Seditious Act on June 15, 1917. Stephen 
Kohn describes this law: "This law, which had nothing whatever to do with espionage, 
made it a felony to make 'false statements' or statements that might cause 
'insubordination' or 'disloyalty' in the armed services or statements that could 'obstruct' 
enlistment into the armed services. A 'conspiracy' to cause such 'disloyalty', 
'insubordination' or 'obstruction' was likely criminalized. Anyone found guilty under the 
law was subject to heavy fines and imprisonment ofup to twenty years." (Kohn, 1994). 
Under this law hundreds ofcitizens were arrest and imprisoned. In 1940, Congress 
passed an anti-seditious act to permit criminal charges against dissidents in peacetime 
(Kohn, 1994). 
But political repression4 by the U.S. government has not been restricted to war 
periods or to the enforcement of those statutes. Rather, it has been present in almost all 
the history of the United States and has been the way in which the U.S. government deals 
with the domestic opposition. Schultz and Schultz say: ''we believe that repression in 
America is a pervasive phenomenon that transcends specific persons and specific 
periods" (Schultz and Schultz, 1989). Political repression in the U.S. not only has been 
present in different historical moments, but also has acquired different forms. The 
repression was and is not limited to enforcement against political dissidents. Instead, 
"each branch of the government, the judicial, the legislative, and the executive, has 
contributed to the selective denial of rights to persons it considers a threat" (Schultz and 
4 Robert Goldstein defined political repression in this way: "Political Repression consists ofgovernment 
action which grossly discriminates against persons or organizations viewed as presenting a fundamental 
challenge to existing power relationships or key government policies, because of their perceived political 
beliefs", cited in Schultz and Schultz, 1989. 
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Schultz, 1989). The participation ofvarious federal agencies (CIA, FBI, IRS, U.S. Army) 
in the persecution, repression and surveillance ofcitizens has been demonstrated 
(Churchill and Vander Wall, 1990). Historically, the consistent presence and harassment 
by the FBI and the use ofgrand juries' subpoenas have been a nightmare for social and 
independence movements in the US and Puerto Rico. 
In an article that is constructed around the authors' political convictions, entitled: 
"Political Prisoners as an Emergent Contradiction of State Repression: An Introductory 
Essay," the authors begin by stating that the topic ofpolitical prisoners in the United 
States is a key theme that needs to be studied by all scholars committed to issues of social 
justice. "As academics and political activists, we find that focusing on the issues of 
political prisoners/prisoners ofwar is a means for developing discussions and activities 
designed to protect the memory ofpast struggles, to call attention to the urgency of 
current movements issues, and to shape the strategies of future battles for human rights in 
the U.S." (Stout and Buono, 1991, p. 338). 
The sixties and seventies were decades ofprofound political conflict in the United 
States. These social movements included the opposition to the Vietnam war, civil rights 
movements ofBlacks, Chicanos, Native-American and feminist movements. The state 
responded by repressing these movements. The authors argue: "Behind the tranquility 
depicted in the corporate storybooks, radical opposition continued and was subjected to a 
concerted strategy ofrepression directed from the highest levels of the U.S. government. 
This state repression was designed to annihilate all of its most radical political opponents, 
an approach best symbolized by the COINTELPRO campaign (Stout and Dello Buono, 
1991, p. 340). COINTELPRO was the FBI's system directed toward the elimination of 
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those movements considered more threatening to U.S. national security. In the next 
section we discuss how COINTELPRO was used against the Puerto Rican independence 
movement. 
Stout and Dello Buono argue that state repression has evolved from traditional 
approaches to more elaborate forms of repression. One of the new forms that state 
repression is acquiring is the criminalization ofpolitical opposition. The authors describe 
this process as follows: "The strategy of criminalization is an effective way ofpreserving 
the 'neutral' image of the state which seeks to manage and contain the contradictions of 
its domination and the organized resistance it breeds ...Criminalization attempts to 
accomplish this by labeling longstanding, organized and legitimate political opposition as 
'ordinary crime,' the activities of 'fanatic terrorists,' or 'unjust' threats to public order" 
(Stout and Dello Buono, 1991, p. 343). 
2.2 Puerto Rican Political Prisoners 
Repression has been a constant in our history, because it is impossible to maintain 
colonialism by consent, no matter how attractive the prize for the privileged few. 
In Puerto Rico, this repression has served three complementary functions: first, to 
protect the enormous U.S. economic interests and infrastructure in Puerto Rico; 
second, to protect the symbols ofU.S. executive and military power; and finally, 
to control the levels of rebellion and protest endemic to the deprivation of liberty 
and the economic hardship that are visited upon colonized peoples (Nieves 
Falcon, 1995, pp. 5). 
There are basically four main sources of information available on this topic. First, 
a book entitled: Prisoners ofColonialism: The Struggle for justice in Puerto Rico, by 
Ronald Fernandez. Second, an article published in the Cardozo Journal oflntemational 
and Comparative Law in 1996 by Lisa Napoli, titled, "The Puerto Rican 
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lndependentistas: Combatants in the Fight for Self-determination and the Right to 
Prisoner ofWar Status." Third an article published on 1991 in the Journal Humanity & 
Society: "State Repression and Popular Resistance: The Criminalization ofPuerto Rican 
Independentistas" by Richard Dello Buono. Finally, several articles and booklets 
prepared by groups supporting the freedom of these prisoners. This section will discuss 
this literature. 
Fernandez (1994) undertakes the task of telling the story of these prisoners by 
adopting a personal and historical approach. In his words: "This is a story which spans 
one hundred years. To fairly understand the prisoners, Prisoners ofColonialism begins in 
the year that, as Senator Millard Tydings acknowledge, 'we acquired Puerto Rico by 
conquest"' (Fernandez, 1994, pp. 16). Thus, he presents the story by interchanging the 
history of the colonial status ofPuerto Rico, and the personal experiences of the prisoners 
themselves. 
The author starts with the person he calls "Political Prisoner #0001" don Pedro 
Albizu Campos, the Nationalist leader who was the first Puerto Rican to be prosecuted 
under seditious conspiracy charges. Fernandez introduces Albizu's story by narrating the 
political conditions in which he grew up: "In the cultural capital ofPuerto Rico, students 
like Albizu began the day with the Pledge of Allegiance to a foreign flag; they also sang 
the Star Spangled Banner'' (Fernandez, 1994, pp. 28). With this interaction ofhistorical 
and personal data, the author presents the life ofAlbizu in an attempt to make this 
particular historical figure -and later he does the same with all the prisoners-a human 
being that committed justifiable acts. 
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With a clear romanticist approach, this author exposes Albizu and the 
Nationalists' ideas: "Do you have a political platform?-Albizu responded-Yes, sir. Our 
program, its general thesis, is to restore to the Puerto Rican people the moral intensity 
which they expressed in 1868 ...then they preached the revolutionary creed. We seek to 
translate that moral indignation into all the forms ofresistance that will enable us to 
dispose ofAmerican colonialism" (Fernandez, 1994, pp. 37). Fernandez continues to 
introduce the three groups ofpolitical prisoners that followed Albizu, the four 
Nationalists who attacked the Congress of the United States, the members of the FALN 
arrested between 1980 and 1983, and the Macheteros arrested for robbery in 1985. The 
same issues were presented for each group, who are they personally, their motives, and 
their conditions of incarceration. These topics are also common in the literature 
assembled by the groups fighting for the freedom ofPuerto Rican political prisoners. 
Lisa Napoli (1996) presents a study of the prisoners ofwar status that these 
prisoners are requesting. She studies this status according to International Law, and 
writes: "This Note will examine the right ofmembers of clandestine armed organizations 
such as el Ejercito Popular Boricua ("Los Macheteros '') and las Fuerzas Armadas de 
Liberaci6n Nacional ("FALN''), to prisoner ofWar ("POW") status when captured" 
(Napoli, 1996, pp. 132). She divides the article into two parts. The first part presents the 
independence movements in Puerto Rico, and their rationale for action. The second part 
is a detailed examination of the Geneva Convention and other International Law sources 
and its application to the request for POW status for the Puerto Ricans. In this section I 
will review the first part of the article, since the issues of International Law are beyond 
the breadth of this research. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
16 
Section A of the first part, titled "Puerto Rico is under colonial domination" 
(Napoli, 1996, pp. 133) presents a briefhistorical account of the colonial situation of 
Puerto Rico since the US invasion ofPuerto Rico in 1898. Napoli presents some 
conclusions: 
a) there has been no free and genuine expression of the will of the Puerto Rican 
people; 
b) the ELA5 does not meet the criteria for Free Association under International 
Law; 
c) Puerto Rico's domination by a colonial power invokes the right to self­
determination; 
d) the right to self-determination includes the right to use arms; 
e) there has been political resistance to the colonial power of Spain and the US 
since the first years of the domination; 
f) therefore, groups such as F ALN and Los Macheteros are engaged in 
legitimate resistance to colonial domination under International Law and are 
entitled to prisoner ofwar status (Napoli, 1996). 
In a very organized and eloquent manner, Napoli is able to make a good case for 
the prisoner's request to being treated as prisoners ofwar. The importance ofthis 
argument is that the Puerto Ricans will not be under the jurisdiction of the US and will 
have to be prosecuted by International Courts. Another important consequence of this 
argument is that there will be international recognition of the colonial domination of 
Puerto Rico and the right ofPuerto Rican independentistas to use arms against the 
colonial power. However, the question ofwhy the Puerto Ricans become the "seditious 
conspirators" of this century and how they became that remains unanswered. 
Richard Dello Buono (1991) in his article entitled "State Repression and Popular 
Resistance: The Criminalization ofPuerto Rican Independentistas" argues that the United 
States has criminalized the Puerto Rican independence movement in order to maintain the 
5 ELA or "Estado Libre Asociado" is the official name in Spanish for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
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colonial domination ofPuerto Rico. Starting by acknowledging his political standpoint as 
a ''North American activ[ist] in the anti-intervention movement" and sociologist, Dello 
Buono states that the colonial domination ofPuerto Rico has economic and military 
importance for the US. For this reason, the US has repressed independence movements 
since the beginning of its domination of the island, including the criminalzaition of the 
FALN and Macheteros during the 1980's. 
In this article Dello Buono offers a comprehensive and detailed account of the 
history of colonial domination and independence struggles in Puerto Rico. Over that 
history of colonialism and independence struggles he argues that the US has repressed 
independence movements to maintain its control over the island. "Repression in the form 
ofpoitical persecution, reactionary legal changes, and campaigns ofpolitical hysteria 
orchestrated by Federal agencies and propagated by the corporate press have in unison 
provided critical pillars of support for U.S. imperial designs in Puerto Rico" (Dello 
buono, 1991, p. 116). 
Criminalization is presented by the author as one of the tools used by the state to 
repress political movements, in this case the Puerto Rican independence movement: "The 
process of criminalization is an effective tool employed by the state to repress popular 
social movements. In general terms, criminalization can be defined as the process by 
which behaviors and individuals are respectively transformed into crimes and criminals" 
(Dello Buono, 1991, p. 116). He further argues that the United States in its effort to 
maintain control over Puerto Rico repressed independence groups by using processes of 
criminalization, manifested in this case with charging independence activists with 
seditious conspiracy and other criminal charges. He suggests that this process engage the 
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assistance ofseveral branches of the government, including the courts and law 
enforcement agencies. Dello Buono also identifies the participation or cooperation of the 
media in the process ofcriminalization: "Clearly, the state was engaged in a larger 
struggle for popular perception of the independence movement, taking political aim at 
independence politics in the media while orchestrating legal maneuvering in the courts" 
(Dello Buono, 1991, p. 119). 
Several organizations are working for the liberation ofPuerto Rican political 
prisoners. These organizations, led by Ofensiva '92 in Puerto Rico, have published 
several articles and booklets denouncing the incarceration of these Puerto Ricans and 
exposing their conditions of incarceration. In an article published on the Internet a US 
organization committed to the liberation of all political prisoners, Arm the Spirit, exposes 
the unjust character of their sentences. According to them, the Puerto Rican political 
prisoners are facing sentences between 55 and 90 years6, sentences reported as nineteen 
times longer than the average sentences during the year of their conviction. They 
compared the sentneces of the Puerto Ricans to other federal sentences for ordinary 
crimes and to sentences for political right-wing crimes. They found that from 1966 to 
1985 the average sentence for murder was 22. 7 years, for rape, 12.5 years and for 
violation of arms law, 12 years. In addition, they found that the longest time served by 
any federal prisoner is for kidnapping, and the time served is 5.3 years. In contrast, 
fourteen of the Puerto Rican political prisoners spent between 11 and 16 years in prison7 
6 It is important to mention that none of the Puerto Ricans Political Prisoners had a prior criminal record at 
the time of their arrest. 
7 By the time they received Clinton's condition pardon, most of these prisoners had spent approximately 18 
years in prison. 
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(Arm the Spirit, 1995). In terms of the political right-wing criminals, the Puerto Rican 
political prisoners' sentences have been compared with the sentence received for a Ku 
Klux Klan member who ''was captured in a boat with an arsenal of arms and explosives 
while attempting to invade a Caribbean island with the goal of establishing a white 
supremacist state." This man received a three year sentence. Another KKK member 
received a three-year sentence after been convicted for "attempted murder and racial 
harassment after shooting at two black men" (Arm the Spirit, 1995). 
Jan Sussler, the defense lawyer of some of the Puerto Rican independentistas, in a 
booklet titled "Conditions of Incarceration" (Sussler, 1992), exposes these conditions. 
According to her, not only are these prisoners facing longer sentences, but the political 
character of their offenses has condemned them to inhuman conditions of incarceration: 
"The U.S. government denies that it has political prisoners. The myth of democracy 
requires this denial. Yet the denial is contradicted by prison conditions which target the 
political prisoners for special punitive treatment" (Sussler, 1992, pp. 21). Despite having 
a federal prison in Puerto Rico, they are imprisoned far away from their families and 
from each other. The visiting privileges for them are extremely restricted. The Bureau of 
Prisons has consistently denied furloughs to visit their dying family members (Sussler, 
1992). 
They are subjected to physical assaults and sexual abuse. Alejandrina Torres has 
been attacked several times in different prisons. In one of these assaults she lost 
the use of an arm for two years, "when a male lieutenant wrenched her arm 
behind her back. ..and then forecely held her head between his knees, watching as 
female guards tore offher clothes and exposed her naked body to him" (Sussler, 
1992, pp. 30-31). 
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The consequences ofbeing labeled as "political activists", "subversives", ''reds", 
"terrorists" extend to the denial ofmedical treatment and political harassment inside 
prison. They have faced denial ofmedical treatment because the health care providers 
considered them as "security cases" not ''medical cases."8 Although, the U.S. has not 
recognized them as political prisoners officially, the prison file oflda Luz Rodriguez was 
recently employed to train prison staff to manage "terrorists," and Alejandrina Torres was 
referred to psychological treatment to "help her in overcoming her intransigent position 
against the U.S. government, insinuating that her political resistance was a form of 
mental illness" (Sussler, 1992, pp. 32). 
This literature provides important information for the political denunciation of the 
incarceration of the Puerto Rican independentistas, and for the historical justification of 
their acts, as in the personal stories provided by Ronald Fernandez (1994). Their 
eligibility as prisoners ofwar according to the international is well discussed and proved 
by Lisa Napoli (1996). The injustices associated with the prosecution, sentencing, and 
incarceration of the Puerto Rican prisoners are exposed and revealed by the above 
literature, produced mainly by political and civic groups that are calling for amnesty. 
Richard Dello Buono presents the argument that inspires this research. Dello 
Buono argues that Puerto Rican independentistas have been criminalized. He argues that 
the United States has criminalized the independence movement in Puerto Rico in order to 
8 "Haydee Beltran Torres is sterile today after prison officials refused for five years to treat her pelvic 
inflammatory disease, ignoring her episodes ofdrastic weight loss and pelvic pain so severe she could not 
stand up. Oscar Lopez Rivera's rectal bleeding was aggravated by an intrusive examination and then 
ignored. Alejandrina Torres was made to wait over six months for repair of a frozen shoulder so painful she 
could not move her arm, and she was then operated on without her informed consent. Instead ofproviding 
meaningful dental care to Elizam Escobar, the 'professionals' have pulled several teeth, and more await the 
same fate" (Sussler, 1992, pp. 32-33). 
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maintain the colonial domination ofPuerto Rico. This compelling argument is presented 
and supported by Dello Buono with historical evidence that points to that conclusion. 
What is missing from this work is a deep analysis of the process by which Puerto Rican 
independence activists became criminalized in practice. In other words, how did this 
happen? This is a question that this research intends to answer. 
2.3 Theory Revisited: Searching for a Theoretical Understanding of the Criminalization 
ofPolitical Dissent 
We now explore different theoretical approaches to the problem of crime 
formation, law and the media in its relation to the criminalization ofpolitical dissent. 
Several theoretical approaches to crime formation, law and the media are explored and 
presented as the foundation to what is introduced as a theoretical approach to the 
criminalization ofpolitical dissent. 
2.3 .1 Political Crimes 
The focus of this topic is the treatment given to political crimes and political 
criminals in the criminological literature. This line ofresearch is presented in this section 
to expand our understanding of this particular crime, and the explanations ofhow 
political activities are criminalized. 
Although political crimes are perhaps the oldest crimes in history, little 
criminological research exists about the topic (Schafer, 1974). Some criminologists and 
sociologists have argued that because crime is defined by the state to protect the given 
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ideological and economic system, all crimes are political (Schafer, 1974). Not only the 
process of crime definition, but punishment is a political act: "It is the state, through 
public policy decisions, that defines what actions are considered criminal and determines 
which types of crimes will be targeted for prosecution at a given point in time and the 
forms that punishment will take. The punishment is also a political act. .." (Diaz-Cotto, 
1996, pp. 1 ). 
Although any crime can be understood as a political act because it challenges an 
imposed norm, I will discuss crimes committed because ofa political conviction to 
change the political system. Schafer (1974) treats this dilemma by differentiating between 
a "common or ordinary offense," which he calls the "relative political crime" versus the 
"absolute political crime where the target of the lawbreaking is the ruling power's value 
system as a whole." He defines political criminals as those who define their acts as 
necessary to attain their major objective--social change (Schafer, 1974). On the other 
hand, Roebuck and Weeber (1978) define political crimes in terms of their social 
reaction. They define political criminals as individuals who are committed to social 
change and who are the targets ofpolitical policing whose objective is "to neutralize or 
destroy intolerable opposition, and thereby to prevent any radical transformation of the 
structure ofpower" (Roebuck and Weeber, 1978, pp. 2). 
In an attempt to create a clear definition ofpolitical crime, William Minor 
develops a definition of it in relation to definitions ofpolitical prisoners and political 
justice. Following the definitions described above, Minor places the political crime 
definition in the motivational arena: 
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Political crime is defined as legally proscribed acts or omission of legally 
proscribed acts which are motivated by the desire to influence public policy or 
power relations through the commission of the crime, and which are characterized 
by concern for group and societal welfare over considerations ofpersonal gain. 
Both crimes by government and crimes against government may be forms of 
political crime. A political criminal is, simply, one who commits a political crime. 
Political justice is the discriminatory application of the machinery of criminal 
justice to the disadvantage of specific individuals or groups because they 
perceived as threatening to the power of the established regime. A political 
prisoner is one who is imprisoned as a result ofpolitical crime, political justice, or 
both (Minor, 1975, pp. 386). 
The definitions given by the literature are largely based on the motivations of the 
"criminals" to change the social system. Little is said about the process by which political 
activities become crimes. This criminological literature, although suggesting the 
unfairness of these crimes in opposition to others, does not explain the process of 
criminalization. Moreover, it is suggested that all crimes are political because they are 
defined by the state, but there is no critique of that definition. In other words, the 
definition ofcrime is uncontested. 
2.3.2 Crime Construction Theories: the Labeling Perspective 
Crime construction theories focus on the process by which certain types of 
behavior become criminalized. In general, these theories propose that crime is a human 
construct. In 1963 Howard Becker was proposing that deviance was not in the act, nor the 
person, but a result of the interaction between the actor and the social environment. 
Labeling theory proposes three main questions: 
"1. What forms ofbehavior are defined as deviance in society? 
2. Who, among the many who deviate, becomes defined as deviant? 
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3. What are the consequences of stigmatizing certain individuals or activities with 
a deviant label?" {Traub and Little, 1994, pp. 289). 
Richard Quinney, in his book, "The Social Reality ofCrime", presents several 
propositions to explain labeling theory. The first question cited above coincides with 
Quinney's first proposition: "Crime is a definition ofhuman conduct that is created by 
authorized agents in a politically organized society ... Thus, crime is created'' (Quinney, 
1994, pp. 363). In other words, the existence ofcrime depends on the definition that 
powerful sectors create to protect their special interest. 
Steven Spitzer, on the other hand, proposes that the analysis of the definition of 
crime must be accomplished by the analysis ofhistorical, economic and political context 
in which the particular crime definition is located. "In other words, the form and content 
ofdeviance definition must be assessed in terms of its relationship to both structural and 
ideological change" (Spitzer, 1994, pp. 398). 
Quinney's second, third and fourth propositions are closely related. In the second 
proposition, Quinney states that crime is determined by the conflict of some behavior 
with the interests of the social groups in power. The third proposition declares that 
powerful sectors or dominant groups are responsible for the application, enforcement and 
administration ofcriminal law. He proposes that enforcement will depend on how the 
dominant interests are "threatened by the opposition's behavior" (Quinney, 1994, pp. 
365). The fourth states that "persons in the segments of society whose behavior patterns 
are not represented in formulating and applying criminal definitions are more likely to act 
in ways that will be defined as criminal than those in the segment that formulate and 
apply criminal definitions" (Quinney, 1994, pp. 366). In this sense, segments of the 
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population without power, who are not represented in the law making or crime definition 
process, are more vulnerable to a crime label because their behavior can be inadequate in 
terms of the dominant values. 
These propositions are essential tools in order to answer the second question (who 
gets defined as deviant?). Spitzer asserts " ... that deviants are culled from groups who 
create specific problems for those who rule ... their problematic quality ultimately resides 
in their challenge to the basis and form ofclass rule" (Spitzer, 1994, pp. 398). 
Furthermore, Spitzer suggests that the severity ofpunishment will depend on the level of 
threat that the "problematic population" presents against the State. "The larger and more 
threatening the problem population, the greater the likelihood that this population will 
have to be controlled through deviance processing rather than other methods" (Spitzer, 
1994, pp. 403). 
To manage the "problematic populations" the state designs and defines laws and 
norms, which differ in terms of the population to which they are directed. Spitzer names 
those sectors of the population that are extremely problematic to the political system, 
sectors with potentiality to challenge the imposed order, as "social dynamite". "Social 
dynamite is normally processed through the legal system with its capacity for active 
intervention" (Spitzer, 1994, pp. 405). 
From this discussion we are left with two main propositions. First, crime is 
created/constructed by human action. Even considering Quinney's assertion that power 
relations dominate the process, the factors or elements that make this process possible are 
not clear. According to what criteria do powerful groups define crime? Who are the 
powerful groups? Are their interests homogenous? Do powerless groups have anything to 
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contribute in that process ofcrime making? These are questions that remain unanswered 
by this theory. 
Second, only that behavior that contradicts the system is defined as criminal and, 
moreover, only those people that oppose the system are defined as criminals. Underlying 
this proposition is an uncontested assumption about the nature of that system. What 
system are we dealing with? An economic system divided into classes as proposed by 
Marx? Is it an ideological system with nonnative consensus? What makes that system? 
The answer to these questions is an important analytical element needed to identify not 
only the "target populations," but also the rationale behind the crime definition. 
Schervish (1984) states that since the 1970s the concern ofdeviance research has 
changed from a question of "how individuals or groups become defined as deviant" to the 
more political question of ''how deviance is created, maintained, and changed through 
political processes" (Schervish, 1984, pp. 195). He maintains that this shift in focus on 
the power relations not only in the process of labeling, but also on the formation and 
maintenance of the very system of control. In other words, the theory will now include a 
more political discussion about the nature of the very system in which the processes of 
crime definition and application take place. 
2.3.3 Radical Criminology 
Radical criminology originated as part of the academic rupture of the 1960's and 
70's (Cardarelli and Hicks, 1993). A product of the civil rights movement of the decade, 
radical scholars began to question the "mainstream or traditional criminological 
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emphases on the nature and etiology ofcriminal behavior" (Inciardi, 1980, pp. 7). One of 
the foci of this tradition is the motivation ofcriminal behavior. In spite of the importance 
of this issue, the responsibility of crime is placed on the individual, and a broader 
explanation ofcrime is obscured. This academic movement departed from the traditional 
criminological consensus approach rooted in the Durkheimian tradition, which contended 
that crime exists in all societies, and it is defined as "an action which offends certain 
collective feelings which are especially strong and clear-cut" (Durkheim, 1982, pp. 99). 
Following this argument, traditional criminologists did not question the definition of 
crime. Rather, they assume that crimes were defined according to some consensual 
notions ofwrong and right. The result was a line ofresearch based on that same 
positivist-consensual approach, in which the focus was to explain why people would 
break those consensual agreements ofproper behavior. 
Radical or critical criminologists started to question those assumptions and posed 
new lines of inquiry. Beginning with a rupture with the consensual approach, this "new" 
criminology stated that society has contradictions between groups or classes. Thomas 
Bernard (1981) summarizes the basic principles ofradical criminology. I will reproduce 
some of those: 
1) No consensus exists in society on the basic values and interests of individuals, 
and on the contrary, society is characterized by conflict on these issues. 
2) Society in general is divided into classes whose members have similar values 
and interests, the principal classes ...the ruling class and ...the working class. 
3) Crimes are defined as socially harmful actions that violate basic human 
rights ...Because the law is a tool of the ruling class in its conflict with 
working class, the socially harmful actions of the ruling class are generally not 
defined as crimes by the official criminal justice. (Bernard, 1981, pp. 369-
370). 
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It is necessary to discuss the relevant points of these principles. Radical 
criminology begins with the assertion that there is no consensus in society. Class 
divisions produce contradictions between the ideas and basic values of the main groups in 
society. The powerful group, the ruling class, controls the state and consequently the 
power ofcrime definition. The result is that the state, to protect the interests of the ruling 
class, defines crimes according to the interests of that class. The actions of the working 
class are defined as criminal, and those of the ruling class are not. 
In this model, law is the means by which the state exercises its power and secures 
the protection ofcapitalist class interests. This view of the law has been criticized for its 
simplistic presentation of a monolithic ruling class (Greenberg, 1981 ). Greenberg points 
out some of these critiques: "[This view] seems to exaggerate the unity of the capitalist 
class and its ability to act cohesively. If capitalists are as unconstrained as the 
instrumental theory suggests, why do they sometimes fail to achieve their goals? Have 
the 'common people' really no influence on public policy?" (Greenberg, 1981, pp. 191). 
Spitzer (1980) argues that instrumentalist notions of the state produce 
oversimplified analysis of the problem ofcrime in society. This analysis obscures 
multiple possibilities ofarrangements of social and political factors that interplay in the 
creation and enforcement ofcrime. Instrumentalism, has been generally criticized within 
the discipline of sociology. In that process, alternative explanations have been developed. 
Gold, Lo, and Olin Wright (1975) disclose the problems with this approach to the state: 
(1) There is no systematic analysis ofhow strategies and actions ofruling-class 
groups are limited by impersonal structural causes. (2) It fails to take into 
account the significance ofclass struggle and conflicts of interests both within 
the state itself and between the state and the class that it ostensibly represents. 
(3) There are important realms of state-related activity which are clearly not 
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manipulated by specific capitalists or coalitions, such as culture, ideology and 
legitimacy (Gold et al., 1975, pp. 35). 
These problems point to the direction of the new developments in state theory. Briefly, 
the new theories consider the effects of class struggles in the formation and policing 
power of the state, they do not view classes as homogeneous, and the ideological 
purposes of state actions are considered, etc (Gold et al, 1975, pp. 46-50). In conclusion, 
we can say that new theories are bringing dialectics back into the analysis. 
2.3.4 New Approaches in Criminological Theory 
Alternative models have been proposed. Beginning with William Chambliss, 
there have been attempts to close the gap between radical criminology and other theories 
of the state. Chambliss (1993) proposed a dialectical approach to law creation in which 
the broader context around the creation of laws is considered and class struggles are 
included in the analysis. In his words: "Our theory stresses the importance of 
fundamental contradictions in political, economic, and social relations as the starting 
point for a sociological understanding of law creation. In our theory people struggle to 
resolve the contradictions by fighting against existing laws (laws supporting colonialism, 
wage discrimination, or racism, for example), while other people fight to maintain the 
status quo through the enforcement ofexisting laws and the creation ofnew ones. In the 
process, ideological justifications develop, shift, and change; these ideologies, in tum, 
become a force of their own, influencing the development of legal institutions which 
reflect the interplay between material conditions and ideology'' (Chambliss, 1993, pp. 
61). 
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Thus, Chambliss introduces the interaction ofclasses to the analysis ofcriminal 
law creation. In his view, the final form oflaw and its enforcement is the product of the 
struggle between classes. Although this certainly opens up the discussion, it still portrays 
a monolithic state and control by a dominant class. On the other hand, Chambliss offers 
the element of ideology as antecedent and subsequent factor. Other scholars have 
developed these two elements -the effects ofclass struggle and ideology more 
thoroughly. 
Steven Spitzer (1980) proposes a model oflaw creation in which law is seen as 
the result of the dialectic relationship between classes and internal contradictions of a 
class society. "A dialectical analysis ofcrime and its control focuses on the internal 
contradictions of class society which give rise to the 'crime problem,' societal reactions 
to crime, and the interaction between the two. The major advantage of the dialectical 
perspective over other approaches to crime and social change is that it encourages us to 
understand crime as growing out of the simultaneous operation of stabilizing and 
destabilizing elements at a specific historical juncture" (Spitzer, 1980, pp. 184). 
With this approach, crime creation and social reaction to it is not seen as the 
action of the ruling class through the state to protect its interests, but as the result of the 
interaction of several factors. This new set of factors included in the analysis expands the 
discussion ofcrime and places it in a particular historical and political context. Now the 
model provides not only for the examination of the factors leading to the creation of 
crime in a specific moment in time, but to consider how changing conditions result in the 
enforcement of specific laws for specific groups or specific activities. 
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Humphries and Greenberg (1981) develop the role of ideology in the analysis of 
crime. They propose that ''many ideas about crime and its control have been 
ideological. . .Ideology consists of ideas that originate in social experience-particularly 
the experience ofclass relations-without the originator ofthe ideas being aware of it. In 
short, it is not bourgeois interests but bourgeois society that is the source of bourgeois 
ideas" (Humphries and Greenberg, 1981, pp. 217). Thus, it is not that class society 
permits the control of a state apparatus by one class in opposition to the other, or that the 
ruling class imposes laws to control ideologically the working class. Rather, what is 
proposed is that capitalism frames social relations according to specific ideologies that 
come out of the material conditions in which life is organized. 
McGarrell and Castellano (1993) present a model ofcrime formation that includes 
the structural factors propose by Chambliss and ideological/cultural factors proposed by 
Humphries and Greenberg. This model consists of three levels: first level includes the 
structural foundations, second level deals with crime and criminal justice, and the third 
level that treats triggering events. The first level, which is the one of interest here, 
includes structural variables such as "economic, racial, gender, and religious 
composition" (McGarrell and Castellano, 1993, pp. 349). It also includes "cultural 
factors, and related ideological assumptions, [that] are viewed as having primary 
importance in how criminal behavior is perceived and reacted to by citizens and criminal 
justice functionaries" (McGarrell and Castellano, 1993, pp. 350). 
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2.3.5 Law and Criminalization 
2.3.5.1 Marxists Approaches to the Law 
Marxist theories9 suggest that the state and the law are strongly related to the 
economic interests of the capitalist class. Marx himself understood the law as part of the 
superstructure, which "is determined" by the material conditions: "The sum total of these 
relations ofproduction constitutes the economic structure of society--the real foundation, 
on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which corresponds definite forms 
of social consciousness" (Marx, 1978). 
Following this base-superstructure metaphor by which Marx explained the 
relationship between the material conditions of life (base), and the state and the law 
(superstructure), the state and the law have been portrayed as the tool of the dominant 
class to protect its interests. By this, many Marxists have argued that the dominant class 
uses the state and its institutions to produce and reproduce the necessary conditions for its 
dominance and exploitation. Richard Quinney asserts: "Viewed historically, the capitalist 
state is the natural product of a society divided by economic classes. Only with the 
emergence of a division of labor based on the exploitation ofone class by another, and 
with the breakup of communal society, was there a need for the state. The new ruling 
class created the state as a mean for coercing the rest of the population into economic and 
political submission" (Quinney, 1973). In this model, the law is the mean by which the 
state exercises its power and secures the protection of the capitalist class' interests. 
9 It is necessary to mention that there are diverse conceptualizations of the law within Marxist theories; see 
Caudill and Gold. 1995. Radical Philosophy ofLaw. New Jersey: Humanities Press. 
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Structuralist Marxism divides society into two separate but related spheres: the 
infrastructure and the superstructure. The infrastructure or economic base is constituted 
by the productive forces and production relationships. The superstructure is divided into 
two instances: the political and legal institutions and, on the other hand, the ideology that 
legitimates it (Althusser, 1977). According to Therbom, "Marx was above all interested 
in how wealth and poverty, domination and subjugation are being (re )produced and how 
this can be changed" (Therbom, 1982). One of the most important mechanisms of 
reproduction is repression. "The development or maintenance ofcertain modes of 
production can be repressed by the army, the police, prisons, or the 
executioner ... Individuals who refuse to accept any of the given positions can be taken 
care of, for instance in prison or in mental hospitals" (Therbom, 1982). In other words, 
the state, through the "repressive apparatus", protect its interests by creating laws and 
norms that help to develop them or repress all activities or individuals that threaten them. 
But, which are the interests of the state? There is no agreement in this respect 
between Marxist theorists. For example, Althusser asserts that the state is a repressive 
instrument through which the dominant classes insure its dominance over the proletariat 
and in this way guarantee the extraction of surplus value (Althusser, 1977). Contrary, 
Offe and Ronge argue that the state is not identified with one class, but with all members 
in a capitalist society, but "since the state depends on a process ofaccumulation, every 
occupant of the state power is basically interested .. .in guaranteeing and safeguarding a 
'healthy' accumulation process upon which it depends" (Offe and Ronge, 1982). The state 
is directly identified with the capitalist class to protect the interest of the capitalist society 
and to protect its own interests. Thus, the state is presented as an institution that in one 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
34 
way or another ends up protecting the interests of the dominant class over the dominated 
one. 
An alternative analrsis emphasizes the role of law as an ideological institution of 
the state in its support of the interests of the dominant class. "Law plays the fundamental 
role ofpreserving the status quo" (Belliotti, 1995). According to this view, the law 
accomplishes these ideological tasks by its appearance ofneutrality and fairness: "behind 
the rule of law's mask of formal neutrality lies a conglomeration ofprocesses, doctrines 
and structures that serves generally to advance certain class interests and to defeat or 
marginalize other class interests" (Belliotti, 1995). 
This ideological role is important to deal with the problem oflegitimization of the 
system; in order to maintain the status quo, the state and its institutions have to give the 
impression ofjustice. To the extent that the law can control oppressed groups it 
diminishes the possibilities of social conflict. This approach acknowledges the existence 
ofcontradictory regulations, since the law has to portray an image ofneutrality and 
fairness, conceding some rights or benefits to the powerless groups. 
2.3.5.2 Critical Legal Studies 
Critical Legal Studies is not a homogeneous theory, but rather a movement. 
Although there is not a shared theory, there are some main concerns that link its 
adherents. Fitzpatrick and Hunt cite the formative statement of the Critical Legal 
Conference in 1984 in Britain: 
The central focus of the critical legal approach is to explore the manner in which 
legal doctrine and legal education and the practices oflegal institutions work to 
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buttress a pervasive system ofoppressive, inegalitarian relations. Critical theory 
works to develop radical alternatives, and to explore and debate the role of law in 
the creation of social, economic and political relations that will advance human 
emancipation (Fitzpatrick and Hunt, 1987, pp. 2). 
In a clear commitment to denounce inequality in society, Critical Legal Scholars 
have exposed the law as an institution that reproduces existing social relations and helps 
in the maintenance of the status quo (Tushnet, 1986; Trubek, 1984; Freeman, 1982; 
Gabel and Feinman, 1982). Belliotti identifies three main topics within the critical legal 
studies tradition. The first one is the "radical indeterminacy of law" (Belliotti, 1995, pp. 
27), which Trubek (1984) sees as the basis for the critique oflegal order. "The critique of 
legal order challenges the idea that a legal order exists in society. The critique is based on 
four principles: indeterminacy, antiformalism, contradiction and marginality" (Trubek, 
1984, pp. 576). In summary, this argument attacks the neutrality of the law. By pointing 
to the absence ofconstant norms the law becomes what the legal officials Gudges, 
lawyers, policemen) make of it, in that sense the law is subject to political and ideological 
bias. 
The second common theme is ''the use of law in political legitimization" 
(Belliotti, 1995, pp. 27). Basically, what is argued here is that the law serves to legitimate 
the social order. The law presents the existing social order as neutral and fair, by giving 
the impression ofneutrality and fairness. In a study about the Antidiscrimination Law, 
Freeman concludes that the perspective used in the law "has effectively served to 
legitimize, legally and morally, major institutions and a social structure that maintain a 
disproportionate number ofblack and other minority people as underclass" (Freeman, 
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1982, pp. 107). This is a good example of Critical Legal Studies, with an emphasis on 
inequality and denouncing the law's role in the maintenance of that inequality. 
Finally, the third common theme in Critical Legal Studies according to Belliotti is 
"law as ideology'' (Belliotti, 1995, pp. 27). Here the argument is that the law reproduces a 
basic system of ideas that ultimately are the basis of the capitalist system. The law then, 
by its language and practice perpetuates those ideas on which the social order is built 
(Gabel and Feinman, 1982). Trubek explains this point: "Critical legal scholars see social 
order as maintained by a system ofbeliefs. The belief systems that structure action and 
maintain order in capitalist societies present as eternal and necessary what is only the 
transitory and arbitrary interest ofa dominant elite. This commonly accepted body of 
ideas justifies the unequal and unjust power of the dominant group" (Trubek, 1984, pp. 
606). Thus, the law acts in a manner that reifies that system ofbeliefs, making it 
hegemonic. 
2.3.5.3 Critical Race Theories 
Critical race scholars claim that the law has worked to support and maintain racial 
inequality (Haywood Bums, 1982). This academic movement is critical of the law 
support ofoppression of specific sectors of the population, and shares with Critical Legal 
Studies the commitment to critique the whole legal system. Calmore asserts that "Critical 
Race Theory challenges the dominant discourses on race and racism as they relate to law. 
The task is to identify values and norms that have been disguised and subordinated in the 
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law. As critical race scholars, we thus seek to demonstrate that our experiences as people 
ofcolor are legitimate, appropriate, an effective bases for analyzing the legal system and 
racial subordination" (Calmore, 1995, pp. 318). This statement is illustrative ofwhat 
critical race theory is all about, anmely deconstructing and critiquing the legal system, its 
language, and practices. Moreover, it is about giving voice to people of color as 
oppressed and silenced groups. 
The use of the phrase "people ofcolor" instead ofBlacks ( although this 
movement is mainly ofBlack scholars) is not accidental. Critical race theorists have 
consistently situated racism within a broader context ofoppression: ''many adherents of 
Critical Race Theory see an interlocking set ofoppressions that extend beyond the 
singular base ofrace and include the bases of gender, economic class, and sexual 
orientation" (Calmore, 1995, pp. 320). Furthermore, the use of the phrase "people of 
color" allows for the theoretical inclusion ofother non-white populations. 
As a movement built up upon a commitment to critique and denounce all forms of 
oppression related to the experience ofracism and the history of slavery, Critical Race 
Theory moves away from mere arguments of ideological domination, to contain elements 
ofdirect forms ofdomination. This awareness is so important to this academic movement 
that it has become a strong line of criticism against Critical Legal Studies. Crenshaw 
explains this point: 
However, this version ofdomination by consent does not present a realistic 
picture of racial domination. Coercion explains much more about racial 
domination than does ideologically induced consent. Black people do not create 
their oppressive worlds moment to moment but rather are coerced into living in 
worlds created and maintained by others; moreover, the ideological source of 
coercion is not liberal legal consciousness but racism. If racism is just as 
important as (ifnot more important than) liberal legal ideology in explaining the 
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persistence ofwhite supremacy, then the CLS scholars' singleminded effort to 
deconstruct liberal legal ideology will be futile" (Crenshaw, 1995, pp. 110). 
Perhaps because of the links ofethnic and racial discrimination, or maybe because 
of the experience of slavery and colonialism, this emphasis on coercion is important in 
my view of the law in the process of criminalization ofPuerto Rican freedom fighters. 
2.3.6 Media and Criminalization 
DeFleur (1966) says that the main concern in media research has been the effect 
ofmass media on the public, describing this line ofresearch as the study ofhow the 
media influence people's opinion ofdifferent topics ranging from political positions to 
cultural tastes. This was in 1966, and since that time media research has moved to other 
realms without overlooking the importance ofmedia effects. 
This area ofresearch is large and includes organizational study ofnew media and 
the subjectivity ofjournalists. Gitlin (1980) uses Gans' list of theories in an attempt to 
summarize current theories. The first group of theories is ''journalist-centered" theories. 
This group of theories deals with the news as the product ofprofessional decisions. The 
second group studies news media as an organization. Some of these studies focus on the 
internal analysis of the media as institution, and others focus the economic constraints on 
the news enterprise. A third group of theories is "event-centered," which argues that news 
reflects the social context. Finally, there are theories that study news as the product of 
outside forces (economics, audience, dominant groups and others) (Gitlin, 1980). 
In this section I am going to discuss some theories that influence my view of the 
media in general and with respect to the criminalization ofpolitical dissent. I present 
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these theories grouped by topics related to my theoretical position: media constructing 
reality, media as an economic corporation (media for profit), and media, ideology and 
legitimization. 
2.3.6.1 Media Constructing Reality 
Constructionists argue that all knowledge we have and, furthermore, the 
understandings we have of our surroundings are social constructions. Berger and 
Luckman (1966) argue that our conceptions ofreality are socially constructed, organized 
and presented in specific social contexts. "The reality of everyday life appears already 
objectified, that is, constituted by an order ofobjects before my appearance on the scene. 
The language used in everyday life continuously provides me with the necessary 
objectifications and posits order within which these make sense and within which 
everyday life has meaning for me" (Berger and Luckman, 1966, pp. 21). 
Hence, the way in which we interpret our life and the events that we experience is 
guided by a set of symbols and meaning that are pre-given. Reality is pre-organized. 
Moreover, it is maintained that this process is molded in specific social contexts "and 
insofar as all human 'knowledge' is developed, transmitted and maintained in social 
situations, the sociology ofknowledge must seek to understand the processes by which 
this is done in such a way that a taken-for-granted 'reality' congeals for the man on the 
street" (Berger and Luckman, 1966, pp. 3). 
When we analyze the criminalization ofpolitical dissent as defined earlier -- the 
"attempt to 'depoliticize' the conflict, portraying the actions ofparamilitary organizations 
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as ordinary crime rather than a part of a politically motivated struggle" (Mulcahy, 1995, 
pp. 3)-the construction ofnotions ofcrime and the interpretation we give to political 
actions is important. Several media researchers have argued that the media provide 
symbols, meaning and interpretations of events that people acquire and with which 
interpret and understand reality (Gitlin, 1980; Gitlin, 1977; Snow, 1983; Mulcany, 1995; 
Comstock, 1981; Fowler, 1991). "We rely on media for concepts, for information, for 
values and emotional frames; for images, for symbols in general, even for language" 
(Gitlin, 1977, pp. 789). Thus, the power of the media in the creation and diffusion of 
specific ways of thinking about the world is enormous. 
Alexander (1981) argues that "the mass media produces symbolic patterns that 
create the invisible tissues of society on the cultural level just as the legal system creates 
the community on a more concrete and 'real' one" (Alexander, 1981, pp. 18). Thus, the 
media contributes to the creation of cultural notions oforder and crime. Media then, 
shapes the form in which the public will respond to specific types ofbehavior and it 
could also influence the way in which certain acts are treated by other social control 
institutions. 
Gitlin argues that the media has the power ofconstructing symbols and meanings 
that people use in their interpretation oflife and politics. "From within their private 
crevices, people find themselves relying on the media, for concepts, for images of their 
heroes, for guiding information, for emotional charges, for a recognition ofpublic values, 
for symbols in general" (Gitlin, 1980, pp. 1 ). In other words, the media influences 
people's opinion and interpretations of events and their actors. Perception of issues as 
problematic or actors as fearful are linked to how the media portray them. Altheide 
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reports that "numerous studies suggest that public perceptions ofproblems and issues (the 
text they construct from experience) incorporate definitions, scenarios and language from 
news reports" (Altheide, 1997, pp. 649). This is very important when analyzing social 
construction ofpolitical activists as common criminals. 
Thus, media provides people with the ways of thinking about reality. In addition, 
the media present an uncontested reality. Not only do we think about events in the way 
media guides us, but the media construct the story under the rubric ofobjectivity and in 
that way presenting reality in a believable way: "by showing you what seem to be 'real 
events', and speaking of them in human voices, television presents a world that seems 
incontrovertible" (Gitlin, 1977, pp. 793). 
2.3.6.2 Media for Profit 
The media is understood as a capitalist institution, as a business that works for 
profit and is subjected to market conditions (Paletz and Entman, 1981). This basic 
statement contains the main points of this theoretical approach to media. Media is a 
commercial organization. The principal goal is profit. The news business depends on 
markets conditions. These elements are going to be explained in more detail. 
The media as a commercial institution is organized in a capitalist manner. The 
basic idea is to get a "product" that will be offer into the market. "The product ofmass 
media is our attention, and the market to which is sold is advertisers . .. " (emphasis in 
original) (Gitlin, 1977, pp. 790). The news are constructed or selected as to attract 
audience. The selection of the news, then, is a product oforganizational decisions that 
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have the goal ofprofit (Schlesinger, 1992). "The 'targets' are selected by the news 
organization on the calculus ofprofitability; the space is allocated to the scores for which 
audiences will presumably pay the most money -or which will attract the greatest number 
ofreaders" (Epstein, 1981, pp. 121). 
Thus, news are selected under the criteria of attracting the public. It is the 
organization that decides what information the public will receive, basing this decision on 
market demand. This view of the media confers a space for journalist discretion. 
According to Epstein (1981), the organization selects the target or the newsworthy topic, 
then the journalist has the task of interpreting, organizing, and presenting the information. 
In this process, his/her own biases or worldview will guide the journalist. Nevertheless, it 
is argued that this process is ultimately constrained by organizational criteria. 
Even in analyzing events, however, journalists must conform to the rules and 
values of the news organization that employs them. They can, ofcourse, assert an 
idiosyncratic opinion or version of reality in an isolated news report; but if they 
are to succeed, the analysis they provide must, over the long run, reflect the 
organization's view ofreality (Epstein, 1981, pp. 123). 
Besides profitability, there are some related criteria that guide the news 
organization in their decision-making process. Within these requirements are the pressure 
of time and the maintenance ofan audience. The market makes demands of fast flow of 
information. Competition requires the news corporations to offer the news report fast. 
This pressure of time affects the form and content of the news. The focus is on what is 
happening, the event, and not the causes or history behind the event (Epstein, 1981 ). This 
has a strong impact on the coverage and legitimization ofpolitical movements. 
To maintain an audience is essential for the economic survival of the news 
business. This affects news selection, content, and presentation as well. The organization 
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has to present attractive news in order to hold public attention with big audiences and sell 
space for advertisement. This affects news selection and presentation since it is assumed 
that the public wants conflictive, dramatic, short, simple news (Epstein, 1981). Moreover, 
it makes the news media institution subject to forces others than a commitment to inform 
the public with objectivity. In this model, the media is subject to pressures from dominant 
classes and economic interests. 
There are many important arguments developed within this approach to the 
media, and a full discussion is not possible. However, Herman and Chomsky have 
concisely summarized the main points of this model: 
(1 )the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth and profit orientation of the 
dominant mass media firms; (2) advertising as the primary income source of the 
mass media; (3) the reliance of the media on information provided by 
government, business and experts funded and approved by these primary sources 
and agents ofpower; (4) 'flak' as a means ofdisciplining the media; and (5) 
'anticommunism' as a national religion and control mechanism (Herman and 
Chomsky, cited in Schlesinger, 1992, pp. 307). 
2.3.6.3 Media, Ideology and Legitimization 
Within the social sciences objectivity has been criticized as a way ofknowing. It 
has been argued that no "objective" research is possible. The researcher cannot separate 
him/herself from their particular point ofview. The way in which he/she sees reality will 
affect the process ofresearch from the selection of the problem to the interpretation of it: 
"because we must see from some perspective, immaculate perception, objectivity, and 
pure science are impossible." (Jansen, 1990) 
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The effect of the ideological perspective of the researcher not only can be 
understood as an individual effect on the particular researcher, but as an ideological 
agenda of a particular group. Beneath the shield ofneutrality they hide their particular 
perspectives, making their way ofknowing universal and in this way restricting others: 
Feminists and others have pointed out that social researchers are predominantly 
white and upper middle class, and mostly male, and many of them have close ties 
to managers, business, and government agencies. Thus their concepts and findings 
often represent the perspectives of these elite groups, but their claim to being 
detached and value free enables them to present their views as universal truths 
and to discredit the views of explicitly political groups as biased and unobjective 
(Cancian, 1992). 
The critique to objectivity has been a topic ofmedia studies as well. Like the 
researcher, the journalist is supposed to be guided by strict objectivity in the process of 
reporting events. There are two important points about objectivity in the presentation of 
news made by media studies that need to be considered. 
First, some media researchers argue that the code of objectivity is a ritual that 
protects them from outside critiques and challenges, a protection that furthers the content 
of the news as reality and the journalists as the reporter ofreality. Citing Weaver, Rachlin 
(1988) asserts that ''those in media defend their legitimacy by claiming fairness, by which 
they mean lack ofbias" (Rachlin, 1988, pp. 10). The content ofwhat a neutral 
commentator reports would have to be true. 
The second point is related to the claim of truthfulness from the news business. It 
has been argued (similar to the critique of science) that objectivity is neither a feasible 
nor a desirable requirement. The journalist as the researcher is submerged in a social 
context that shapes his/her worldview, and 'journalists, rather than being detached, are, 
like readers immersed in the social sea ofour culture. The work ofjournalists is shaped 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
45 
and defined by the currents and tides of our culture" (Rachlin, 1988, pp. 11). 
Consequently, journalists as regular people will understand life according to specific 
ideas. These ideas are thought to be influenced by existing social arrangements (Rachlin, 
1988). 
Furthermore, the set of ideas that molds the reporter's way of seeing the world or 
understanding reality are thought to be the dominant ideas in a particular society. ''News 
is ideology to the extent that it provides an integrated picture ofreality. But an ideology 
is more than this; it is also the world view ofparticular social groups, and especially of 
social classes. The claim that news is ideology implies that it provides a world view both 
consistent in itself, and supportive of the interests ofpowerful social groupings" 
(Golding, 1981, pp. 79). The news are not only thought to be biased, but biased according 
the ideas ofdominant groups (for some) or dominant ideology (for others). 
"News, then, presents a politically legitimated reality" (Tuchman, 1981, pp. 90). 
Behind an armor of objectivity and neutrality the media present a reality that seems to be 
fair. Since the reality presented by the media is shaped by dominant values, the public 
receives a reality that appears to be legitimate. In this process power, domination, 
inequality, oppression, are presented as legitimate social relations. Gitlin describes the 
how the media reproduces existing social relations and what is being legitimated: 
By socialization, by the bonds ofexperience and relationships -in other words, by 
direct corporate and class interest-the owners and managers of the major media 
are committed to the maintenance of the going system in its main outlines: 
committed, that is to say, to private property relations which honor the 
prerogatives ofcapital; committed to a national security State; committed to 
reform of selected violations of the moral code through selective action by State 
agencies; and committed to approving individual success within corporate and 
bureaucratic structures ....The media elite want to honor the political-economic 
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system as a whole; their very power and prestige deeply presuppose that system 
(Gitlin, 1980, pp. 258). 
2.3.6.4 Media and Political Movements 
"There is no such thing as political murder, political bombing or political 
violence...There is only criminal murder, criminal bombing, and criminal 
violence"(Margaret Thatcher, cited in Mulcahy, 1995, pp. 2). 
Political movements are often portrayed in the media as communists, insane, 
merciless, terrorists. The media can influence the characterization of these groups by 
negating the group's motivations or legitimacy in the claims-making process, which in 
turn creates feelings of fear and anger amongst the public. Gerbner describes this process 
as follows: "Typically isolated from their historical and social context, denied legitimacy 
ofconditions or cause, and portrayed as unpredictable and irrational, if not insane, those 
labeled terrorists symbolize a menace that rational and humane means cannot control" 
(Gerbner, 1992, pp. 96). 
According to Altheide (1997) the media define events or situations as problematic 
or not. The power ofmedia to define and interpret reality (as discussed earlier) has a 
particular effect on the criminalization ofpolitical activists. The media has the power to 
construct notions of crime and criminal behavior. Media's treatment ofopposition groups 
can make the public evaluate such groups as legitimate social groups or terrorists. 
"Whether the media portray the practitioners ofviolence as terrorists or freedom fighters 
may make the difference to public feelings or affects" (Weimann and Winn, 1994, pp. 
175). 
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These characterizations have important effects on how the public is going to react 
to such groups and their activities. Altheide argues that the media has the power to define 
what and ''who to is to be feared", but also that these are elements that could make people 
to react with fear, and pressure agents of social control for strong reactions (Altheide, 
1997, pp. 665). 
Thus, media's characterization ofpolitical groups as criminals has not only the 
effect of generating meanings of legitimacy and feelings of admiration or fear toward the 
respective groups, but has impact on the social reaction to it. The way in which groups 
are defined and interpreted determines the way in which they are going to be treated. 
While freedom fighters are seen with respect and approval, terrorists are feared and 
condemned. This is turn justifies harsh treatment: 
Stigma is a mark ofdisgrace that evokes disgraceful behavior. Labeling some 
people barbarians makes it easier to treat them as barbarians would. Calling them 
aggressors justifies aggression against them, presumably to uphold the dictum that 
'aggression must not pay'. Classifying some people as criminals permits dealing 
with them in ways otherwise considered criminal. Proclaiming them enemies 
makes it legitimate to attack and kill them. Naming some people crazy or insane 
makes it possible to suspend rules ofrationality and decency towards them. 
Labeling a person or group as terrorists seems to justify terrorizing them 
(Gerbner, 1992, pp. 96-97). 
Hence, the media has the power to define the ways in which political movements 
are going to be interpreted and treated. Since most of the time people depend on the 
media to learn about a movement they have to rely on what the media covers and presents 
to make an evaluation (Gitlin, 1977). This portrayal is often negative and 
delegitimizating, especially when the movement goes against the basic values of a society 
(Gitlin, 1980). Several researchers have reached this conclusion. Mulcahy in a study 
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about media coverage of an IRA hunger strike concluded that "despite the often 
significant differences among the papers, politically violent groups can expect 
condemnation rather than legitimization from the media" (Mulcahy, 1995, pp. 16). 
In a study about media coverage of the Student for a Democratic Society (SDS) 
and the anti-war movement on the '60s, Gitlin concludes that media coverage ofpolitical 
movements is negative and prejudicial. About this he says: "Political news is treated as if 
it were crime news -what went wrong today, not what goes wrong every day. A 
demonstration is treated as a potential or actual disruption of legitimate order, not as a 
statement about the world" (Gitlin, 1980, pp. 271). 
A final example is the study by Paletz and Entman describing media coverage of 
the Winston-Salem riot on 1967. They expose the relationship between law enforcers and 
the media, suggesting a somewhat direct influence of law enforcement agencies and the 
form and content ofmedia coverage. Besides this issue, they argue that the media 
neglected to cover the motives of the rioters, the underlying conditions that led to the riot, 
and the protestors' version of the events, resulting in the media supporting the criminal 
justice system and the unjust social conditions that motivated the protests (Paletz and 
Entman, 1981 ). 
This has also been the case with the political organization being studied in this 
research, the FALN. Paletz, Ayanian and Fozzard (1982) studied television coverage of 
three political organizations that they call ''terrorists" organizations: the IRA, the Red 
Brigades and the FALN. The study is about coverage between July 1977 through June 
1979. 
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Although, as the authors say, the objectives of the FALN were very clear (to get 
the independence ofPuerto Rico) most of the TV coverage overlooked an explanation of 
it or the historical conditions of the island. Interestingly, the authors mention that ABC 
called a well-known Puerto Rican, Geraldo Rivera, to explain to viewers who the F ALN 
were and what did they want. His explanation is exemplary of the way in which this issue 
is treated by the media: "No more than a dozen fanatics based here in the United States 
and committed murder and mayhem they say will somehow make Puerto Rico 
independent whether Puerto Rico like it or not" ( cited in Paletz, Ayanian and Fozzard, 
1982, pp. 153). They conclude then, that terrorist groups will get coverage in the media, 
but this coverage will deny legitimization. 
In this way media creates meanings that influence action and reactions. The law 
and the media are therefore related in the production and reproduction of social meanings 
and social reactions. 
2.4 An Ideological-Historical Approach to Understanding the Criminalization of 
Politically Dissident Groups 
The survey of literature that precedes this section provides a basis for 
understanding the role of the law and the media in the process of criminalizing political 
dissidents. We now present a theoretical frame for understanding the process by which 
Puerto Rican political activists became treated and processed by the state as terrorists 
deserving extremely long sentences. In general it is proposed here that the law and the 
media both contributed to the generation ofnotions and images of deviant-criminal-
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terrorist-fearful-alien actors in opposition to the images that the actors themselves (the 
F ALN) were divulging -as freedom fighters. 
To say that the law serves an ideological role is to say that the law is in part an 
ideological or cultural agent. Merry (1992) maintains that "law is no longer only a mode 
of social control; it is also a constitutive system that creates conceptions oforder and 
enforces them" (Merry, 1992, pp. 360). In other words, the law is producing and 
reproducing sets ofvalues that will be adopted by and imposed upon society. But how 
does law produces these cultural conceptions? Is it an exclusive creation of the law? 
Antonio Gramsci (1971) introduced a conception ofcultural or ideological 
systems based on what he called cultural hegemony. Gitlin (1980) defines this concept as 
follows: ''Hegemony is a ruling class's (or alliance's) domination ofsubordinate classes 
and groups through the elaboration and penetration of ideology (ideas and assumptions) 
into their common sense and everyday practice; engineering ofmass consent to the 
established order" (Gitlin, 1980, pp. 253). Contrary to consensus theories, as Durkheim's 
normative consensus, cultural hegemony "depends on a combination of force and 
consent. But -Gramsci argues-in the liberal-capitalist state, consent is normally in the 
lead, operating behind 'the armour ofcoercion"' (Hall cited in Gitlin, 1980, pp. 253). It is 
not that everybody agrees in notions ofright and wrong, but that an ideological basis is 
imposed to society. 
The latter point deserves more explanation. Gramsci' s concept of cultural 
hegemony is often understood as a pure ideological domination that does not contains 
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any consideration of force and coercion. Hoare and Smith (1971) in their introduction to 
Gramsci' s "State and Civil Society'' explain this point: 
The fact that, more than any other great revolutionary Marxist thinker, he 
concerned himself with the sphere of"civil society'' and of 'hegemony'', in his 
prison writings, cannot be taken to indicate neglect of the moment ofpolitical 
society, of force, of domination. On the contrary, his entire record shows that this 
was not the case, and that his constant preoccupation was to avoid any 
undialectical separation of the 'ethical-political aspects ofpolitics or theory of 
hegemony and consent" from ''the aspect of force and economics" (Hoare and 
Smith, 1971, pp. 207). 
Hence, the conceptualization ofhegemony that I will use as a theoretical approach 
to the study ofcriminalization ofpolitical dissent is one that includes both elements 
ideological domination and coercive domination. In this scheme the "Law is the 
repressive and negative aspect" (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 247) of the state. It is coercive and 
ideological. The way in which this cultural hegemony is created is through the agency of 
organic intellectuals. These intellectuals are the ones with the responsibility ofcreating 
and organizing the new cultural system. The maintenance and dissemination of the new 
cultural system is a function ofa group of institutions. In Gramsci's words: "Ifevery 
State tends to create and maintain a certain type of civilization and ofcitizen ( and hence 
ofcollective life and of individual relations), and to eliminate certain customs and 
attitudes and to disseminate others, the Law will be its instrument for this purpose 
(together with the school system, and other institutions and activities)" (Gramsci, 1971, 
pp. 246). 
Thus, the law is a cultural agent. It participates in the maintenance and 
dissemination of society's cultural/ideological foundation. But the law is not the only 
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institution with this responsibility. Gitlin (1980) argues that "in capitalist societies, no 
institution is devoid ofhegemonic functions, and none does hegemonic work only. But it 
is the cultural industry as a whole, along with the educational system, that most 
coherently specializes in the production, relaying, and re gearing ofhegemonic ideology" 
(Gitlin, 1980, pp. 254). Two parts of that cultural industry are of special concern for the 
analysis of criminalization proposed here: the law as discussed before, and the media. 
Alexander (1981) argues that "the mass media produces symbolic patterns that 
create the invisible tissues of society on the cultural level just as the legal system creates 
the community on a more concrete and 'real' one" (Alexander, 1981, pp. 18). Thus, the 
media contributes to the creation ofcultural notions oforder and crime. It does this by 
modeling public opinion according to particular cultural values. As Tuchman puts it 
"news, then, presents a politically legitimated reality'' (Tuchman, 1981, pp. 90). Media 
then, shapes the form in which the public will respond to specific types ofbehavior and it 
could also influence the way in which certain acts are treated by other social control 
institutions. 
Gitlin argues that the media has the power of constructing symbols and meanings 
that people use in their interpretation of life and politics. "From within their private 
crevices, people find themselves relying on the media, for concepts, for images of their 
heroes, for guiding information, for emotional charges, for a recognition ofpublic values, 
for symbols in general" (Gitlin, 1980, pp. 1). In other words, the media influences 
people's opinion and interpretations of events and their actors. Perception of issues as 
problematic or actors as fearful are linked to how the media portray them. Altheide 
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reports that "numerous studies suggest that public perceptions ofproblems and issues (the 
text they construct from experience) incorporate definitions, scenarios and language from 
news reports" (Altheide, 1997, pp. 649). This is very important when analyzing social 
construction ofpolitical activists as common criminals and terrorists. 
The criminalization ofpolitical dissidents or the "attempt to 'depoliticize' the 
conflict, portraying the actions ofparamilitary organizations as ordinary crime rather than 
a part of a politically motivated struggle" (Mulcahy, 1995, pp. 3) is a process in which 
the media plays a significant role. Political movements are usually portrayed in the media 
as communists, insane, merciless, terrorists. The media can influence the characterization 
of these groups by negating the group's motivations or legitimacy in the claims-making 
process, which in turn creates feelings of fear and anger amongst the public. Gerbner 
describes this process as follows: "Typically isolated from their historical and social 
context, denied legitimacy of conditions or cause, and portrayed as unpredictable and 
irrational, ifnot insane, those labeled terrorists symbolize a menace that rational and 
humane means cannot control" (Gerbner, 1992, pp. 96). 
Going back to the discussion of the cultural foundation ofsociety for a moment, 
there is an element that has not being discussed: is the cultural foundation ofa society 
stagnant? A fast reading ofGramsci's work would suggest that the cultural composition 
ofany new society is built at the moment of the creation ofthat new order, without 
posterior changes. Nevertheless, considering Gramsci's historical approach to social 
analysis we will be held to the conclusion that a stagnant cultural foundation is 
contradictory with Gramsci's cultural theory. 
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Consistent with Chambliss and Spitzer's ideas (see previous section: "New 
Approaches in Criminological Theory'') about the importance of including dialectics to 
the analysis ofcrime formation, it is necessary to understand a society's cultural 
foundation as a result of the conflict of different classes in society. A comprehensive 
analysis of the cultural foundation of a particular society must consider not only the 
economic system in which is embedded, but it would have to be situated in a particular 
social, political, and historical moment. Class and social contradictions need to be 
included in the analysis. Moreover, such social analysis has to be placed in a particular 
historical moment. 
In sum, the theoretical approach to crime formation proposed here points to the 
understanding of the law and media as cultural agents. These institutions produce and 
reproduce social notions ofwhat are accepted and criminal activities. This process is not 
tied to any particular class, as instrumentalist analysis will suggest, but is a response to a 
cultural/ideological foundation. The cultural foundation of a society is not stagnant, but 
constantly changing as a result ofpolitical processes in particular historical moments. 
The argument here is that both institutions participate in the process of 
criminalizing political dissident groups. It is not intended in this work to prove causal 
relations thus, it does not try to prove which institution influences the other. This could 
be an impossible task, and probably inappropriate. The relationship I am proposing here 
is one that takes place in a process. As many social processes, the law and the media 
work both, independently and separately in this process. Both contribute to this process 
by reproducing existing ideas of acceptable and unacceptable political activists. They 
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influence and are influenced by each other and the social context. Following the approach 
suggested by Rachlin for the study ofmedia which we extend to the study of the law and 
their inter-relationship: 
To understand the relative position or influence of the media at any particular 
time we must examine the society and the media of that time. As in the previous 
divisions and separations, this is one artificial. Understanding requires that we 
recognize the parts of the social order in the interpenetrated context within which 
we find them. In this manner, all study of a social order, of society, must be 
ecological. Such study does not suggest ''the substitution ofmultiple, interactive 
isolatable causes (as in regression analysis) for cause"; instead it is being 
suggested that elements, as aspects of society, "have no identity or effectivity 
outside of their interrelationship. The causal determinant is itself determined by 
the character of the interrelationship, not the sum of the individual elements" 
(Rachlin, 1988, pp. 29). 
The elements of the theoretical approach to the criminalization ofPuerto Rican 
activists are summarized as follows: 
• The law and the media are both institutions that have to be analyzed in their 
social, historical, economic and political context, because both are products of 
that context. 
• The law and the media (re)produce and diffuse particular ideas, including notions 
of legitimate political activity and crime. 
• The law and the media, reproduce the dominant ideas of a particular society in a 
particular historical moment. 
• The law and the media, protected with an appearance of fairness, neutrality, and 
objectivity, present a reality that appears to be just. 
• The law and the media contribute in the process ofcriminalizing dissent. 
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• The law has a twofold role in that process: it represses political movements by 
persecuting and prosecuting leaders and organizations, treating them as criminals; 
and it disperses characterizations ofpolitical activists as terrorists and criminals. 
Thus it is in practice coercive and ideological. 
• The media gives a negative coverage to political movements, delegitimizing 
motives, and presenting an image of those involved in political movements as 
criminals and terrorists. In this way, the media contributes to the criminalization 
of those groups. 
• Both, the law and the media use images and constructions of fear to justify or 
propose specific methods of social control. 
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CHAPTER3:METHODOLOGY 
The principal question of this research is how political activists become defined 
and treated as criminals. This research studies the process ofcriminalization ofpolitical 
dissent. It focuses on the case of a group ofPuerto Rican fighters for the independence of 
Puerto Rico that became the targets of the seditious conspiracy charge, and were 
prosecuted and convicted for conspiring to overthrow the government of the United 
States. Treated as criminals and terrorists, these Puerto Ricans were sentenced to terms 
ranging from 55 to 90 years. 
The theoretical approach used for this research ( see Chapter 11) focuses on the 
character of the law and the media as cultural agents. These institutions act as producers 
and reproducers ofcultural meanings/definitions of crime and order. Hence, the research 
design will focus on how legal institutions and the media constructed political actors as 
criminals and terrorists. 
The study of this process will rely on the thorough analysis ofrelevant 
documents. Altheide ( 1996) describes the study ofdocuments as the study ofcultural 
production: "Documents are studied to understand culture -or the process and the array 
ofobjects, symbols, and meanings that make up social reality shared by members ofa 
society" (Altheide, 1996: 2). Thus, documents are studied to discover the (re)production 
ofmeanings. In this research, documents will be studied to understand the (re)production 
of ideas about crime. 
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Document analysis is "an integrated and conceptually informed method, 
procedure, and technique for locating, identifying, retrieving, and analyzing documents 
for their relevance, significance, and meaning" (Altheide, 1996, pp. 2). This method (also 
called content analysis) can use a quantitative or qualitative approach, the final decision 
between one or the other must rest on how well the chosen approach fits the research 
question and perspective of the researcher (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). 
Quantitative document/content analysis is based on pre-established categories or 
variables that will be collected and counted according to pre-made codes. The emphasis 
is on hypothesis testing methods, and measurable variables that are analyzed in terms of 
frequency and causal relations (Altheide, 1996). Qualitative document/content analysis, 
on the contrary, emphasizes rich description and concept development. Altheide (1996) 
proposes a method that he calls "ethnographic content analysis" that he describes as a 
method in which "categories and variables initially guide the study, but others are 
allowed and expected to emerge throughout the study, including an orientation toward 
constant discovery and constant comparison ofrelevant situations, settings, images, 
meanings and nuances" (emphasis provided) (Altheide, 1996:16). 
The importance of studying the context in which the document is produced is also 
stressed by ethnographic content analysis (Altheide, 1996). If the document is the product 
or reflection of the social context, then the understanding of that context is essential for 
the research process. The latter points to the fitness of this method to the theoretical 
approach selected for this research. As discussed before, the theoretical approach that will 
be used in the research approach stresses the necessity of understanding the production of 
cultural meanings in particular historical and political moments. Therefore, ethnographic 
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content analysis is the best method to study the criminalization process by the analysis of 
relevant documents. 
The documents selected for this research are primary documents reflecting the 
criminalizing process by legal institutions and the media: 
1) Legal documents 
a. State trial transcript: This was the trial where most ofFALN members 
were prosecuted. 
b. Federal decisions: Several decisions in appellate courts regarding F ALN 
members and F ALN supporters. These are studied to see the way in which 
courts treat and conceptualize the actors and their activities. Moreover, 
with these decisions we can evaluate the words ofyet another actor -
judges. 
c. Motions and other preliminary documents: Several motions, applications 
to the court and affidavits are studied to evaluate the prosecutors and law 
enforcement agents in their role in the criminalization process. An 
important aspect that this type of document brings to the analysis is the 
time frame. Since these documents are presented to the court prior to the 
trial, we can observe the early stages of the process ofcriminalization. 
2) Media: Due to the vast amount ofmedia sources available, a purposive 
decision was made in order to decide what documents were going to be used. 
Considering that the organization studied in this research-F.A.L.N.-was 
based in Chicago and their activities were mainly held in Chicago and New 
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York, then two newspapers are selected: The New York Times, and The 
Chicago Tribune. The articles were selected in the following manner. 
a. Major events were selected within specific actions, arrests, trial, and 
sentencing10• The two newspapers were studied for a week following each 
date. For example, the first action for which F ALN took responsibility 
occurred in October 27, 197 4 thus, both newspapers were studied starting on 
the 28th through November 2, 1974. Every single story appearing with that 
time frame regarding F ALN was selected for the study. 
The analysis of these documents will be guided with the following questions: 
1. Characterization of the acts -how are the acts committed by the accused 
depicted in the documents? 
2. Characterization of the actors-how are the actors portrayed? 
3. Is ethnicity mentioned? Is it important or not that these people are Puerto 
Ricans? 
4. Are motives mentioned? 
5. Does the law or the media use elements of fear to advance their positions? 
Based on these guiding questions I created a protocol to be used in the process of 
analyzing the documents. The goal was to create an instrument with which to approach 
these documents and extract the important information in an organized and systematic 
manner, without sacrificing the opportunity for new discoveries. 
The unit of analysis for the media section is each newspaper article. On the law 
section, since some documents are very long the unit of analysis will be sections to be 
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created and explained with each document. For example, with a trial transcript some 
sections might be opening statements, witnesses, closing statements, etc. 
3.1 Protocol 
1. Unit (i.e. news paper article, or a description of the unit in the case oflegal 
documents): _______________________ 
2. Date: (month/day/year) __/__/__ 
3. Page and section: ---~______ 
4. Ifnewspaper, length of article: _______ 
If legal document, length of section: (measured in pages) ____ 
5. Subject matter ofarticle or section: (Describe) _____________ 
6. Headline or title: 
7. Who is talking? (Circle one, describe ifneeded) 
a. Government Officials: (police, district attorney, judge, governor, etc.) 
b. Defense Lawyers 
C. FALN members 
d. Victims or victim's families 
e. Supporters (who?) 
f. Detractors (who?) 
g. Other 
8. Source of information: (Circle one, describe ifneeded) 
10 See the Chronology on this chapter and the table of all documents studied in Appendix I. 
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a. government sources: police, justice department, district attorney, other 
b. victim or victim's families 
c. F ALN Press Release 
d. Other: (specify)_______________________ 
9. Is there a specific activity (i.e. bombing) mentioned? Date and brief description of the 
activity? 
10. Characterization of activity: (Circle one, describe if needed) 
a. terrorist attack 
b. protest act 
C. bombing 
d. cnme 
e. other (specify) 
11. Characterization of actors: (Circle one, describe if needed) 
a. freedom fighters 






h. other (specify) 
12. Is the ethnic or national origin of the FALN activists mentioned? 
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a. Yes / No 
b. How many times? _________ 
13. ls the ethnic or national origin of the victims mentioned? 
a. Yes / No 
b. How many times? _________ 
14. Is the situation of Puerto Rico mentioned? (Circle one, describe if needed) 
a. political status 
b. history of independence movements 
c. emigration to the United States 
d. poverty 
e. No mention 
f. other (specify) _______________________ 










17. Arc there any policy or handling suggestions? 
a. Jail time 
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b. Psychological treatment 
c. Death penalty 
d. Strict surveillance to other groups or individuals. Specify:--------~ 
e. Strict immigration laws 
f. Others: ---------------------------
18. Is there any mention ofFALN political motives or goals? 
a. No. 
b. Yes. 
19. Miscellaneous (Include important or interesting quotes). 
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After the document or media article was selected and read, a protocol form was 
filled. The first six questions were designed to keep record of the document-date, length, 
subject matter and headline or title. 
Question number seven (7) was designed in order to know the speaker. For this 
research is important to know the context, for that reason it is important to include in the 
analysis the person doing the expressions. Six categories of possible speakers were 
created. If a speaker did not fit in any of the categories it was rcp01ied as other. 
Question number eight (8) is related to number seven (7) in that both are designed 
to know the origin of the content analyzed. The distinction is that number seven is 
designed for those occasions in which there specific quotes form individuals and number 
eight (8) is for those times when the article makes reference to a general source, like the 
police or a F ALN communique and no specific person is quoted. 
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Questions nine (9) and ten (10) are designed to study the activities. Question nine 
is created to keep record ofwhat activities the documents in making reference to. 
Question 1 O goes to answer ofone the guiding questions: characterizations of the activity. 
This question is designed in order to understand the way in which the law and the media 
define F ALN's activities. Each document is scrutinized to discover the categories used to 
describe the activities thus, there could be as many answers as categories used in each 
document. 
In the same way, question number eleven (11) goes to the way in which the law 
and the media label, treat or characterize the actors. As for question ten, here what is 
counted is the categories used in each document and not the times each category is used. 
Questions twelve (12) and thirteen (13) are created to explore if the media and the 
law use ethnicity or national origin as an element in their approach to the F ALN or the 
victims. 
Questions fourteen (14), fifteen (15) and eighteen (18) are designed to understand 
the way in which the law and the media deal with F ALN political motivations. These 
three questions attend three different ways in which the law and the media could have 
treated this topic. Question eighteen is the most direct, asking about direct references to 
FALN's political motivation. Question fourteen breaks down several aspects ofwhat 
F ALN identifies in their communications as their main political motivations -the 
political, historical, and economic situation ofPuerto Rico. With this question it is 
intended to learn if the law and the media covered this topic in a more indirect manner. 
Question fifteen, on the other hand, is designed in order to uncover associations with 
other political groups. 
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Finally, questions sixteen (16) and seventeen (17) go to the third aspect in this 
study-the use of fear. Question sixteen attends the issue in a direct manner, while 
question seventeen go to explore the theoretical proposition of influence on special 
treatment. The phrase "handling suggestions" is used here to include any type of state's 
actions toward the F ALN. Included in these could be surveillance, repression, 
prosecutions, arrests, institutionalization, etc. 
3.2 Chronology 
There are several dates important for understanding the topics covered in this 
research. What follows is a chronology ofkey dates, including historical moments and 
F ALN events 11 • This chronology is in part based on a chronology published in a booklet 
distributed at the Symposium on 100 Years ofUnited States Colonialism in Puerto Rico 
held at DePaul University on April 4, 1998. Several items are included and updated. 
1922 The Nationalist Party is organized, Pedro Albizu Campos is elected Vice 
president of the organization in 1924. 
1930-40 The economic situation is precarious, 80% of the population is in poverty. 
There are several strikes. In 1935 Puerto Rico lived a tragic moment in its 
political struggle. In what was called the Massacre at Rio Piedras four 
Nationalists were killed after an encounter with the police at the 
University ofPuerto Rico. At their funeral Albizu swears that ''this 
assassination shall not go unpunished in Puerto Rico" (Symposium, 1998, 
p. 5). After this event, Albizu is charged with seditious conpiracy. At the 
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first trial, with a jury that included seven Puerto Ricans Albizu was 
acquitted. "The United States manages, in a second trial, to preselect a 
jury of twelve North Americans, and gets its guilty verdict and maximum 
sentence often years, to be served in the United States" (Symposium, 
1998, p. 5). In 1937 another massacre occurs during a demonstration 
convoked by the Nationalist Party, the Ponce Massacre. On this occasion 
twenty protestors died and more than two hundred were injured after a 
confrontation with the police. 
1947 Albizu Campos returns to Puerto Rico after a completing his sentence. 
1948 The "Gag Law" is approved. By this law the state could arrest any 
individual suspected ofconspiring against public security. Historians 
concur in arguing that this law was adopted to be specifically used against 
the Communist and the Nationalist Party (Scarano, 1993). 
1950 On October 28th, 1950, the Nationalist Party starts a coordinated effort to 
attack the government and police in Puerto Rico, ending in the 
proclamation of the Republic ofPuerto Rico in Jayuya. Several days after 
the incidents in Puerto Rico, the insurgency efforts moved to the United 
States when on Novemeber 1, 1950, nationalists Oscar Collazo and 
Griselio Torresola attack the temporary presidential house -Blair House­
killing a guard and wounding two more. Torresola dies in the attack and 
Collazo is sentenced to death. These events provoked the arrest and 
11 For a more complete account of the history ofPuerto Rico see Chapter I. 
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imprisonment ofmore than a thousand Puerto Ricans suspected ofbeing 
nationalists or communists under the Gag Law (Sacarano, 1993). 
1954 A group ofNationalists directed by Lolita Lebron attack the Congress of 
the United States wounding five persons. The four nationalists were 
charged with seditious conspiracy. 
1974 On October 26, 1974, a group identified as Fuerzas Armadas de 
Liberacion Nacional (F ALN) took credit of a series ofbombings in New 
York City. 
1975 On January, 24, 1975 FALN takes credit for an action at a public place in 
New York City, called Fraunces Tavern. As a result of this action five 
people died and many were injured. Several months later, on October 27, 
1975, FALN takes responsibility for another action on several locations in 
New York, Chicago and Washington. 
1977 On August 3, 1977, FALN assumes credit for an action at the Mobil Oil 
Company employment office in New York City. 
1978 Two young independence activists were killed by the police in Cerro 
Maravilla. As a result of investigations in the late 1980's it was learned 
that these killings were planned by police agencies and high officers of the 
Government ofCarlos Romero Barcelo of the New Progressive Party 
(political party endorsing statehood for Puerto Rico). 
1980-81 Members ofF ALN are arrested in Chicago. They were prosecuted in state 
courts charged with possession ofarms and other related charges. They 
declared themselves prisoners ofwar and refused to present a defense. 
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They were found guilty and were sentenced. Shortly after the state trial, 
they were prosecuted in federal courts charged with seditious conspiracy. 
On February of 1981 the FALN members who declaring themselves 
prisoners ofwar did not present any defense, were sentenced to prison 
terms ranging from 55 to 90 years. 
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CHAPTER 4: "WHAT'S IN A NAME"; CHARACTERIZATION OF ACTORS AND 
ACTNITIES 
This chapter examines the manner in which the actors, i.e. the Puerto Rican 
political prisoners, and their activities are named, characterized or labeled. "Who are 
they?" That is the question that is going to be explored through the words ofthe three 
main speakers, three voices, three versions; the prisoners themselves 12, the law (through 
their institutional instruments and actors), and the media. 
In order to understand who the political prisoners are, various issues need to be 
explored. First, how are they called or described? What words are used to name these 
people? The labeling or words used in the characterization ofgroups is essentialin the 
process ofgiving meaning, understanding, and processing people. 
12 As it was explained in the methodology chapter, the prisoner's version is not analyzed with he same 
methodological rigorousness as the other two. The prisoner's voice is presented as an introduction to the 
each chapter in order to provide a different perspective and to further present the clash of ideologies. 
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Another aspect that comprises the answer to the question ''who are they?", is what 
they did to bring them to their current situation. In this section, it is important to address 
the issue ofhow did the three sectors (the prisoners, the law and the media) construct the 
activities that are being criminalized or processed by the legal system as crimes? As we 
will see, the constructions of these activities from the different groups are antithetically 
different. For the prisoners, these activities were political moves to further their political 
goals, war tactics if you wish. For the others, the activities were abominable acts of 
terrorism. 
The third aspect to be explored in this chapter attempts to further answer the first 
question, ''who are they?" The ethnic background of the actors is explored here as a 
possible important element in the characterization and identification of the actors. At 
least it was very important, essential indeed, for the prisoners, who made it an issue in 
their motions to the court and for whom their loyalty to the motherland was a main 
motive. 
This chapter will be organized in the following manner. First, the prisoner's voice 
is presented as a way to introduce the topic. This will serve the purpose of offering the 
reader a background and a different perspective that could be useful in the process of 
identifying trends and modes of characterization by the other groups. The law and the 
media will be studied separately, and for each one there will be a section explaining the 
documents used and the applicable questions in the protocol_(the methodology chapter 
explains the way in which the documents were studied). Then, a discussion of the 
findings including analysis ofquotes that demonstrate the way in which each group 
approached the issue in discussion. 
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4.1 Who is F ALN? How do they see themselves? 
The sources for this section and for the F ALN's versions on other chapters are 
limited given the nature of the organization. Their clandestine work makes almost 
impossible to find firsthand materials of their position. In spite of that, there are a limited 
amount ofdocuments where the FALN's members and their representatives (i.e. lawyers) 
state their view of themselves and their activities. 
The FALN describe themselves mainly as a group ofPuerto Ricans committed to 
community work in favor of the Latino community in the United States. They present 
themselves as normal people, with normal jobs that are identified with their Puerto Rican 
ancestry in spite ofhaving lived most of their lives in the United States. Their defense 
lawyer, Jan Susler, in one of the many writings in support of their freedom, describes 
them as follows: 
The prisoners are mothers and fathers who have spent over a decade behind bars 
while their children have grown up without them. They are workers and 
professionals, secretaries and artists, teachers and students, community 
organizers, lawyers and activists. Most of them grew up in the United States, their 
families forced by the colonial economy to migrate in hopes ofa better life for 
their children, but finding instead poverty and discrimination. Yet they learned 
their culture and history and decided to act before the culture, economy, 
environment, and fabric ofPuerto Rican society was irreversibly devastated 
(Susler, 1995, p. 21). 
The previous quote represents the main elements ofFALN's presentation of their 
members and their motives. First, they are productive members of their community. They 
are committed to the advancement of the Puerto Rican community and they are very 
much identified with their culture. These elements are constantly presented by their 
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supporters as the way to identify them: "During the 1970's and the beginning of the '80s, 
the prisoners were involved in community, union, student and political struggles in 
Puerto Rico and one in the United States13• They fought for the people's right to high 
quality and free education. They worked to create community institutions such as 
alternative education programs, child-care centers, health centers, housing cooperatives, 
recreational facilities and political organizations ... In summary they challenged the U.S. 
political system in many ways" (Arm the Spirit, 1995). 
Their Puerto Rican identity is one of the main forces moving them and one of the 
main elements of identification. What means for a person with Puerto Rican background 
to live in the United States? How does he/she come to the identification with the Puerto 
Rican culture? The United States is a conglomerate ofnumerous ethnicities. In that sense, 
the Puerto Rican background becomes an identity, moreover it becomes a salient identity 
because it is that identity what defines Puerto Ricans. The Puerto Rican culture is 
maintained and highly precious within Puerto Ricans families in the US, Ronald 
Fernandez tell about Alicia Rodriguez's (former Puerto Rican Political Prisoner and 
F ALN member) family: 
In Chicago, Alicia only heard about the island. She also heard she was 'ugly' 
because her features were Latin and stupid because her English was imperfect. At 
home Alicia grew up in a family which matter-of-factly celebrated its ancestry. 
Her parents always spoke Spanish in the house; they ate Puerto Rican food; and 
despite a shortage ofmoney, they maintained an atmosphere of so much love that 
Alicia believes she uses the world created by her mother and father as a model for 
the larger extended family she calls Puerto Rico" (Fernandez, 1994). 
13 All except one, Elizam Escobar, of these prisoners were born in the United States. Most of them were 
raised in the Chicago area (Femandez,1994). 
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Their Puerto Rican background becomes the most important element of identity and 
description. In an application for release presented by their defense lawyer, Jan Susler, to 
the United State Pardon Attorney on November 9, 1993, the presentation of the 
organization focuses on their ethnicity as the force that moves them. 
The men and women on whose behalf this application is submitted are Puerto 
Ricans who witnessed and lived the conditions wrought by U.S. colonial control, 
who love their people, their culture, their nation, and who, like the founding 
mothers and fathers of the thirteen colonies and of so many other countries in the 
world, were moved by this love and burning desire for freedom to seek and end 
colonialism, to seek self-determination and independence (Susler, 1993, p. 2). 
In terms of their arrest and prosecution, the F ALN members declared themselves 
prisoners ofwar and requested being tried under the specifications of the international 
treaty regarding prisoners ofwar. Their argument was that they were engaged in a 
struggle for self-determination against the illegal colonial domination of the United States 
over Puerto Rico and for that reason they were to be considered freedom fighters and 
prisoners ofwar. Susler best elaborates the argument in the letter applying for their 
release previously mentioned: 
When the first fourteen of the Puerto Rican political prisoners listed below 
proceeded to trial, they claimed to be members of the anti-colonial clandestine 
movement which sought to exercise the legitimate right ofPuerto Rican people to 
self-determination, and invoked international law which applies to the United 
States and which provides that a colonial government may not criminalize anti­
colonial conduct and that captured anti-colonial combatants are entitled to 
prisoners ofwar status. They therefore did not recognize the jurisdiction of the 
courts of Illinois or the United States to prosecute them and elected not to defend 
themselves at trial ... (Susler, 1993, p. 4). 
Not only is their argument that they are prisoners ofwar and legitimate freedom 
fighters, combatants in an anti-colonial war, but their actions are not terrorist actions but 
valid acts of self-determination. In an unpublished statement issued by the FALN entitled 
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"Statement from the Puerto Rican Political Prisoners"14, the F ALN members explain the 
difference between their actions and other considered terrorist actions, like the Oklahoma 
City attack. 
Although it is obvious that there is a world ofdistance between acts like the 
assaults on innocent civilians in Oklahoma City ...and our own struggle for 
independence, we want to intentionally express that distance between acts of 
hatred and acts of self-determination. Invoking the right under international law to 
use all means available does not mean we used them with no respect for human 
life .. .It has always been the practice and purpose of groups participating in the 
independence struggle to rake all possible measures to endure that innocent 
people are not harmed. Our actions, for the most part symbolic, have had the 
objective of focusing the attention of the U.S. government on the colonial 
conditions ofPuerto Rico, and not causing terror to the citizens of the U.S. or 
Puerto Rico (Torres, 1996, p. 2). 
This was their perspective about themselves. The law and the media treated and 
presented them in a very different way. 
4.2 The Law: the Legal System at Work 
As discussed in the methodology chapter, 36 units oflegal documents were 
analyzed. These units include motions from the state attorneys, affidavits in support from 
police officers and FBI agents, court orders, a state trial transcript, and various court 
decisions. All documents are strictly related to the process by which the subjects of this 
research were criminally processed and the obtaining of evidence for these legal 
processes. 
14 This is an unpublished statement that was used in support of a petition and the author, Carlos Alberto 
Torres, sent it to me. 
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The protocol contained one question that directly addresses the issue of the 
characterization of the actors, question number 11 reads: 
11. Characterization ofActors: 
a. freedom fighters 




f mentally disturbed 
g. terrorists 
h. criminals 
i. others (specify) 
It is important to mention that for every unit, there could be as many responses as there 
were in the document. This is because I was not trying to summarize or force categories 
but to capture what the document contained. In addition, it is necessary to clarify that 
these are broad categories, thus in some occasions these were the exact terms found in the 
documents, but in other occasions the term was implied. 
Out of 37 units analyzed, the responses (a)freedomfighters, (c) dissenters, (d) 
communists/reds, (g) criminals, and (e) extremists resulted empty categories. In other 
words, no document reflected those categories as names or labels for the subjects. On the 
other hand, the category (b) independence activists, was found in two occasions and also 
the category (f) mentally disturbed. With one occurrence the (i) category other, with the 
specific word ofrecalcitrant. Finally, the category (g) terrorists, was found 14 times in 
the documents analyzed. 
At a first glance, it appears that the law (represented by the legal documents 
studied) mostly names these subjects as terrorists and on second place, and in equal 
proportion, it names or treats them as independence activists or mentally disturbed. Since 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
77 
the category independence activists contradicts the category terrorists, and seems to 
legitimate in a way their activities, I will discuss these results first and later the main 
finding. 
4.2.1 F ALN as Independence Activists 
Words are powerful, especially when we are dealing with the way in which a 
group and their activities are going to be treated and seen by a judge or a jury. In the 
game of good and evil played by the prosecution in the adversarial system of law that we 
have, the prosecution has the role ofpresenting an image ofevil subjects so the legal 
audience (i.e. judge, jury) treats and prosecutes the subject accordingly. 
Thus, it makes perfect sense that the law, as represented here, portrays these . 
subjects as terrorists or maniacs. That is not necessarily the case with the phrase 
"independence activists." In these cases, the context, the audience and the speaker 
acquires relevance. 
The two units that reflected the category "independence activists" were court 
decisions. Unit number 033 is United States v. Julio Rosado, 728 F. 2d 89 (1984), and it 
is an appeal about the right ofdefendants to present evidence beyond what is thought to 
be relevant. Unit number 034, Matter ofArchuleta, 561 F. 2d 1059 (1977), is an appeal 
from an order :finding Pedro Archuleta in civil contempt for refusing to testify before a 
grand jury about the activities and members ofFALN. In both cases, these are legal 
proceedings promoted by the defense. In both cases, the speaker is a judge that 
summarizes the facts to present the issue in a written decision. 
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Furthermore, what is interesting is that in both cases the mention of their 
independence goals and work is accompanied and modified by the label of terrorism. In 
Unit #033 Circuit Judge Newman says in paragraph 16 of the decision: 
This litigation is the latest chapter in the Government's persistent efforts to obtain 
grand jury testimony from recalcitrant witnesses regarding the activities of the 
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional Puertorriquefia, a terrorist group that 
seeks independence for Puerto Rico. 
Thus, the judge acknowledges in a restricted way the motivation of the 
organization, but only after characterizing the group as a terrorist group. This is also the 
case of the mention in Unit #034, in which the judge begins his decision by stating: 
On January 24, 1975, bomb exploded in Fraunces Tavern, a restaurant in New 
York City. Four people were killed, and fifty-three were injured. A group known 
as Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional Puertorriquefia, or FALN, which 
seeks independence for Puerto Rico, claimed responsibility for this act of 
terrorism. 
Again, the reference to the group's motivation is obscured by the overriding 
references to their terrorist nature and terrorist activities. Furthermore, in both cases the 
phrase "seeks independence for Puerto Rico" is used as an addendum of the group's 
name. In other situations, as we will see when discussing the terrorist category, the name 
of the group in Spanish is followed by the translation of the organization's name, in a 
way explaining it to the English speaking audience. It could be argued that in this case 
the use of the phrase regarding their political agenda, is not intended to recognize their 
motives or political goals but to try to explain the Spanish name. 
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4.2.2 FALN as Terrorists 
Most of the documents analyzed revealed that the law actors were using the 
category "terrorist" as the word to name the Puerto Rican prisoners. As it was mentioned 
before, the word terrorist was used as an adjective that defines the subject group. The 
following sentence was found in several of the documents analyzed, being the most 
common manner in which these documents refer to FALN. 
. . . the criminal activities ofa violent terrorist group calling itself the Fuerzas 
Armadas de Liberacion Nacional Puertorriquefi.a, F ALN, (Armed Forces of 
Puerto Rican National Liberation) ... (Unit# 001, Application for an order 
authorizing the continued interception oforal communications) 
The phrase "a violent terrorist group calling itself..." acts as an adjective that defines the 
organization. 
This sentence is important because it was used by the state attorneys in the first 
documents of this case (as unit #001 quoted before), and previously by the FBI agents 
reporting to the state attorneys. This initial calling was used in almost all the later legal 
documents, in that sense shaping the labeling of the FALN. The construction of the 
sentence is very interesting. It begins with the description of the activities, defined as 
criminal, later it describes the group by calling it violent and terrorist and then it goes to 
naming it. In this way, when the reader gets to the name of the group he/she already has 
information that shapes the definition of the group. He/she already knows that the group 
commits criminal activities and that is violent and terrorist. 
The demonization of the subjects is further elaborated and exemplified in the 
remarks by state attorney, Michael Ficaro in his Opening Statement of the state trial 
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against Carlos Torres, Freddie Mendez, Adolfo Matos, and others. These are the first 
words that Mr. Ficaro said to the jury: 
Our Honor, Judge Mahon, Mr. Shabat, ladies and gentlemen. FALN, Fuerzas 
Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional Puertorriquefia, The Armed Forces for the 
National Liberation ofPuerto Rico. Whether you use the anachronism (sic), 
Spanish, English, it means the same thing. Terrorist and terrorism. It means 
people who will do anything, including the spilling ofblood, for the cause they 
want (Unit #006, State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres, et.al., Trial Transcript, June 
29, 1980). 
The initial words of an Opening Statement in a trial are the foundation ofa case. 
Generally, it is the first opportunity of the prosecutor and defense lawyers to address the 
jurors. And most of the times it is the first time that the jury will hear something about 
the case they have in hand. As in any social interaction, first impressions are utterly 
determining of the latter perceptions of the actors and matter. 
Thus, F ALN is introduced to the jury as an organization whose name is not more 
than an acronym meaning terrorism. And the concept -terrorism-is further defined as 
"people who will do anything, including the spilling ofblood for the cause they want." In 
this way, the organization, which was not on trial, appears in the scenario as the link that 
united the defendants for a hateful mission. Two interesting elements emerge from this. 
On the one hand, the presentation of the defendants as an organization, and on the other 
hand, their characterization as cold-blooded terrorists. 
The state attorney in the previous quote establishes the foundation of the case 
nicely. He introduces the defendants by defining their culpability in terms of their 
character. He defines them as terrorists. An interesting point that is present throughout 
the whole case and in most of the other legal documents studied, is that the defendants 
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are prosecuted as an organization. The introduction of the defendants is as FALN and it is 
acknowledged that they have a "cause", although that cause is never disclosed. Their 
motives and the reluctance of the state and the media to present those motives, is a topic 
that will be discussed in a later chapter. Notwithstanding, it is related to the issue of the 
presentation as an organization. 
This criminal case, as most criminal cases, except for exceptional ones such as the 
RICO cases, was against several individuals. The organization, F ALN, was not charged, 
furthermore, it was not supposed to be on trial. The political character of this prosecution 
is exposed by the fact that it was almost impossible for the prosecution to make its case 
against these defendants without linking them to this obviously political organization. 
The differentiation of the two, the organization-defendants dyad and their motives was so 
problematic for the prosecution, that their intent to separate the two failed in several 
occasions. For example, in his closing statement, Mr. Shabat, Assistant State Attorney 
stated: 
They are guilty because of the acts which they committed, not because of the 
beliefs that they share in common, but these people are members of an 
organization called the F.A.L.N. The evidence has proved that they are members 
of the FALN. And it has proved the common ideology and belief which they 
share as members of that group, that group which has conspired in this case to 
commit armed robbery and brought with them an arsenal of death to Evaston, 
Illinois, on April 4th, 1980. And if this kind ofconduct is the character of the 
FALN membership, then justice cries out "Down with the F.A.L.N." (emphasis 
added) (Unit# 030, State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres, et.al., Trial Transcript, June 
29, 1980). 
In other words, they are not being tried because ofwhat they believe, but what they 
believe makes them organized and their membership makes them criminals. It is a long 
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stretch, but since the defendants did not present any defense whatsoever, much 
objectionable evidence and statements were admitted. 
Statements about ''their cold-blooded", "cruel", "dispassionate" nature 
accompanied the labeling of these Puerto Ricans as terrorists. Perhaps the passage that 
best shows the intention ofcreating this image is the following: 
Among the items discovered in Milwaukee, Wisconsin was a page from a book. 
The book is called the Anarchist Cook Book. It is a book which contains recipes 
for making a bomb, incinerary devices for altering weapons. It is a book designed 
to tell people how to kill. And from this book was found among other papers of 
the F ALN this last page. It is this last page, ladies and gentlemen, that best 
describes the people that are here on trial. 
The page reads: Allow the fear and loneliness and hatred to build inside 
you, rather than diminish in time. Allow your patience to torture material file the 
seeds ofconstructive revolution (sic). Allow your love of freedom to overcome 
the false values placed on human life, for the only method to communicate with 
the enemy is to speak on his own level, using his own terms. Freedom is based on 
respect, and respect must be earned by the spilling ofblood (Unit #006, State of 
Illinois vs. Carlos Torres, et.al., Trial Transcript, June 29, 1980). 
These lines are strong and troubling, but a book written by a third party cannot be 
used to demonstrate the beliefs or state ofmind of anyone but the author. Furthermore, 
this case was about a conspiracy to commit an armed robbery. Thus, it was irrelevant the 
nature of the accused, in other words it was irrelevant for the purpose ofproving beyond 
reasonable doubt that they conspired to commit a robbery that the defendants were 
immersed in "hatred." The latter goes to the point of the necessity ofcriminalizing 
political actors that were not thought of as common criminals. After all, this was not a 
difficult criminal case, the police found the accused in a bus and many weapons were 
found. Moreover, the defendants were not presenting any defense. Why the urge to create 
this awful image? Why did the prosecution feel the necessity to convince the jury/ the 
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public of their criminal mind setting? What was really on trial here? These are questions 
of interest throughout this research. 
A perfect image of cold-blooded-criminals/terrorists is not complete without the 
counterpart, as in all antagonistic relationship there has to be the good and the evil. The 
evil has been presented by the prosecution and law enforcement agents as a group called 
FALN that came together to conspire. The puzzle is completed with the creation of the 
victim. And who is the victim here? According to the prosecution, the victims are the 
good people of this country: 
Now, the afternoon ofApril 4th was Good Friday. It was also part of the Passover. 
And at that time Christians and Jews throughout the world were together in 
worship and to reflect upon the values oflife, morality, and the respect for and 
general laws. At this time, and I say by the very nature of its time and indeed 
occurrences, these eleven terrorists came together and demonstrated to you and to 
the people of this state, country and world their respect for life, morality and the 
laws of this country ...(Unit #006, State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres. et.al., Trial 
Transcript, June 29, 1980). 
Generating a dichotomous relationship between the defendants and all the good 
people in the world, the prosecution furthers the image ofcriminals and eliminates the 
possibilities for the jury to consider the defendants as political actors, which is their 
position. In the last passage, the prosecution describes what the "good people of this 
country'' is, in opposition to what the "evil" defendants are. 
The religious references are very interesting, since it suggests that the 
"terrorists"-as they are called here-do not share or even disregard Christian customs. 
This is very interesting since, Puerto Ricans in general are of strong religious beliefs and 
loyal followers ofreligious customs, specially those sponsored by the Catholic Church. 
Although we do not know the religious convictions of the defendants, it is not difficult to 
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infer that they at least will share a respect for the customs of their culture. Moreover, 
Puerto Rican nationalism has been traditionally very supportive ofCatholicism, and 
strengthens religiosity among its supporters. In spite ofwhatever religious conviction the 
defendants may have, it does not make any difference to the case in hand, other than to 
present the worst image possible to the audience. An image ofpeople who are the enemy 
of every good citizen, a person who deserves the worst punishment: 
Although you sit here today, you must know that the "enemy'' is not in this 
courtroom, but they are in the backroom, and they have declared war on the law­
abiding God-fearing citizens of this country and state. They have spilled blood, 
but they can gain no respect (Unit #006, State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres. et.al., 
Trial Transcript, June 29, 1980). 
Interesting last words, ''but they can gain no respect." Why would the prosecutor think 
that evil terrorists, cold-blooded killers, could gain respect? This suggests that the 
prosecution was aware of the political character of these prisoners, or at least that they 
were not dealing with common criminals. 
4.2.3 F ALN as the Other: Ethnicity 
An important element of the answer to the question, who are they?, that was 
posed at the beginning of this chapter, is the ethnic background of the actors. It has been 
proposed by theorists, that race and ethnic background modifies or shapes the way in 
which individuals conceptualize law and norms and on the other hand, the way in which 
the Other think of them, and in that sense shaping social reaction and social control. 
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Therefore, ethnic background is an important theoretical variable that needed to 
be included in the study. The protocol contains two questions that directly address this 
issue. The two questions are: 
12. Is the ethnic or national origin ofthe F ALN activists mentioned? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. How many times? 
13. Is the ethnic or national origin ofthe victims mentioned? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. How many times? 
In order to quantify the answers to these questions for this initial discussion each 
time there was a mention of their national or ethnic background it was counted, and for 
that reason there could be more Yes answers than number ofunits. Another point that 
needs to be clarified, is the way in which these answers were collected. Any mention to 
their nationality was counted as a yes, including indirect remarks as reference to their 
language (Spanish). 
Out of37 documents analyzed, 23 documents (62%) contained no mention 
whatsoever of the ethnic or national origin of the F ALN members. On the rest of the 
documents, there were 17 mentions of their ethnicity. For question number 13, there were 
no references to the national or ethnic background of the victims. 
At this point of the research, the identity of the victims is not clear. The legal 
documents analyzed do not make references to the victims, besides the abstract 
identification with United States citizenry, as it was implied by the statements of the state 
attorneys in the state trial. 
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Turning to the results for question number 12, the ethnicity ofFALN members, it 
is important to underline that most of the documents contained no mention of the ethnic 
or national identity ofF ALN members. The majority of the mentions were interestingly 
concentrated in the testimonies ofpolice officers during the state trial, whose testimonies 
were mainly for identification purposes. Phrases like "Latino woman" or "Spanish 
descent man" were used by these witnesses in order to make their identifications. For 
example, Sergeant Gerald Brandt from Evanston Police Department, in his testimony 
made six mentions of their ethnicity, identifying them as "female Latino" and "male 
Latino". 
If ethnicity was so important for the identification of subjects, why is it not 
important in other areas? Ethnicity was not mentioned in the description of the 
organization, their motives, or to explain their arguments for denying the jurisdiction of 
the United States. Ethnicity was not considered an important element by the court in the 
jury composition, and it was dismissed by the court when the defendants raised the issue. 
Ethnicity was neither considered to be an element of selective prosecution, and it was 
also dismissed by the court. 
4.3 Media: On Naming and Judging 
The media coverage selected for this study is divided into three main moments or 
periods -the events, the arrests, trial and sentencing.· The coverage of the events goes 
from the first public appearance ofFALN and includes three of the most covered events 
or bombings. The second period includes the arrests in 1980 and the third involves the 
trial and sentencing of the F ALN members who were charged with seditious 
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conspiracy15• The different periods were selected for the purpose ofcomparing and 
contrasting the media coverage over time. Moreover, the analysis ofmedia coverage 
through time could permit the analysis of trends and patterns and determine if those 
changed through time. 
There are two main topics in the analysis of the coverage by the media. First, the 
media acts as a producer of images and meanings, in this sense it is essential to see how 
the media treats, names and defines the actors. From their first public appearance, how 
did the media name, describe or define F ALN? Did that definition stayed unchanged 
through time? If it changed, how? Besides the actors, how did the media describe their 
activities, as political events or terrorist acts? This naming process is going to be studied 
through different periods of time. 
The second aspect of this analysis is intrinsically related to the first, and this is the 
way in which F ALN members are identified, not just in terms of their actions or beliefs 
but in terms of their ethnic identity. ls ethnicity important for the definition ofFALN? If 
so, is it accompanied with a similar identification of the victim? Iftheir ethnic 
background mainly identifies F ALN members, are all other actors (police, victims, etc.) 
equally identified in terms of their ethnicity? 
15 See Chapter III for a detailed explanation ofthe media documents studied. 
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4.3.1 Characterization ofActivities and Actors 
4.3.1.1 The Activities 
Two questions were included in the protocol that specifically addressed the first 
topic --characterization of actors and activities. Question number 10 reads: 
10. Characterization ofActivity 
a. terrorist attack 




Each of the 59 media units was scrutinized in order to identify the ways in which the 
specific activity was named. Each article could name an activity in many different ways. 
For that reason, each way, not each time was recorded. Thus, ifin an article the reporter 
describes an event as a bombing and as a terrorist act, both alternatives were marked. 
This is important because there are more results than documents analyzed, and the 
intention was not to force one solely category into each document but to report the ways 
in which the media described the activity. In other words, what is reported is which 
categories are used and in what frequency. 
On the 59 media documents analyzed the category ''terrorist attack" was used in 
34 of the documents. The category "bombing" was used to name the specific activity on 
37 documents. The category "crime" was used on three of the documents and the 
category "protest or political act" was not used on any of the documents analyzed. In 
sum, the media named or defined F ALN activities as terrorist acts or as bombings, and 
never as a political act. 
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FALN members defined their actions in terms of their political motivations. They 
maintained that their actions were designed and planned with specific purposes in mind. 
These purposes or motivations were usually exposed in their communiques, in which 
they usually described their actions as political in nature. The media, on the contrary 
rarely presented their contentions, but utilized concepts and words with very strong and 
negative implications. The use ofwords like ''terrorist attack" and ''bombing" places the 
event in the illegal arena and definitely focuses on the effect rather than on the cause. 
FALN appeared into the public arena on October of 1974, after claiming 
responsibility for a series ofactions in Manhattan. The next day The Chicago Tribune 
had in its cover page as the main headline: "5 Bombings in NY." The news article begins 
as follows: 
Five bombs exploded minutes apart across midtown and lower Manhattan early 
Saturday, shattering windows and damaging buildings facades ofbanks and large 
corporations (The Chicago Tribune, 10/27/1974; p. 1). 
Notice how after using the term ''bomb" the focus shifts immediately to the damages. In 
contrast, the F ALN communique quoted on the same article, used the term "actions" and 
moves directly to declare the motivations: 
These actions have been taken in memory of the October 30, 1950, actions in 
Puerto Rico against Yanqui (sic) colonial domination (The Chicago Tribune, 
10/27/1974, p.14). 
Reporting on the same event, The New York Times has two headlines with 
completely different focuses. For one headline the focus is on the damages and the other 
on motives. The first headline, which is the main one with large size fonts, reads: 
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''Terrorists here set off 5 bombs at business sites." The message is directed toward the 
damaging impact rather than on the nature of the event. The second smaller headline, in 
contrast, presents the act as politically motivated, although the effect on the reader is 
already affected by the main headline. This second one reads: "Puerto Rican Group 
Attacks 'Imperialist Banks' in Bid to Obtain Release of 5." 
The reader gets the message that a bomb was planted and its explosion had 
damaging effects and that the "alien"/Puerto Rican group16 that planted the bomb did so 
to obtain the release ofothers. The use ofcertain words to name and describe the acts sets 
the stage to evaluate those actions in terms of the effects or in terms of the motivations. 
This effect is dramatically accentuated when the term used is terrorism. 
Mayor Beame denounced the bombings as "outrageous acts of terrorism. Our city 
cannot and will not tolerate such acts ofviolence by any group," he said (The New 
York Times, 10/27/1974). 
The use of these terms was constant throughout the coverage of all F ALN actions 
until their arrests on 1980. On August 4, 1977 The Chicago Tribune reports on its cover 
page: "Bombs rip Manhattan." This time the focus on the damages and the intent to shock 
the audience is clearer. The story opens as follows: 
Terrorist bombs exploded in two midtown Manhattan office buildings 
Wednesday, killing one man and injuring at least six others, while dozens of 
bomb threats forced more than 100,000 people to vacate their offices (The 
Chicago Tribune, 8/4/1977, p. 1). 
Notice how the report starts offby setting the stage, by naming the event "terrorist 
bombs", after that frightening initiation, the report moves to describe the effects and 
consequences of the actions. This structure-categorizing the event with a negative term 
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and then reporting damages is seen in the following quote. This quote comes from an 
article appearing on The Chicago Tribune on November 2, 1975. In this article the author 
is theorizing about the ''terrorist mind", which follows from the title of the article which 
is "Inside the terrorist mind." Reflecting on the emergence ofmany terrorist 
organizations and terrorist attacks, he starts his story like this: "Last Monday, terrorist 
bombs shattered the early morning calm at three downtown buildings." 
This structure ofnaming the event as terrorist and then moving to inform readers 
of the damages was a consistent practice, and it was used to summarize F ALN actions. At 
the later period of coverage, during the arrests and trials, after nearly two years of 
inactivity of the FALN, the usual presentation of the organization was as follows: 
FALN has claimed responsibility for more than 100 bombings or attempted 
bombings in the US and PR since 1974. Those attacks have resulted in five deaths 
and more than seventy injuries (The Chicago Tribune, 4/5/1980, p.l). 
The political motivations of their organization or their public statements were never 
presented at this point. The only information the reader is given is the name of the 
organization and that it had planted bombs and caused damages. The impact on the reader 
of this story construction is very negative. The media creates an image of an organization 
that plants bombs and kills people, as The New York Times reports by quoting a police 
officer: "They seem to want to kill people" (The New York Times, 01/25/1975, p.10). 
16 The focus on ethnicity will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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4.3.1.2 The Actors 
Question number 11 on the protocol deals with the issue ofhow the media 
describes, identifies and names the actors. 
11. Characterization ofActors 
a. freedom fighters 
b. independence activists or nationalists 
c. dissenters 
d. communists or reds 
e. extremists 
f maniacs or lunatics 
g. terrorists 
h. other 
As for the previous question, the way in which this question was quantified was 
not in terms of use frequency but in terms ofwhat categories were used to identify the 
actors. For that reason, the categories used in each document were recorded not in terms 
ofhow many times the actors were named but in what way were they named. For 
example, in one single article the F ALN members could have been called terrorists in 
four different times and independence activists one time. In that case, two categories are 
recorded for this article -terrorists and independence activists. 
The categories "freedom fighters", "dissenters" and "communists or reds" were 
each used in one document to name FALN members. F ALN members were referred to as 
"maniacs or lunatics" in two of the documents. Five of the documents used the category 
"extremists" to described F ALN members. Fifteen of the documents used the terms 
"independence activists or nationalists" to refer to F ALN members. And finally, 45 of the 
documents used the term ''terrorists" to label the members of the FALN. 
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The phrase "freedom fighters" is the way in which F ALN members describe 
themselves in several of their public statements. Likewise, many of their support 
organizations name them freedom fighters, fighters for the independence ofPuerto Rico. 
For that reason, it could be expected from the media to use this category when restating 
FALN's "side of the story." In fact, the only time that this phrase was used was not in the 
words of the reporter, but in a quote from the declarations ofRev.. Jose Torres, father of 
Carlos Alberto Torres, after his son was arrested. The Chicago Tribune reports how the 
prisoners see themselves by quoting Rev. Torres who was as well quoting prisoner Carlos 
Alberto Torres: "The Rev. Mr. Torres quoted his son as saying FALN members are 'not 
terrorists but freedom fighters"' (The Chicago Tribune, 4/6/1980, p. 11). It is noteworthy 
that the reporter separates him/herself from the quote by specifying the source of the 
words. 
Although the phrase "freedom fighters" was used, it is important to indicate that it 
was used just once in a period ofover six years of coverage. It could be argued that the 
second category, "independence activists or nationalists", also reflects their version or 
FALN's own definition because it reflects their political motivations and standpoint. In 
that sense the fact that this was the second most used category could be interpreted as an 
indicator of equal or balanced coverage. Nevertheless, the phrase "freedom fighters" has 
positive and noble connotations. Freedom fighters are admirable and altruistic people. 
"Independence activists or nationalists," although recognizes a political standpoint, is 
neutral and purely informative. This category does presents their work as political in 
nature, but without granting any positive evaluation. 
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The categories "dissenters", "communists or reds", and "extremists", also reflect 
political definitions, but absolutely different in nature. FALN's own definition is given by 
their political goals, and for that reason political categories are very important. It was 
discussed earlier that the use ofcategories such as "freedom fighters" and "independence 
activists" are political in nature, but with very different connotations. 
The term "dissenter" denotes a political standpoint in opposition to the current 
political system. In our tradition ofrepublicanism, dissent is legally admissible and 
publicly acceptable. Although communism is generally criticized in the United States, 
especially after the Cold War, and in that sense it could carry negative responses, it is 
also a term that reflects a political standpoint, and it could be limited to that meaning. The 
term "extremists", on the other hand, is a negative adjective that could only suggest 
reproachable character and fanaticism. 
The term "dissenter'' was used in an article about an initiative by Mayor Daley 
(Chicago's Mayor at the time). Mayor Daley had been promulgating the need to infiltrate 
opposing organizations in order to stop F ALN's bombings. The Federal Bureau of 
Investigations supported this initiative, and responded criticism as follows: 
"People have to decide what they want", one agent said. "Ifpeople don't want 
dissident groups infiltrated, then they have to realize it will be tougher to catch the 
bombers" (The Chicago Tribune, 10/28/1975, p. 11). 
Thus, they refer to F ALN as part of those "dissident groups" that needed to be 
infiltrated in order for them to "catch the bombers." The term "dissidents" was used in 
this context to denote the nature of a group being treated as criminals or at least outlaws 
in need ofbeing closely monitored and controlled. In this sense, although dissidence is 
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politically acceptable, in this statement dissidents are treated as the responsible parties for 
the bombings. This is the only occasion in which this term was used to refer to F ALN in 
all the 59 media documents analyzed. And, as it was shown, it did not help the actors to 
be presented as bombers. 
The term "communist" was found one time in the media documents included in 
this study. It appears in the words of Governor Carlos Romero Barcelo, the governor of 
Puerto Rico at the time. Governor Romero was the candidate of the Partido Nuevo 
Progresista, the political party that favors the statehood for Puerto Rico, and who was 
considered by many as the author of Cerro Maravilla killings17• Reacting to the bombings 
ofOctober 1974 in an article entitled "Blame Bombing on Reds", Gov. Romero was 
quoted as saying: 
Carlos Romero Barcelo said that the bombings "may have been the work of a 
Communist front organization trying to discredit the people ofPuerto Rico" ...said 
he does not believe any legitimate Puerto Rican nationalists were responsible for 
the bombings that extensively damaged windows and buildings in Manhattan (The 
Chicago Tribune, 10/28/1974, p. 5). 
Therefore, the use of the term "communist" was not used as a way of identifying 
political standpoints or even agendas. The term was used by a known rightwing 
conservative as a way ofplacing accusations and demonizing the group. He describes 
them as part ofa "communist front" that wants to discredit the good people ofPuerto 
Rico, and moreover he distinguishes them from any "legitimate nationalist" organization. 
Thus, they are not only blamed for being communists but they are also illegitimate and 
secluded from the independence movement in Puerto Rico. 
17 See the history section on Chapter I. 
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The term "extremist" is also used as to reflect excesses. In fact, the Merrian-
W ebster dictionary defines extremist as one who upholds extreme views, and defines 
extreme as exceeding the ordinary, usual, or expected. So an extremist is the one who 
upholds views that exceeds the ordinary, the usual, the expected, and we can say the 
normal. To use this term to refer to a dissident political organization is to call them 
abnormal or unacceptable. Thus, when this words is used as an adjective that modifies the 
noun -FALN-then, the purpose is to place their political standpoints outside the socially 
accepted ones. Phrases like: "The extremist group has claimed responsibility for a series 
of explosions..." (The Chicago Tribune, 1/25/1975, p. 3) and "an extremist Puerto Rican 
organization believed responsible for bombing three downtown buildings early Monday", 
do no more than to demonize the actors. This fact is corroborated in the following 
example coming from an Editorial of The New York Times. In this article the editor is 
making the point that groups like the F ALN are just frustrated people who turn to violent 
tactics because they are not able to convince Puerto Ricans of the benefits of 
independence. So they deviate from the norms and turn to the unaccepted. 
Indeed, it is doubtless frustration at their inability to persuade fellow Puerto 
Ricans in open debate at home that provokes extremist groups to resort to such 
tactics as bombings and carefully-stacked independence rallies18 in New York 
(The New York Times, 10/28/1974, p. 30). 
Far more damaging than the use of terms like "communists" or "extremists" is the 
use of the term "terrorist", which could only mean danger for everyone's safety and life. 
As it was reported above, the vast majority of the categories used to describe the FALN 
were ''terrorist". In fact, 69% of the categories observed were "terrorists". The second 
18 Here the editor is referring to an independence rally that took place in New York just after the first series 
ofbombings in Manhattan on 1974. This rally was very well attended and counted with the participation of 
notorious personalities as Angela Davis and Jane Fonda. 
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most found category was "independence activists or nationalists", being the 23% of the 
categories observed. 
The use of the term "independence activists or nationalists" was very common at 
the outset of this process. The very first event, the acts on October 197 4, were described 
as being claimed by a "nationalist group" (The Chicago Tribune, 10/27/1974, p. 1). At 
these first stages when F ALN was just appearing in the public scene, and when 
judgements were not yet made, the most common way ofreferring to the group was as 
follows: 
An hour after the blast, callers identifying themselves as members ofFuerzas 
Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional (F.A.L.N.), a Puerto Rican nationalist 
organization that has been linked to previous acts of terrorism here, claimed 
responsibility for the explosion (The New York Times, 1/25/1975, p.l). 
Statements like this characterized the way in which the organization and their acts 
were presented at the beginning ofthis process. The organization is described as a 
nationalist group, with a political standpoint, and their acts are described as political from 
the start. In spite of the naming of the act as a terrorist action, the characterization of the 
actors as "a nationalist group" definitely sets the image ofa political rather than a 
criminal organization. 
Even in cases when the reporter is informing the gathering of law enforcement 
agents to study the case ofFALN and their acts, referring to the organization as a 
"nationalist" group gives the reader the message that the group is organized with a 
common political agenda, even if that agenda is not accepted: 
Bomb experts from all over the country met with Chicago police to piece together 
evidence "and to exchange information on the little known Puerto Rican 
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nationalist group, which began its terror bombings in this country just one year 
ago" (The Chicago Tribune, 10/29/1975, p. 23). 
However, as time passed and the unknown Puerto Rican group surfaced more and 
more, the naming of it moved from a rather neutral and informing way to a more 
judgmental and accusing one. The once ''nationalist group" became the Puerto Rican 
terrorist organization. This shift started sporadically and then became the way in which 
F ALN was defined. The following quotes show how the term ''terrorists" became the first 
name ofFALN. 
The attack on Fraunces Tavern on 1975 was possibly the most covered and tragic 
ofFALN actions. This attack on the heart ofManhattan caused many injuries and four 
deaths. In this circumstance the term terrorism started to be unanimous. The New York 
Times issued a report trying to identify or offer a profile of the F ALN after the Fraunces 
Tavern incident. Under the headlines "Bombers Called Intent on Killing. Police say New 
Terrorism ofPuerto Rican Separatists Represent Perilous Shift", the news article 
establishes the nature of the organization as terrorist and dangerous. 
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional, or F.A.L.N., the latest terrorist group 
arising from Puerto Rican independence liberation movement, departs from the 
style of earlier Puerto Rican political organizations in a macabre way, according 
to police. As one official said yesterday: 'They seem to want to kill people' (The 
New York Times, 1/25/1975, p. 10). 
In this article, the clear purpose was to identify the organization and the reporter 
defines the organization first ofall as a terrorist group. This characteristic is what, 
according to the article, separates them from the regular and traditional independence 
organizations, but also that the F ALN deviates from those traditional organizations "in a 
macabre way''. Hence, the organization is presented as a violent unscrupulous group. The 
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terrifying image set by these sentences are reaffirmed with 'the words of the police officer 
quoted here saying that what differentiates the F ALN to other groups is their wish "to kill 
people". Needless to say that the political character of the organization is obscured and 
invalidated by the image ofviolence and danger. 
The intention of invalidating the legitimacy of the F ALN as a political group 
struggling for the independence ofPuerto Rico by establishing an image of terror, is 
taken forward by the editorial panel of The New York Times. In a short piece entitled 
"Terror in Manhattan", the editors engage in a political attack on the FALN by accusing 
them ofnot representing the will of the Puerto Ricans and on the contrary violating their 
will. 
Responsibility for Friday's brutal lunch-hour bombing on historic Fraunces 
Tavern, which left four dead and scores injured, is asserted by a group that claims 
to represent the desire of2.5 million Puerto Ricans for "immediate 
independence." They represent no such thing. In free elections, Puerto Ricans 
have voted overwhelmingly to retain the self-governing commonwealth status 
they now enjoy. If they should ever change their minds, the islanders know they 
do not have to stoop to terror and bloodshed to dissolve what is widely regarded 
as an arrangement ofmutual benefit. 
Those who planted the Wall Street bomb are not patriots. They are first 
and foremost enemies of their own people, both here and in Puerto Rico. They 
must be speedily brought to justice as the murderers they are (The New York 
Times, 1/26/1975, p. 16). 
The editors engage in an attack on FALN tactics and political motivations. They 
are called terrorists, but more than that, they are called terrorist without a legitimate 
cause. It has been discussed before that what gives meaning to the F ALN is precisely 
their political goals, and this is commonly what defines political groups. So this attack on 
the political motivations and political agenda harms their identity and their support. Also 
interesting is how the editors assume the Puerto Ricans voice is opposed to that of the 
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F ALN, which is taken to the extreme when it is stated that the F ALN is the enemy "of 
their own people." It is arguable to say that this article is actually directed toward the 
Puerto Rican community that had supported independence of the island. It attacks the 
FALN's support by accusing them ofbetraying their cause. 
This style ofnaming and defining the F ALN as terrorists became a pattern and 
almost the standard way ofreferring to the organization in most news stories. The term 
"terrorist" was followed by different ways of calling the group, but the prefix was 
constant. The New York Times called them "the terrorist band, calling itselfFuerzas 
Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional" (The New York Times, 10/28/1975, p.l). 
Yet, the most common way of identifying the organization was to state the name 
and then describe them as terrorists, as if to explain the nature of the organization. The 
following sentence became a typical way in which F ALN was referred to: "The Fuerzas 
Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional (F.A.L.N.) a Puerto Rican terrorist group, claimed 
responsibility for the explosion in the restaurant" (The New York Times, 1/28/1975, p.20). 
So the group's name is FALN and they are a "Puerto Rican terrorist group", the phrase 
that actually defined the nature of the group was the one accusing them as being 
terrorists. 
Sometimes the name was not even important, to name the organization the only 
thing that was needed was the ethnic referent and the adjective. As in the report in The 
Chicago Tribune, where it was stated that the New York police had found and defused a 
bomb and "said it was the work of the Puerto Rican terrorist group that claimed 
responsibility for the last week's Manhattan bombings" (The Chicago Tribune, 8/9/1977, 
p. 5). The focus on the ethnicity as a way of identifying the group will be the topic of a 
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discussion later in this chapter. At this point, though, it is important to report how the 
naming of the group could change in terms ofmentioning the name of the group or not, 
but what was constant was the ethnicity and the terrorist label. 
There are many examples to demonstrate this point; here two of those are 
presented. The New York Times refers to them as ''the Puerto Rican terrorists who took 
responsibility for yesterday's blasts" (The New York Times, 8/4/1977, p. B6). And it also 
calls them "the Puerto Rican terrorist group known as the FALN" (The New York Times, 
8/9/1977). In this context, the matter ofpolitical standpoints or agenda, nor the support or 
even the name that much, was as important as the ethnic background of the group and 
their terrorist nature. The image that the media wanted to present was complete with this 
information, the separation from the common citizen-aliens--, and the de-legitimization 
of their actions. 
To say that the media wanted to present a specific image could be a pretentious 
and, some could say, unsubstantiated statement, because there is no way ofproving 
media's intentions or even there is no way ofknowing that there even was a single 
intention. However, after careful examination ofmedia arguments, especially those 
presented in editorials, patterns of coverage could be identified. Up to this point there 
have been several strong indicators of at least an anti-F ALN sentiment. The astonishing 
preponderance of the use of the category "terrorist" is one of those indicators. Also the 
fact that this coverage did not include FALN's version but, on the contrary, excluded 
their own nomenclature or even interviews with F ALN supporters. Yet, the following 
exceipts of an editorial piece appearing on The Chicago Tribune on April 8, 1980 just 
after the arrests may show media's position. 
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The editors start by congratulating and applauding police actions that ended up 
with the arrests. Under the headline "Excellent arrests in Evanston" the editors engage in 
an ode to the police and a fierce and incisive attack on FALN. It is important to 
remember that by the time of these arrests, the FALN was not active on the public scene 
as several years have elapsed since their last action. 
Those were admirable arrests in Evanston Friday, when police took custody of 11 
persons suspected of involvement with the Puerto Rican terrorist group F ALN 
[Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional]. Included in the group was Carlos 
Torres, 27, long on the list of the FBI's "most wanted" list. The arrests were 
carried out without the firing of a single shot (The Chicago Tribune, 04/08/1980, 
p. 2 section 2). 
Thus the editors start by congratulating the police for the arrests of the "Puerto 
Rican terrorist group". Once more the naming of the group with the term ''terrorist" sets 
the stage for a deep criticism ofFALN's actions and definitely exhibits a sense of 
culpability, damaging enormously F ALN's presumption of innocence and even more 
media's supposed neutrality. The second sentence informs the reader that one of the 
arrested was one of the individuals appearing in the FBI's ''most wanted" list. Of course 
this statement, which creates an image of fear and accountability, would be completely 
different if it was explained that he was on that list precisely because ofhis alleged 
involvement with F ALN and not because of a criminal career. Then, the editors go on to 
say with a tone ofpositive surprise, that the police did not have to fire a single shot, 
implying an excellent control ofpolice agents over very dangerous subjects. 
And the attack continues on FALN's political standpoints: 
...and no revolutionaries with a romantically attractive cause. Carlos Torres and 
others in the group called themselves ''prisoners ofwar," refusing to recognize the 
authority of the ordinary authorities who cope with criminal misconduct. But 
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F ALN is an army only in the sense that the "Symbionese Liberation Army'' of 
Patty Hearst days was an army. It is a tiny group ofcharacters with abnormal 
psychologies. F ALN has almost nothing in common with liberation fighters with 
a constituency (id.). 
As an old scene ofgood vs. evil, the editors engage in a negative characterization of 
F ALN, attacking every hint ofnobility in their actions. Starting by attacking their view as 
"freedom fighters", the actors are presented here as outlaws that unjustly oppose the good 
cops who free society from the bad seed. The comparison with the Symbionese 
Liberation Army works to demonize even more the actors, taking advantage of the 
general negative view of this organization. They are not only called outlaws and 
criminals, but they are shown as "abnormal" whose insanity has moved them to pursue 
these equally "abnormal" goals. 
The arrests in Evanston in April 1980 were the turning point in the media 
characterization ofFALN. Before that, the description of the FALN, although mainly as 
terrorists, was not as one-sided and biased as it appeared afterwards. The use of the 
category "independence activists or nationalists" before the arrests was commonly used 
as a description and adjective. After the arrests, the name was unanimous. The F ALN 
acquired a first name-terrorists. The organization was being mentioned like this: "New 
York police officers arrived in Evanston, Illinois, today with warrants for the arrest of 
two persons accused ofbeing leaders ofa Puerto Rican terrorist group that is suspected in 
100 bombings" (The New York Times, 04/06/1980, p.l). The examples are many; the 
naming is the same: 
A federal prosecutor said Thursday that federal charges are expected to be 
brought against eight Puerto Rican terrorists who were convicted Wednesday 
night on local charges of conspiracy armed robbery and weapon offenses (The 
Chicago Tribune, 08/01/1980, p.l, section 2). 
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A federal district judge today imposed prison terms of 55 to 90 years on 10 
suspected members of the Puerto Rican terrorist group F.A.L.N. who were found 
guilty ofconspiracy, armed robbery and other crimes (The New York Times, 
02/19/1981, p. A 20). 
4.3.1.3 Them Puerto Ricans 
The description of the F ALN was mainly as terrorists and Puerto Ricans. How 
important was it for the media's coverage of the situation and of the FALN to focus on 
their ethnicity? Was ethnicity as a general category an important element in the 
understanding of the situation? If so, then was it equally important to know the ethnicity 
of the victim? 
There were two questions in the protocol that directly addressed the issue of 
ethnicity. Question number 12 reads: 
12. Is the ethnic or national origin ofthe F ALN activists mentioned? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
As the necessary following question, question number 13 asked about the victim's 
ethnicity. Here victim refers to those affected by FALN's actions, being individuals or 
corporations. 
13. Is the ethnic or national origin ofthe victim(s) mentioned? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
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Question number 12 explores the frequency of the mention of ethnicity on the 
media documents analyzed. Out of the 59 documents included, a mention or discussion of 
FALN members' ethnicity was included in 86.4% of the documents. In contrast, just 12 
(20%) mentioned the victim's ethnicity. 
The use of the ethnic referent was mainly for identification purposes. That is, the 
organization was identified as being Puerto Rican, and their being Puerto Rican was 
essential in the interpretation and understanding of the group. Since their first public 
appearance the F ALN was identified and distinguished as being Puerto Rican. The ethnic 
referent was so important that it made the headlines since the first time. The New York 
Times had the following headlines in the cover page on October 10, 1974: "Terrorist here 
set off 5 bombs at business sites. Puerto Rican Group Attacks 'Imperialist Banks' in Bid 
to Obtain Release of 5". The way in which this newspaper identified a group that has just 
attacked important business sites in Manhattan, was first as terrorists and then as Puerto 
Ricans. 
The news article continues to expose the information they had on the 
organization. This information came mostly from police reports and the police did not 
have much information on the origin of this organization, as is reflected by the words of 
the Assistant ChiefofDetectives when he expressed: "This is a new name ...but we feel 
is affiliated with Puerto Rican independence groups ...". At this point, the first 
appearances ofFALN in the public arena, one of the few sources of information is the 
group's communique where they claimed responsibility for the actions. Although this 
report did not include an extensive account ofwhat was stated in the communique, it did 
mention the way in which the FALN announced the existence of the communique: 
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A man and a woman with Puerto Rican accents telephoned and directed reporters 
to a telephone booth at Broadway and 73d Street, where the pair left a statement 
from F.A.L.N. (The New York Times, 10/27/1974, p. 1). 
The communique left by the F ALN expressed their ethnic identity and this was 
part ofwhat the reporter included in the article. Then, why was it relevant to mention the 
"Puerto Rican accents"? Perhaps, the accents' reference put in perspective the difference 
between them and us. If we understand that the use of the ethnicity was an element that 
distinguished them from us, then it is easier to understand the extensive presence of 
ethnic referents in the documents analyzed. On the other hand, an alternative 
interpretation of this fact is that reporters use this type ofreferents for authentication 
purposes. This is, in order for the caller to be validly identified as member of this Puerto 
Rican organization, is important for the reporter to mention the accents. 
The ethnic referent was used in the same way in which the "terrorist organization" 
was described. As it was discussed before, terrorist became the first name of the FALN 
and the main description was as Puerto Ricans. The following quotes demonstrate how 
the ethnic referent was used to describe the organization and it was the main 
identification. 
In 1977 The Chicago Tribune reports on a defused bomb believed to be related to 
FALN's actions, and the name of the organization was not even necessary to name it, 
they just used the two labels: ''New York police found and defused a bomb and 'said it 
was the work of the Puerto Rican terrorist group that claimed responsibility for last 
week's Manhattan bombings"' (The New York Times, 08/09/1977, p. 5). 
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The same newspaper five days earlier reports the progress of the investigation of 
F ALN acts and intent to offer a profile on the organization. The article attacks the 
organization as being a small group with deadly intentions, not before letting everyone 
know that these individuals were Puerto Ricans. 
The Puerto Rican terrorists who took responsibility for yesterday's blasts are an 
elusive band who have bombed scores ofbuildings in four American cities, 
killing five persons in recent years in the name of independence for their 
Caribbean homeland (The New York Times, 08/04/1977, p. B6). 
They were called terrorist or nationalists or "elusive band" but always preceded by the 
ethnic referent. As is evident in the following quote, the ethnic referent was not just a 
meaningless addendum to the name of the organization, but it was purposely utilized in 
contrast or opposition to the others US citizens. 
An all-white jury of seven women and five men was selected in Criminal Court 
on Monday as the trial began for eight suspected Puerto Rican terrorists on 
conspiracy and weapons charges (The Chicago Tribune, 07/29/1980, p. 3). 
For the F ALN their Puerto Rican background was a very important element in 
their political agenda and their work. Thus, it could be argued that the fact that the media 
uses their ethnicity as a way of identifying the organization is a legitimate way of 
reporting the facts. However, the only part ofFALN's own definition of their 
organization or political motivations that is so extensively used by the media to identify 
the F ALN is their ethnicity. Moreover, the ethnic referent is accompanied by the terrorist 
label, which makes the identification prejudicial and discriminatory as it makes 
accusations and imparts negative association for the people of the same ethnic 
background. The rationale behind the selection of ethnicity as the main form of 
identification is beyond the scope of this r~search. In turn, what is presented here is the 
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fact that ethnicity and the terrorist label were found to be the most common way of 
referring to this organization and the effects that this could have had. 
The focus on their ethnic background may have had an effect on the way the 
investigation was conducted. At the very least, the information provided by the media 
identifies members of the Puerto Rican community as possible suspects. The emphasis on 
the Puerto Rican identity was also seen in the investigative efforts that were directed 
toward people sharing the same ethnic background. In the following quote it is noticeable 
how the national identity of the person arrested was an important factor: "Police raided a 
Bronx apartment on a tip from an informant and arrested David Peres, 27, a Puerto 
Rican" (The Chicago Tribune, 8/5/1977, p. 8). 
The Puerto Rican community as a whole was affected since police efforts, as 
reported by the media, were directed their way. 
Chicago police seeking leads to the persons who bombed three downtown 
buildings were attempting Tuesday to trace the movements of a dozen Puerto 
Rican activists here who have made a series of trips to Cuba in recent months 
(The Chicago Tribune, 10/29/1975, p.23). 
This focus on ethnicity could have created an anti-Puerto Rican sentiment in the 
community, especially since the newspapers studied circulated in cities with a large 
concentration ofPuerto Ricans. The anti-FALN sentiment caused by the strong coverage 
in the media and the events themselves could have being translated into an anti-Puerto 
Rican sentiment since most ofFALN's identification was based upon their ethnic 
identity. The following quote, covering the reaction of a female employee that had to be 
evacuated because of a bomb threat, illustrates how this could in effect be a consequence 
of the ethnic emphasis. 
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The occupants of the buildings left silently and smoothly obeying the orders of 
their wardens, supervisors and security personnel. Then they huddled outside in 
the rain -accountants trying to do their work under umbrellas, drenched 
secretaries calling home from street phones, bookkeepers whispering in 
doorways..."It's a damned nuisance," a woman snarled outside the Empire, State 
Building. "The Spanish language is not going to be welcome in New York if they 
keep on threatening and bombing people" (The Chicago Tribune, 08/04/1977, p. 
2). 
The article connected with the above quote presented the situation of"good hard 
working Americans", sacrificed people who continued working under terrible 
circumstances-"under umbrellas"-who are law-abiding citizens-"silently...obeying 
orders"-are so disturbed with these actions. These good Americans contend that the 
"Spanish language" will not be welcome in New York. The Spanish language is used as a 
phrase that implies every one who speaks that language, every Latino, every Puerto 
Rican. Thus, the "bombers" are identified and equated to Puerto Ricans. Since the main 
description ofFALN in the media is based on their ethnic background, their ethnicity is 
held accountable. 
This attack on the Puerto Rican nationality can be observed in the reaction of 
Puerto Rican personalities and groups that felt the need to defend themselves and 
separate themselves from the FALN. The Governor ofPuerto Rico at the time, Gov. 
Carlos Romero Barcelo, made strong statements censuring F ALN activities and calling 
for the de-legitimatization of their cause 19• Another politician ofPuerto Rican descent, 
Congressman Badillo, not only criticized F ALN and their actions but also invited the 
Puerto Rican community to cooperate with the police in their investigation. 
Calling the bombing "an outrageous act," Representative Badillo of the Bronx, a 
leading spokesman for the Puerto Rican community, urged "anyone in the city, 
19 See quote earlier on this chapter, Chicago Tribune, 10/28/1974, p. 5. 
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and especially in the Puerto Rican community, having information to immediately 
contact the proper authorities" (The New York Times, 01/25/1975, p. 10). 
Here, this "Puerto Rican leader" is making clear to the public that he does not support 
FALN's actions by two different strategies. In the first place he censures the actions of 
the F ALN, and then he calls up the whole Puerto Rican community to oppose them. By 
this strategy, the Puerto Rican representative is giving the message that he and his 
community are not to be blamed for these acts, and moreover we are willing to cooperate 
in the capture of them bombers. 
Not just politicians felt the necessity to protect themselves against blame or to 
make clear the difference between F ALN and the rest of the Puerto Rican community. 
Other groups associated with the Latino community reacted at the time to send the 
message ofdisassociation and cooperation in the criminal process. For example, a 
workers organization mainly composed by Puerto Ricans in New York made the 
following public statement: 
A Puerto Rican labor union headquartered in Brooklyn said, last night that it was 
offering a $2,000 reward to anyone who could provide information leading to the 
arrests and conviction of those responsible for last Friday's bombings (The New 
York Times, 0/28/1975, p. 20). 
In other words the attack on the Puerto Rican origin ofFALN members in the media, was 
so overwhelming that people sharing the national origin, or even the ethnic background 
were faced with the need ofdisassociating themselves from F ALN and their actions, and 
even publicize their status as good law-abiding citizens by participating in the criminal 
investigation. 
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4.4 Some Concluding Remarks 
The F ALN considered themselves to be freedom fighters and combatants in an 
anti-colonial war. Their Puerto Rican identity was the major force moving them towards 
the organized struggle to free Puerto Rico from what they considered to be an illegal 
colonial domination. Consequently, when on their trials they declared themselves 
prisoners ofwar and did not recognize the jurisdiction of the US courts over them. 
The treatment received by the legal system and the media was completely 
different from what they were stating. The law and its actors -law enforcement agents, 
prosecutors and judges-treated the F ALN as a criminal and terrorist organization. The 
political character of their actions was obscured in order to present an image of illegality 
and deviance. The subjects were treated as criminals and terrorist that did not care for 
"good American values", deserving to be punished with all the severity of the law. 
The media presented FALN's actions as acts of terrorism and FALN members as 
alien terrorist. The most salient image in the media was that of the Puerto Rican terrorist 
that needed to be persecuted and prosecuted for being a menace to society. Although the 
media had presented F ALN's communiques and often quoted from them, the coverage 
was mainly characterized by the presentation of a demonized image. 
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CHAPTER 5: WHY?--A SEARCH FOR POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS 
The literature on political movements and terrorism suggests that most of the 
times the motives, which is what in the first instance defines a political movement or 
activity, are obscured by the media20• This chapter examines the way in which the three 
voices studied in this research treat, discuss, and approach the motives behind the acts 
and their actors. The question to be explored in this chapter is then, Why? Why did these 
people organize in a secret organization? Why did they engage in illegal acts? And 
moreover, is it important? 
The three voices that narrate this story have very different accounts of the 
motive's importance. As it will be revealed in this chapter, the majority of the legal and 
media documents studied do not make references to, or do not explain the motivation 
behind the acts or the actors. When it does appear, it is as a restatement ofwhat the 
political prisoners said and it appears accompanied by belittling remarks. On the other 
hand, for the political prisoners their motives are the most important aspect of their story. 
This chapter will include an analysis of the responses found in the documents to 
three questions included in the protocol. One of the questions goes directly to the point in 
2 °For a thorough discussion of the literature on this topic, see Chapter II. 
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discussion, and it is written in a very general manner. Question number 18 reads as 
follows: 
18. Is there any mention ofFALNpolitical motives or goali1? 
a.No 
b. Yes 
Any reference to their political standpoints or to the rationale behind their organization or 
any act was counted as a Yes in this question. 
The category political motives or goals could be interpreted in many different 
ways and a reference in any form to the rationale behind the organization or acts could 
include mentions ofmany aspects of the prisoners' political agenda or political 
background. For that reason, question number 14 is more specific in its possible answers, 
and it implicates a broader aspect of the prisoner's political motives or goals-the 
political situation ofPuerto Rico: 
14. Is the situation ofPuerto Rico mentioned? 
a. Puerto Rico 's political status 
b. History ofindependence movements 
c. Emigration ofPuerto Ricans to the United States 
d. Poverty or economic situation ofPuerto Rico 
e. No mention 
f Other 
This question encompasses the whole spectrum ofpolitical issues surrounding the 
prisoner's motives. Any reference to the issues included in the possible answers would 
constitute an acknowledgment of the political character of the prosecuted acts and actors. 
Finally, there is a third question included in this chapter that considers another 
aspect of the political motives or political character of the organization, members and 
21 The terms political motives or goals are used here interchangeably to include the political ideals and ends 
of the prisoners and the F ALN as an organization. 
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their acts. This question seeks to expose the relationship ofFALN with other political 
movements or political groups. The different speakers' versions will offer different pieces 
of information. The political prisoner's own account of their relationship with other 
political movements or groups will provide to the analysis the way in which the subjects 
construct their own political movement in a broader social conjuncture. For the latter, is 
important to consider the political effervescence of the '70s and the many political groups 
that were present in the public political debate. 
The law and the media versions will provide to the discussion the manner in 
which others, in this case the judging ones, see the F ALN and their acts. Of this, two 
factors are ofspecial significance. On the one hand, the way in which the law and the 
media see the F ALN in relation to other political actors or groups could facilitate the 
unfolding ofpolitical and moral evaluations of the group. It would be easier to 
extrapolate judgements and evaluation of the group in question if they give us a 
comparison with other groups ofknown reputation. For example, if a judge in a decision 
or a reporter in a news article compares one ofFALN acts to the activities of the IRA, it 
could be argued that the same negative moral evaluation ofthe IRA's acts is equally 
applied to FALN's acts. 
On the other hand, a comparison ofF ALN with other known political movements 
or actors would imply an acknowledgment of the political character of the organization. 
This would be in apparent contradiction with the treatment received by the F ALN and its 
members, which singled them out as common criminals. Question number 19 reads as 
follows: 
19. Are there any connections, references, or comparisons with other political 
movements or groups? 




5.1 The F ALN's Side: Why did They Become F ALN? 
The members of the F ALN were Puerto Ricans living in the United States that felt 
close to their Puerto Rican ancestry and culture and who believed that to be Puerto 
Ricans meant to defend the island at all costs. They decided that the political and 
economic situation ofPuerto Rico were a result of the colonial domination of the United 
States and decided that it was their right and duty to act against that domination. Like 
Fernandez describes in his book about Puerto Rican political prisoners: 
In its 120 bombings the F ALN generally focused on political targets because 
gaining independence for Puerto Rico was at the center of Oscar Lopez's or 
Alejandrina Torres' life; because they hated the dependence fostered by 
colonialism and symbolized by food stamps; and, because they agreed with Pedro 
Albizu Campos that an indispensable basis for any self-sustaining economy was 
political power (Fernandez, 1994, p. 218). 
The situation ofPuerto Rico in general terms, including the economic, political 
and cultural situation, was the main motivation for these Puerto Ricans to embrace the 
struggle for the independence of the island. However, what remains to explain is why 
within all the forms that political support for independence could take, they chose to 
engage in a clandestine movement. 
One way ofexplaining this is by arguing that given the colonial domination of 
Puerto Rico to the United States and the ruthless repression to which independence 
groups had been subjected throughout the years22 people wanting complete independence 
have not other choice but to resort to clandestine movements. Susler, in a Memorandum 
ofLaw that was never filed in court, suggest this explanation: "In the face of this 
22 For a history ofpolitical repression of independence activists in Puerto Rico, see Chapter I. 
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trajectory of the U.S. government's overt and covert attempts to destroy the Puerto Rican 
people's efforts to obtain self-determination, it is no wonder that people who desire 
freedom would develop clandestine means of seeking that freedom" (Susler, unknown 
date, p. 10). 
In various opportunities F ALN members themselves explained that for them the 
only way to fight against the United States was through armed struggle. Carmen Valentin 
in response to her sentence in 1981 expressed this point ofview: "Revolution doesn't get 
accomplished by mere thought. Action must lead the way, and that is what the F ALN is. 
The F ALN is action on behalfof the millions ofPuerto Ricans who have been victims of 
colonialism and exploitation. This action has to take place because without it our territory 
will not be free. Guns and bombs, guns and bombs imply death or life imprisonment. 
They also imply revolution and freedom for our country'' ( cited in Fernandez, 1994, p. 
224). In other words, the only way to fight against violent domination is with violent 
struggles. 
This view ofhaving to fight violently and sacrifice for the motherland is 
consistent and constant within the majority of the FALN's statements. By this, they 
explain in a general way why to fight violently. The actual choice ofmethods is 
explained by one of the FALN member, Elizam Escobar, in an interview conducted while 
he was still in prison. In this opportunity, Elizam reflects on the history of the struggle for 
independence in Puerto Rico, and how the clandestine work of the F ALN fit into that 
broader history. This interview was published in Spanish, so what follows is a translation 
of the original. 
I understood the importance within that specific conjuncture of the clandestine 
movement as a symbolic force capable of invigorate the psychological aspect and 
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the self-esteem of a country or a struggle that was diagnosed by many as a lost 
cause. But also, in the concrete aspect, very concrete, ofdefending in practice the 
right of self-determination and independence, to self-defense and to respond to the 
repression existing in those years. All of that was more important and could not 
be postponed" (Gil, 1995, p. 152). 
The argument seems to be that within the context of the struggle for independence 
ofPuerto Rico, the clandestine armed struggle was a necessary step in order to invigorate 
the support for independence and to surpass the repression that independence movements 
had been subjected to. This aspect of self-preservation is also mentioned as the rationale 
behind choosing a clandestine approach to the independence struggle on a statement 
assuming credit for actions that took place on 198223 • This statement is available through 
the internet in Spanish. What follows in a translation ofwhat is published on the Internet. 
Ifwe want to be victorious, our struggle has to be enclosed within the strategy of 
the prolonged popular war. We have to create organizations that cannot be 
destroyed by the enemy because it cannot see them acting publicly. Only the 
political-military organization with structures, membership and clandestine work 
methods is in a position to mobilize and organize our people and at the same time 
engage in an armed struggle. Those independence organizations that work within 
bourgeois legality, either because they believe in that system, or because they 
think that there are no conditions to create clandestine organizations, or because 
they preach to have nothing to hide, only lie to themselves. When the enemy 
concludes that these organizations are a menace it will annihilate them (Comando 
Central FALN, 1982, p. 4). 
The FALN assumed responsibility ofover 120 actions in their whole public 
existence. They usually took credit of an action by a communique that was made public 
by the press. These communiques were published in part or referred to in the press. The 
next sections will explore the way in which the law and the media approached FALN's 
motivations. 
23 Although this action is beyond the time period covered by this research, the document authored by the 
FALN is valuable in terms of their statements regarding the explanation to their movement. 
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5.2 The Law: Are the Political Motivations Relevant for the Judicial Process? 
For the general question, question number 18, out of37 legal units analyzed 24 
( 64.9%) did not reflect any reference to F ALN motives. Only 13 documents contain 
mentions ofFALN motives, that is 35.13% of the documents discuss in any degree 
F ALN motives. 
For the more specific question regarding the political issues ofPuerto Rico, 
question number 14, two documents made a reference to Puerto Rico's political status, 
and three made references to the history ofindependence movements. No documents 
made references to the emigration ofPuerto Ricans to the United States or to the 
poverty or economic situation ofPuerto Rico. On the contrary, 32 documents made no 
reference to the situation ofPuerto Rico in any way, in other words 86.5% of the 
documents analyzed contained no discussion or reference to the situation ofPuerto Rico 
or the broader political motivations of the F ALN and its members. 
However, these numerical counts of the document's topical content do not present 
an accurate sense of the documents. The specific speaker and the context allow for a 
better understanding ofhow the topic is treated. 
Before we undergo a deeper exploration of the legal scene, it is important to make 
some operational definitions. For some criminal cases, the prosecution has to prove a 
specific criminal intent or motive. For example, to prove a case ofmurder in the first 
degree is essential to prove mens rea24 or the intention to commit murder, contrary to 
murder in the second degree, which do not require criminal motive (18 USC section 
24 Mens rea is a phrase derived from the Latin used by the legal jargon to mean a guilty mind. ''The state of 
mind required to constitute a particular crime; the mental element ofan offence" (Butterworth Legal 
Dictionary). 
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1111). The subject of this chapter is not criminal motives but political motives or goals. 
The purpose is to discuss the way in which the law approaches or dismisses the political 
motivations of the actors. This should not be confused with the legal exercise of the 
prosecution to prove criminal intent. 
In the previous chapter it was shown how legal documents often accompanied the 
name F ALN with a short phrase explaining who the actors were. In some occasions this 
was expanded in a way that included an indirect recognition of the organization's 
motives. In a court decision Circuit Court Judge Posner, introduces the organization by 
stating: 
The FALN is a secret organization ofPuerto Rican separatists that has been trying 
to win independence for Puerto Rico by tactics that include bombing buildings in 
New York, Chicago, and Washington ... (Unit #031, United States ofAmerica vs. 
Alejandrina Torres, et. al.. 751 F.2d 875). 
In this quote it is noteworthy that the judge introduces the organization by declaring not 
only their motives and their history ofwork toward the independence ofPuerto Rico, but 
also introduces elements ofnegative evaluation when he discloses the tactics. The choice 
of specific words like "secret" and "bombing" is important. Here, we are not looking at 
informal or formal oral communication like testimonies, or oral statements, but to a 
written and published decision, element that in this case implies careful selection of 
words. Here, the judge, who is supposed to represent objectivity in the legal process, 
presents the defendants as an organization with a well-defined political agenda that uses 
illegal, immoral tactics to pursue their goals. 
This tactic ofpresenting the organization's motives by stating their actions as 
reproachable was used by the legal actors since the beginning of the criminal process 
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against the FALN. In one of the documents that initiated the criminal prosecution, an 
affidavit in support ofan application for surveillance, Special FBI Agent Richard S. 
Hahn, introduces F ALN as follows: 
The F ALN is a clandestine organization composed of individuals who have 
dedicated themselves to "liberating Puerto Rico from United States control". The 
group's members claim that armed struggle is the only vehicle through which 
independence can be achieved. The group's members also seek the release of 
convicted felons and the removal ofall military installations from the island of 
Puerto Rico. Unlike other independence groups that engage in violent actions on 
the island ofPuerto Rico itself, the FALN has elected to stage its violent actions 
within continental United States. The F ALN is responsible for over 130 bombings 
and incendiary attacks, armed takeovers and a series of armed robberies 
( quotation marks included in the text) (Unit #005, page 3). 
This document is a 67-page long affidavit provided by Special FBI Agent Hahn. 
Hahn is a self-proclaimed expert on FALN and other independence movements ofPuerto 
Rico. This affidavit is in many ways the basis of the prosecution against FALN. It is in 
this document that the F ALN is first introduced as an organization with clear political 
ends and with a clear modus operandi. Hahn, in this lengthy statement carefully situates 
FALN within the context of a prolonged history of independence struggles from Puerto 
Ricans. He situates the organization and describes their mode ofwork. Mainly based on 
the statements of former FALN member, Freddie Mendez, who became the prosecution's 
main information source, Hahn presents a complete picture ofFALN. This sworn 
statement is often quoted directly and indirectly in all the later legal documents. It is this 
document the ~ne that sets the base for the various ways in which the law approaches the 
political motivations of the FALN and its members. These different ways or patterns are 
going to be identified as they appear in the documents. 
Thus, Hahn names FALN a "clandestine" organization, situating the organization 
on the illegal side. Then, he continues his description with a phrase that presents the 
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motives. Ofparticular interesting is how Hahn uses quotation marks when he states the 
main motive-"liberating Puerto Rico from United States control". Since there is no 
reference to any quotes source, we have to assume that the use ofquotation marks is to 
question, to doubt, to challenge the truth of the text inside the marks. So he questions the 
veracity of the US control's over Puerto Rico. This is an essential element throughout the 
whole criminal procedure, and defines the public relationship between the United States 
government and Puerto Rico25• 
After questioning the foundation of the F ALN's whole political motivation, Hahn 
continues by stating the organization's tactics or modus operandi-armed struggle. He 
then expands the presentation by exposing other motives. He mentions the F ALN 
campaign for the liberation of the nationalist Puerto Rican political prisoners. Ofcourse, 
he fails to mention the political character of their imprisonment, or the fact that this 
campaign was broadly supported, he just says ''the release of convicted felons". And in 
the same paragraph he continues to introduce the organization by describing the tactics 
again. In sum, Hahn accompanies a statement about F ALN's motives with a statement 
about FALN's tactics. In this way, he vilifies the motives by emphasizing the tactics. 
This is the first pattern: vilifying the motives by emphasizing tactics. 
However, contrary to this affidavit most of the legal documents only contain a 
very short reference to F ALN motives, if at all. For example, in Unit# 032 Judge Bauer 
introduces the defendant as follows: "Jose Rodriguez is a member of the F ALN, an 
armed clandestine organization seeking independence for Puerto Rico" (United States v. 
Jose Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318). Once again, the small recognition of the motives is 
25 See Chapter I for a discussion of the political and historical relationship between the United States and 
Puerto Rico. 
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preceded by an adjectival phrase that decries the actors and their political goals. The 
vilification in this variant is given by a short adjectival phrase that names or labels the 
organization and consequently its members. This second pattern is then, vilification of 
motives by stigmatizing the subjects. Phrases like "armed clandestine organization" or 
"secret organization" (as the one used by Judge Posner26) create a stigma that when used 
as the introduction to the organization impregnate a negative and reproachable character 
not only to the subjects but to everything they stand for. 
Another form in which statements about F ALN motives were found, was in an 
indirect manner, by relating them to other known political movements or actors. This is: 
guilty by association, our third pattern. In the state trial, the first witness called by the 
prosecution, FBI Agent Thomas C. Deans, while relating and describing objects found in 
a search of a safe house, introduces into evidence books and booklets of known political 
"nature" 27: 
Q: Can you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury some of the books you 
observed? 
A: They are various terrorist type publications including Regions to Grasp, 
Revolution to Revolution, Book on Carbines, a Military Assault, rifle and items in 
the background (sic), a book on make-up, Standing Back Up. 
Q: Can you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury the nature of these books and 
the contents thereof? 
A: Specifically, the revolutionary books are authored by older revolutionaries, 
Mary Sutton-(sic) many types where our own groups used these books to gain 
tactics in strategy to carry on clandestine actions. 
The evidence presented by this witness relates the defendants to ''terrorist type 
publications", fact that brings up an important point. The evidence presented is books 
26 See quote above. 
27 Most of these statements would probably not have been admitted into evidence if there have been 
objections to what constitute inadmissible evidence according to the Federal Rules ofEvidence, 18 USC 
App. 18, and most of the state rule ofevidence. 
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referred to as "terrorist type publications". What does ''terrorist type" mean? Is it a matter 
of image? Do those books look "terroristish"? The purpose ofpresenting this evidence is 
to associate the defendants with it, thus creating a picture ofculpability by associating the 
defendants with blameworthy objects or people. This is how this pattern, guilty by 
association, works. 
On the other hand, perhaps it was not a matter of image, but ofcontent. These 
books were allegedly about (and I say allegedly because there is not enough information 
to know the content of these books) revolution and revolutionary tactics, about arms, 
about military actions. If the intention of the prosecution with this witness was to prove 
that the defendants shared the beliefs expressed in these books, then at the same time they 
were exposing the political character of the actions and, in that same sense, of the 
prosecution. Hence, the motivations were an important part of the prosecution, in spite of 
their apparent intent to obscure those political motives. 
From the standpoint of the defendants, the motivations were the most important 
factor. They were moved by those political aspirations and they tried to expose those 
motivations every chance they had. Some of the legal documents that contained 
references to the political prisoners' motives were as a restatement ofwhat the prisoners 
said. For example, the same first witness, FBI Agent Thomas C. Deans, was asked to read 
from one ofFALN communiques found in the safe house seized. 
A: It reads on Saturday March 15, 1980, at 9:00am, Lannus (Phonetic Spelling) 
(sic) Freedom Fighters of the FALN seized the Carter and Mondale Headquarters 
in Chicago, and the office of George Bush in New York City. Action was attack 
of defiance against the crime areas which are being celebrated in Puerto Rico 
(sic). (Unit #007, page 47). 
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The intention of the prosecution with this testimony was to link the defendants 
with the F ALN. The defendants were not present in the courtroom during the trial, at the 
beginning of the proceedings they were placed in a restricted room after some arguments 
about their conduct. The communique that this witness is referring to was found in a safe 
house. The prosecution is trying to link FALN's statements to the subjects. It is important 
to remember that F ALN as organization was not on trial, but individuals. For that reason, 
it was essential for the prosecution to somehow make the connection between the two. 
Thus, by introducing this evidence the prosecution is also introducing statements 
declaring the political motivations. Therefore, it was not a conscious recognition of 
political motivations, but a consequence. In other words, they were disclosing political 
motivations as an unwanted aftereffect. This is the fourth pattern. 
Another example of the fourth pattern or how the legal actors were disclosing the 
defendants' motives as a consequence and not as a direct recognition, can be found in the 
testimony ofMr. Charles Bums, law clerk at the State's Attorney Office and fourth 
witness of the prosecution. This witness was brought to testify about the defendants' 
conduct on various pre-trial hearings28• 
Q: Now, with regards to oral statements that have been made by various 
defendants depicted in these photographs, I would like to call your attention to 
court proceedings on May 19th, 1980. 
Do you recall any statement that was made by the defendant Jiminez (sic)? 
A: Yes, I do. The defendant Jimenez stated various slogans regarding freedom of 
Puerto Rico, and after that he said there will be assignations (sic) ...She (Dylcia 
Pagan) said that she was speaking on behalf ofher comrads and that they are 
28 As it was mentioned before, the defendants were not present in the courtroom during the trial. Therefore, 
it was difficult for the prosecution to link the evidence to defendants that were absent, or to construct an 
image of villains just by the use ofphotos. This witness• testimony was important to personify the 
photographs. 
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members of the armed clandestine movement. And she also stated, "Long live the 
armed clandestine struggle, not with guns, not with jail, our fight will not stop 
(Unit #010, page 60). 
With the intention of linking the defendants to the evidence, the witness repeats 
revealing statements regarding political motivations. The same type of testimony was the 
one from Mr. Dennis Wolter, Assistant State Attorney, and second witness of the 
prosecution, who also testified about defendants' conduct in previous hearings. 
Q: Could you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury some of the things that you 
heard Luis Rosa say in open court on that day? 
A: First ofall, I don't think he (Luis Rosa) said anything. He shouted at the top of 
his voice -it was very difficult to understand-and he was shouting in Spanish 
and English both. Among some of the things he said were, "Long live Puerto 
Rico", "Long live an independent and socialistic (sic) Puerto Rico", and "Long 
live the FALN" (Unit# 008, 54). 
Again, motives are disclosed just as an indirect, probably unwanted, consequence; 
thus disclosing political motivations as an unwanted aftereffect. In this specific 
situation, the witness' testimony goes to the point of linking the defendants with the 
evidence (identification purposes), and the goal is to connect the defendant with the 
FALN. In this process, the witness repeats some of the defendants' previous statements. 
It is interesting how the witness begins by saying that he doesn't believe the 
defendant said "anything". Yet immediately after, he repeats very strong statements that 
the prosecution uses as self-incriminatory statements29, after all the defendant is openly 
admitting that he supports the F ALN and their struggle. The witness however, says that 
he thinks the defendant said nothing. Since, the witness is an Assistant State Attorney, 
who knows about the case in hand, it could be argued that the initial statement ("he said 
29 According to the Federal Rules ofEvidence (18 USC App. 18), this type of statement would be 
considered hearsay, and for that reason inadmissible if objected in a proper and timely manner. However, 
the defendants presented no defense and for that reason many objectionable evidence was admitted. 
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nothing") reflects the witness' evaluation of the motivations and that he evaluates these 
statements as meaningless political slogans. 
The political prisoners ( defendants at this point) took advantage of any 
opportunity they had to express their political convictions and their rejection to the whole 
judicial process. On many occasions their expressions were very strong ( as reflected in 
the last quote) and their statements very revealing. The third witness of the prosecution, 
Timothy McMahon, another Assistant State Attorney, also testifies about the defendants' 
conduct in previous hearings. This testimony was also used by the prosecution to prove 
the defendants' negative conduct on pre-trial hearings. 
Q: Please tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury some of the things which she 
said? (sic) 
A: Well, she came before the bench and began shouting at the court and other 
personnel. Among the things that she did say at that time, first of all, she declared 
herself a prisoner ofwar, that the courtroom in which she was had no jurisdiction 
over her, that they engaged in war and a war against the United States, and that 
the United States system ofjustice was a lie and a farce (Unit# 009, page 57). 
This statement, the proclamation of their acts as war acts and their status as 
prisoners ofwar, is a cardinal point within FALN arguments. It was not a mere slogan, it 
was their political standpoint, their only defense. It was discussed in previous chapters, 
the Geneva Convention's dispositions about prisoners ofwar and the reluctance of the 
United States to even recognize the existence of a colonial relationship between Puerto 
Rico and the United States30• This precluded, at the beginning, any claim ofprisoners of 
war status. The courts and the legal actors dismissed this claim, although in some 
occasions it was conveniently used against the defendants, like it is shown in the previous 
quote where the witness testifies about the negative conduct of the defendants by 
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repeating their argument. In other words, their only defense, their claim for the prisoners 
ofwar status was used by the prosecution to prove their negative and uncooperative 
conduct. 
The next quote shows how the FALN's argument about being in war with the 
United States, although dismissed when argued by the defendants was used for the 
prosecution against them: 
Although you sit here today, you must know that the "enemy'' is not in this 
courtroom, and that they have declared war on the United States ofAmerica. 
They have declared war on the law-abiding God-fearing citizens of this country 
and state. They have spilled blood, but they can gain no respect (Opening 
Statement, Unit # 006, page 9). 
Thus, it is war in the sense ofbeing considered evil, but it is not war in the sense ofbeing 
considered prisoners ofwar. Here the second pattern, vilification of motives by 
stigmatizing the subjects, is once again present. The motivations are tainted or vilified 
by the prosecution's characterization of the defendants as the "enemy''. 
The legal actors dismissed the F ALN arguments in many ways. At the initial 
proceedings the defendants were denied their petition for prisoners ofwar status, and in 
many instances they were not even allowed to present their only defense, their argument 
about the absence ofjurisdiction based on the colonial relationship ofPuerto Rico and the 
United States. This treatment was constant and consistent throughout the whole judicial 
process. This constitutes the fifth pattern: FALN's political motivations are dismissed. 
A reading of some of the cases brought up to higher courts demonstrate how 
F ALN arguments were merely dismissed and often ridiculed. In USA v. Alejandrina 
30 See chapter II. 
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Torres. et. al.• 583 F. Supp. 86, 8931 , the judge makes a mockery of the defendants' 
arguments: 
After learning of these aural and visual interceptions, but in accordance with a 
previously set schedule, defendant Torres, Cortes, and Alberto Rodriguez filed a 
99 page motion to dismiss the indictment, supported by appendices totaling 65 
pages in which they reviewed the history of the relation between 1898 and 1974. 
This review covered what defendants described as the struggle for independence 
ofPuerto Rico. They argued that they are prisoners ofwar to whom this court 
should afford P.O.W. status. 
Noticeable is how the court continuously mentions the length of the motion and 
appendices. The regular readers ofa published decision are lawyers, law students and 
legal scholars. These readers are familiar with the length ofthe documents that are 
usually filed in the courts. In this context, how important it is to know the length of the 
documents ifnot to suggest they were nonsense? 
Furthermore, the court does not discuss in the decision the merits of the 
arguments. The only aspect mentioned is the length of the submitted documents. To 
further indicate the way in which these arguments were dismissed, the judge leaves to a 
footnote the decision about their petition to dismiss the indictment. In this footnote the 
judge states that this motion was denied without offering the reasoning. The footnote 
reads: "The petition to dismiss was denied; and the court's reasons were stated from the 
bench, an order was entered accordingly'' (Unit# 037, page 89). What was stated during 
the hearing is not available to the reader. Thus, the judge considers this argument so 
lacking of importance that he did not bother in explaining his decision. 
31 In this case the defendants moved to suppress the evidence obtained by electronic surveillance. 
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The denial ofopportunity to present their point ofview was constant32• This was 
one of the main points of the defendants in several of the cases they brought up to higher 
courts. The result of these cases was the same. The decisions supported the dismissal. In 
Matter of Special February 1975 Grand Jury, 565 F.2d 40733, the court attends various 
arguments, within which was: 
Appellants allege that the district court erred in refusing to allow them to show the 
"dominant purpose" of the Special grand Jury was political suppression of the 
Puerto Rican Independence Movement and an attempt to locate missing witnesses 
(Unit# 035, page 410). 
A couple ofparagraphs later, the court simply states that the district judge concluded 
there was not basis for granting further hearings and they agree. 
The defendants' main point, and most of the times their only point, was their 
political view of the situation. This argument, in its multiple forms, was most of the times 
not allowed in the judicial proceedings. Once again, denying the political prisoners the 
opportunity to present their motives. In United States ofAmerica v. Jose Rodriguez, 803 
F .2d 318, Unit # 032, it is clear that the court did not allow them to present their side. 
Finally, Rodriguez argues that the district court improperly took judicial notice of 
the authority of the United States over Puerto Rico. He contends that it was an 
error to instruct the jury that the United States has authority over Puerto Rico and 
exclude his evidence on the unlawfulness of that authority. We disagree. The 
court properly took judicial notice ofUnited States over Puerto Rico, and this 
authority is not subject to dispute. 
Putting aside the legal technicalities of the case, which is beyond this project, the fact 
remains that the F ALN and its members are embodied by their political views of the 
32 Even though the defendants did not present a defense at state trial, they presented their arguments at pre­
trial hearings. 
33 This an appeal ofa decision fmding appellants --people called to testify before a grand jury investigation 
ofFALN activities-in civil contempt for not testifying before the grand jury. 
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situation ofPuerto Rico, yet they were not allowed to successfully present their 
arguments. Their motives were excluded. 
Even when the courts showed some laxity, this was corrected. In United States v. 
Julio Rosado, 728 F.2 89, the state appeals arguing that the lower court erred in admitting 
irrelevant evidence. The issue was precisely that the trial court permitted the defendants 
to present their side. 
At trial, appellants conceded that they had willfully defied Judge Sifton's 
order...In the current fashion ofmounting what some have called a "political" 
defense, appellants condemned United States involvement in Puerto Rico, and 
invited jury nullification by questioning the Government's motives in 
subpoenaing appellants and prosecuting them for contempt. One witness, a self­
proclaimed expert on grand jury abuse, testified that the Government used the 
grand jury to ''punish people whose political beliefs are an anathema to the 
Government. .. " In addition, apparently making the erroneous assumption that 
good motives for committing a crime is inconsistent with criminal intent, 
appellants presented witnesses who testified that cooperation with the grand jury 
investigation would compromise their effectiveness as community leaders. 
Appellants also introduced testimony of their good character and devotion to 
community service. 
Once more it is irrelevant to this research whether or not in strict legal terms these 
were correct decisions. If legally it was correct to not permit the defendants to dispute the 
authority of the United States, or to present evidence about the use and abuse of the grand 
jury against independence activists, or to debate about the negative effects of testifying 
for these individuals, sociologically this shows a clash between relevant issues for the 
state and for the citizens. Furthermore, the conclusion is obvious, political motivations 
are not relevant. 
One of the few opportunities that the defendants had to present their side of the 
case, it was reversed by a higher court. The appellate court identified this as a serious 
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hazard (United States v. Julio Rosado, 728 F.2 89). Furthermore, their attempt to present 
a defense was called a ''political defense". Ofcourse it was political. That was the only 
way to go for people who decided to commit themselves to a political venture. As it has 
been shown, the whole judicial process was filled with political content, but to present a 
"political defense" was out of the question. 
The last sentence of the above quote says that the defendants tried to present 
evidence about their good character. Ironically, this evidence was also excluded (United 
States v. Julio Rosado, 728 F.2 89). Ironically, because throughout the whole process 
F ALN members were judged by characterization as terrorists and criminals. This was 
presented by the prosecution in their opening and closing statements, by the witnesses, by 
the judges in appellate decisions. Yet, they were not permitted to refute these accusations. 
Finally, the last aspect considered in this chapter about motives, is the 
comparisons ofF ALN with other political groups or movements. As it was explained at 
the beginning of this chapter, the idea is to identify motives ofFALN by the association 
of them with other known political actors. In other words, the third pattern identified, 
guilty by association. 
Question number 15 of the protocol reads: 
Are there any comparisons with other political groups or movements? 
a. Yes. 
b. No. 
Out of 37 documents analyzed, just 2 contained references or comparisons with other 
groups, that is only .05%. 
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However, the only two documents that contain references are very revealing. 
First, Unit #005, is the affidavit in support of an application for surveillance by Special 
FBI Agent Richard S. Hahn, which contains a few interesting references. Here, Hahn 
insinuates F ALN contacts with the Black Liberation Army and with other Puerto Rican 
clandestine organizations. 
On February 28 and March 1, 1982 four powerful dynamite bombs detonated in 
New York City's financial district. F ALN members claimed credit for these 
explosions in a five page communique expresses solidarity with and support for 
persons involved in a number ofother violent criminal activities. Particular 
attention is paid to support for the defendants charged in connection with the 
Black Liberation Army armored car robbery attempt in New York, New York on 
October 20, 1981, which resulted in the murders of two police officers and one 
armored car guard and wounding of several other officers ...F ALN bomb making 
literature and bomb components were found in the subsequent search of the East 
Orange, New Jersey apartment/safe house ofBlack Liberation Army member 
Marilyn Jean Buck (Unit #005, p. 9). 
Hahn is making a detailed presentation ofF ALN in order to support the granting 
of a permission to utilize specific type of surveillance methodology. Thus, he is trying to 
portray the worst possible picture ofF ALN. In this particular part, Hahn is presenting 
F ALN as related to other known political and "criminal" actors. First, he states that 
FALN expresses solidarity with people convicted for "other violent criminal activities". 
The association is direct and obvious, as is the one with the Black Liberation Army. 
Given the reputation of the Black Liberation Army, for many considered at that time as 
the major domestic threat to national security, Hahn succeeds in connecting F ALN with 
dangerous activities and dangerous actors. This is reinforced with the reference to the 
victims resulting from Black Liberation Army's actions. 
On page number 5, Hahn reports about some other F ALN activities that 
connected them with other Puerto Rican movements. 
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In October, 1979 explosive devices detonated in New York and Chicago in 
conjunction with a series ofbombings on the island ofPuerto Rico. 
Communiques issued both in the United States and Puerto Rico claimed credit for 
these incidents in the names of the FALN and other three island-based groups. 
The joint communiques also informed the world that at least four Puerto Rican 
independence groups were now working in cooperation with one another. 
Thus, several Puerto Rican independence movements were working altogether in a 
common agenda. 
The other document that contains any reference or connections to other political 
movements is the testimony of the first witness of the prosecution in the state trial. This 
testimony, which was quoted before in this chapter, includes some interesting references 
to other Puerto Rican movements and to some elements of support to the independence of 
Puerto Rico as evidence against the defendants. Responding to questions of the 
prosecutor, the witness is relating what he observed in the search of a safe house. At this 
specific point, he is testifying about a calendar they observed in the wall. Throughout 
these series ofquestions and answers it is noticeable how the "puertoricanness" of the 
defendants and their support to the independence ofPuerto Rico was an important issue 
for the prosecution and its witnesses. 
A: It was a calendar. The inscribing in each specific date, chronological order of 
FALN activities and other terrorist group activities specifically directed to the 
Puerto Rican independent movement (sic). 
Q: This was an actual printed calendar? 
A: Yes. It was with photographs on the top pages and actual calendar had writing 
describing what significance a particular date had (sic). 
Q: Showing you what has been marked as People's Exhibit No. 40-A, I ask you to 
look at People's Exhibit No. 40-A. Explain it and explain its contents? 
A: The first- Viva Puerto Rico Libre y Socialista34 1980 calendar. On the first 
page there is a photograph, and the calendar of January 1980, reflecting that on 
34 This means "live long to a free and socialist Puerto Rico". 
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the 25th of January, 197Sbombings at Anglers Club and Fraunces Tavern by 
FALN in retaliation for murder of two independentistas during - ( sic )35• 
In part because of the poor communication skills ofthis witness, we have not 
enough information to make an informed analysis about this excerpt. However, we are in 
a good position to make inferences. First, apparently this piece of evidence is a printed 
calendar that contained pictures and writings. We have to assume that what the witness is 
describing is as well printed information in the calendar, because ifnot he would have 
had to describe the way in which this was written. Following that premise, it is interesting 
how it was considered negative evidence for the defendants to connect them to political 
material in support of the independence ofPuerto Rico. 
5.3 Media: A Search for Political Motivations 
The media plays an important role in the creation and re-creation of images and 
understandings of social reality or social phenomena. The way in which the media treats, 
discusses or approaches the subjects of this research is essential to the way in which 
others (audience) react and think of the FALN. It has been stated before that for the 
FALN their political goals and motivations are the element that defines them, and this is 
true for most political groups (Mulcahy, A., 1995). 
The literature on media and political organizations suggests that media often 
obscures or is silent in regard to the political motivations ofpolitical groups (Gitlin, T., 
1980; Mulcahy, A., 1995). In this section, the media coverage of the FALN is studied to 
35 Here the defense attorney makes a request to approach the bench. According to the transcript, he requests 
time to go and request the defendants if they wanted to make any objections. After a pause, the transcripts 
reflect that the defense attorney, Mr. Fletcher, returns and explains to the court that he consulted the 
defendants about making objections to this evidence that he thought was inadmissible, but they insisted in 
not participating in the trial. 
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explore this proposition, and to see how and how often political motivations are included 
in media's coverage. This analysis has two emphases: first how the media acts on 
political motivations as a reporter of facts, and second it acts as a judge of facts. Thus, in 
this chapter we examine different ways in which the media approaches the element of 
political motivations. On some occasions the political motivations are presented as part of 
the introduction of the organization, in others, as re-statements ofFALN's 
communications. Sometimes the media will present a little of the F ALN's support and 
other times it will not only present but also assume the opposition. 
The protocol included three questions regarding this topic. Question number 18 
reads: 
18. Is there any mention ofFALNpolitical motives or goals? 
a.No. 
b. Yes. 
Out of 59 media documents analyzed, 34 (57.6%) of the documents contained any 
mention ofFALN's motivations, and 25 (42.4%) did not mention FALN's motivations. 
These results contrast what was found for the legal documents. And, as noted earlier, it 
contrasts with what the literature suggests regarding the lack ofcoverage ofpolitical 
motivations by the media. Nevertheless, the way in which these references to motivations 
are included and their content should illuminate us in regards to this point. In this chapter, 
excerpts and quotes are studied in order to include form and content into the analysis. 
The second question concerning political motivations and goals is question 
number 14. As it was explained before, this question's purpose is to specify the array of 
elements related to FALN's motivations. Question number 14 reads: 
14. Is the situation ofPuerto Rico mentioned? 
a. Puerto Rico 's political status 
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b. History ofindependence movements 
c. Emigration ofPuerto Ricans to the United States 
d. Poverty or economic situation ofPuerto Rico 
e. No mention 
f Other 
The results for this question in the media documents reflect the different issues regarding 
political motivations that were included in each document. For that reason, there could be 
more than one answer for each document, hence, more answers than total of documents. 
The political status ofPuerto Rico was mentioned in 6 of the 59 media documents 
included in this study. The history of independence movement was included in 5 of the 
59 documents. The emigration ofPuerto Ricans to the United States was discussed in 2 of 
the documents. Finally, 50 of the documents contained none of the categories included in 
this question. In other words, 84.7% of the documents did not discuss anything related to 
the political, social or historical situation ofPuerto Rico. 
Ifwe take the results for both questions, we can see that although more than half 
of the documents included a mention ofFALN's political motivations, this did not 
translate into a discussion of the general situation that promoted FALN's interests 
concerning the political, historical or economic situation ofPuerto Rico. If a media article 
includes general phrases like "a group seeking the independence ofPuerto Rico", by 
which a recognition ofpolitical motivations is included, but excludes significant 
information for the reader in terms of the situation that causes such a claim, then the 
information is incomplete and perhaps incomprehensible. In contrast, an article 
approaching the same issue by explaining to the reader even the smallest piece of 
information, like "Puerto Rico is a territory of the United States", would put into 
perspective the facts motivating this organization. In other words, content and form will 
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modify the coverage ofFALN's political motivations. It is in this context that the 
literature's proposition has to be evaluated. 
5.3.1 Discussion ofMotivations as Part of the Introduction 
One of the ways in which media included FALN's political motivations was as 
part of the introduction to the organization. That is, the media would introduce the 
organization with a short report of the organization's political agenda. The reporter 
mentions the name of the organization and this was followed by a description ofFALN's 
motivations as if to explain to the reader the nature of that organization. 
The latter was particularly important during the coverage of the initial acts, when 
the F ALN was completely unknown to the public. At this initial point the organization is 
likely to be described in its own terms as those are expressed in their communication, 
since the reporters lack alternate sources of information. In the report ofFALN's very 
first action, The Chicago Tribune introduces the organization in this manner: 
The group calling itself the Armed Forces ofPuerto Rican National Liberation, 
called for unconditional independence for Puerto Rico and demanded the release 
of five Puerto Ricans who they said were being held as political prisoners in 
federal penitentiaries across the country (The Chicago Tribune, 10/27/1974, p. 1). 
Here the organization is presented by its name and their political claims. As the literature 
suggest political groups act and communicate through the media in order to gain attention 
to their political claim (Mulcahy, 1995). This point is particularly important when the 
coverage ofpolitical motivations in media is analyzed. The way in which the media 
covers and reports the group's claims is the essence of their actions. 
The last quote is an example ofhow to present the motivations of the group in 
their own terms, and it explains to the public the origin and nature of the group using 
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statements of the groups' claims. These usually short statements were similar to each 
other and somehow repetitive, in the sense ofusing mostly the same phrases. Statements 
limited to the group's actual claims are rare, and more often media coverage would 
include more information on the topic. This extra information was often to present a 
negative perspective. For example, the following quote shows how the reporter includes 
more information, but this works toward a negative evaluation of the claim being 
presented. 
The group identified by telephone as the "Armed Forces ofNational Liberation", 
called for "immediate independence" for Puerto Rico and the release of five 
Puerto Rican nationalists prisoners being held by the Federal Government for the 
attempted assassination ofPresident Harry S. Truman and shooting up the House 
ofRepresentatives in 1954 (The New York Times, 10/30/1974, p. 28). 
Thus, the reporter took the time of looking for additional information on the issue 
he/she was reporting. Contrary to the first quote on this section from The Chicago 
Tribune, the reporter this time went into more detail and explained to the reader who 
those five Puerto Rican prisoners were. Interesting is how the angle chosen here is to 
present the acts for which these people were imprisoned and not the reasons why F ALN 
was acting on their behalf. As it was noted before in this chapter, the F ALN was involved 
in a larger struggle for the release of these prisoners and their point was not what the 
prisoners did, but the fact that they were "the longest held political prisoners in the 
Western Hemisphere." The reporter chooses to present a negative angle on the claim, and 
in this way it-the claim-gets de-legitimized. 
The media approach ofpresenting the organization by disclosing a part of their 
political motivations could work to the benefit of the organization's purposes of 
promulgating their claims, but it is turned against them when the information provided is 
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accompanied by negative statements that only affect negatively their position. As in the 
previous quote where the information provided presents an image of the nationalist 
prisoners as dangerous criminals, the claim is affected by this additional information. The 
negative statements on FALN's political motivations, when these-the political 
motivations-were presented as part of the introduction, included in some cases their 
most important claim: the independence ofPuerto Rico. 
The group's name stands for Armed Forces ofNational Liberation. It seeks 
complete independence for the island from the United States. Independence is one 
of the three important political currents in Puerto Rico along with the retention of 
the present commonwealth status, and statehood, following the example ofAlaska 
and Hawaii. In most island election, the independence candidates rarely get more 
than 5 per cent of the votes cast (The New York Times, 01/25/1975, p. 10). 
The most significant political issue ofFALN's agenda was the independence of 
Puerto Rico. Their struggle was aimed toward the political status of the island. Here the 
reporter gives additional information to the reader that could put into perspective the 
issue. It was suggested in the introduction to this section that it had less meaning to just 
repeat a claim for independence than to actually explain the reader that Puerto Rico was a 
territory of the United States and that independence is a goal for many Puerto Ricans in 
history. 
This time the reader gets that information. The reader knows by this report first 
the name of the organization. Second, their political claim -independence. Then the 
report adds important information, independence is not a crazy idea but actually one of 
the "three important political currents in Puerto Rico." However, the reader not only 
receives that significant information, but then gets that independence although valid and 
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important, is not massively supported by the voters. The effect then is that their claim is 
not valid because voters do not support it. 
Phrases like ''terrorist organization" were often used to name the organization36• 
These introductory and descriptive phrases also modified and affected the presentation of 
FALN's claims. For example, in a 1975 article published in The New York Times, the 
organization is presented first as terrorist, then named, and then the political motivations 
are mentioned. 
The terrorist band, calling itselfFuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional 
Puertorriquefi.a (F.A.L.N.) said the bombings were part of a "coordinated attack 
against Yanki (sic) government and monopoly capitalist institutions" (The New 
York Times, 10/28/1975, p. 1). 
The reporter did not include additional information, just a quote from a F ALN's 
communique. But, the sentence starts with the phrase ''terrorist band" which sets the 
image of the organization since the beginning. An image of illegality and dangerousness 
that obscures and demonizes not only the group but also everything they stand for. 
Moreover, the quote used only reproduces political jargon, and does not explain the 
issues or claims. The message sent is one of radical gibberish and not of serious political 
issues. 
In the last period of this process, at the moment of the arrests, when the 
organization had been absent from the public arena for almost two years before the 
arrests on 1980, the media had the task of re-introducing the organization. At this point 
the most common way ofpresenting the group was by describing them as the "Puerto 
Rican terrorist group" and to recall their actions. In Chapter IV it was shown how at this 
36 See Chapter IV. 
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later point the group was mainly called by its ethnic identity and by the label of terrorism. 
This was usually followed, and reinforced, by summarizing all F ALN acts, and as a final 
touch, a short statement on their political motivations. The following quote is an example 
of the common way of talking about FALN during this process of the arrests and trials. 
The Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional, or Armed Forces ofNational 
Liberation, have claimed responsibility for or have been accused ofbombings that 
killed five people and injured more than 80 others. The group says its activities 
are in behalf ofPuerto Rican independence (The New York Times, 4/9/1980, p. 
A22). 
In this variation, the political motivations are not obscured by derogatory 
additional information or labeling, but by the mention ofall the damage that F ALN has 
caused. In this context, the fact that political motivation did have a space in media's 
coverage did not alter the effect of silencing or diminishing the political motivations of 
the group. 
5.3.2 As a Re-statement ofFALN's Communications 
Mostly on the initial phases of this process, approximately 197 4 to 1977, when 
F ALN was first appearing into the public spectrum and getting more and more 
recognition as their actions were occurring, the media quoted from and, in some very 
limited occasions, reproduced parts ofF ALN communications. The typical way in which 
F ALN made public their position was via a communique that was left in a public place. 
After an action had taken place, one or more F ALN members communicated 
anonymously by phone with the press and directed them to the exact location where the 
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document was left. They did not identify themselves individually, but identified 
themselves as members ofFALN, sometimes accompanied by a short statement. 
The media then had two main sources of information regarding F ALN's 
authorship and identity. First, it had F ALN's oral communication by phone. The media 
often noted this initial and direct interaction with F ALN members. This report was one­
sided since the source was the person who received the call and often reflected political 
and social evaluations of the FALN. The second source was obviously the actual 
communique. This document was often referred to in the media. The references were in 
terms of its content and its form. Although the references to the communique were 
customary, the actual reproduction of the document or at least considerable sections of it 
was rare. In the documents included in this study, every F ALN related article from 197 4 
to 198137, the reproduction ofF ALN communiques occurred only once. 
The article reporting the first action included both types ofcommunications. The 
communication by phone directing the media to the communique was carefully 
described, the account ofFALN's political motivations is modified by the focus on 
ethnicity and an image ofviolence. 
A woman then took the phone, identified herself as a member of the Armed 
Forces ofNational Liberation and announced, "We have just bombed Yankee 
imperialist banks. Free all Puerto Rican political prisoners." 
At 9:25 a.m., a man with thick Puerto Rican accent phoned the offices ofUnited 
Press International and said: "I want to tell the people of the United States, I'm 
going to blow up all ofWashington and New York unless the five political 
prisoners are released in 30 days" (The Chicago Tribune, 10/27/1974, p. 1). 
37 For a detailed explanation ofthe media documents included in this research, see Chapter III. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
143 
In this report on the communication of the FALN, the cardinal issue should have been the 
fact of the claim ofcredit by these individuals and their identity. At this point no one 
knew the F ALN and why were they taking these actions. The reporter accomplishes the 
task by reporting the actual assumption ofresponsibility and naming the organization. 
The other two elements included are their ethnicity (given by the reference to the accent) 
and the mention of the motive of the release of the Puerto Rican political prisoners. This 
report is complemented by quotes from the communique. 
The statement said in part: 
These actions have been taken in memory of the October 30, 1950, actions in 
Puerto Rico against Y anqui [Yankee] colonial domination. 
These bombings are also to accentuate the seriousness of our demands to 
release five political prisoners in this hemisphere and the immediate and 
unconditional independence ofPuerto Rico" (The Chicago Tribune, 10/27/1974, 
p. 1). 
Here we have an article that contains both of the forms previously identified as 
the ways in which the media re-stated FALN's communications. This article reports the 
first public act of the FALN, the first time that the FALN appeared publicly taking 
responsibility of an action. At this point there was no information or previous knowledge 
of the organization and their political motivations. Moreover, the only two sources of 
information supposedly available to the media were the phone call and the communique. 
In spite of an apparent effort to cover the content of the document, F ALN's political 
motivations are not clearly disclosed since the claims are not explained or at least put in 
the context of the situation ofPuerto Rico. As it was mentioned before in this chapter, the 
situation ofPuerto Rico or the existence of the Puerto Rican political prisoners was not 
regularly covered by the media. It is not enough to state the claim for the independence of 
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Puerto Rico, in many instances it is necessary to explain the political status ofPuerto 
Rico in order to understand the claim. Otherwise the information is incomplete. 
The same coverage is found on the article appearing the same day on The New 
York Times. Once again, the phone call when the F ALN claimed responsibility was 
described and small parts of the communique are included. 
A man and a woman with Puerto Rican accents telephoned and directed reporters 
to a telephone booth at Broadway and 73d Street, where the pair left a statement 
from F ALN...The statement demanded the release of five Puerto Rican prisoners 
by the Federal Government and called for the immediate independence ofPuerto 
Rico (New York Times, 10/27/1974, p.l). 
In this first account of an organization that is claiming responsibility for bombing several 
buildings in New York City, the focus again is on ethnicity. Since the organization 
identify itself as being part of the struggle for the independence ofPuerto Rico, and its 
name was in Spanish, why is it important to mention the accents? One possible 
explanation is that reporters use this type ofreference in order to provide some 
authenticity to the caller. Be that as it may, the effect remains the same: ethnicity 
continues to be the constant modifier ofcharacterization (Chapter V) and political 
motivations. 
The political claim is mentioned by a reference to the content of the communique. 
The two main political issues are mentioned -the release of the political prisoners and the 
independence ofPuerto Rico. Although this article does include a brief account of the 
identity of these prisoners, there is no mention ofthe political status ofPuerto Rico. 
Moreover, the account of the identity of these prisoners does little more than to taint their 
claim since the information provided is that these people attacked the House of 
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Representatives and the Blair House (The New York Times, 10/27/1974, p.1). In this 
manner, the political aim of the independence ofPuerto Rico is covered incompletely due 
to the absence of information on the situation of the island. 
A couple ofmonths later, on January, 1975, on the occasion ofFALN's second 
public act38, The New York Times reports on the form and content ofa communique. 
After being identified as a "Puerto Rican nationalist organization that has been linked to 
previous acts of terrorism", the article goes on to describe the content of the document 
not without making a derogatory remark as an introduction. 
The message, which had some typing errors, said in part: "We did this in 
retaliation for the CIA ordered bomb that murdered Angel Luis Chavonnier and 
Eddie Ramos, two innocent young workers who supported Puerto Rican 
independence and the conscienceless (sic) maiming often innocent persons and 
one beautiful Puerto Rican child six years old in Mayaguez, Puerto Rico dinning 
place on Saturday the eleventh of January of 1975" (The New York Times, 
01/25/1975, p. 1). 
The content of the communique is preceded by a comment on the form -the 
presence of some typing errors. Here they were dealing with a major event. As their own 
headline pointed out "4 killed, 44 injured in Fraunces Tavern blast", there was an 
enormous effect and consequently many important angles to report. In this conjuncture, 
the reporter stops to mention that the document, in which an organization assumes 
responsibility of this action and states their reasons, had some typing errors. The only 
logical explanation for this interest in spelling is to point out errors in the document and 
thereby discredit somehow the legitimacy or seriousness of the group, or to present an 
image of low education or maybe otherness by exposing a lack of fluency in the 
language. 
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These events to which the communique refers are not explained in this report. The 
two deaths and several injuries that were caused the alleged CIA bomb are completely 
unknown to the reader. The intent of reporting the political motivation by quoting the 
communique is obscured by the fact that the reasons exposed in the document make no 
sense ifnot accompanied by a minimal explanation. In a long article with several quotes 
from interviews with law enforcement agents and full ofdetailed descriptions of the 
damages and the victims, a single unexplained quote from a badly written document, 
seems insignificant and contributes in no way to the disclosure of the political claims of 
the group. 
The same day, The New York Times published several articles about the same 
event, including a complete reproduction of the communique in a small text box 
surrounded by several pieces on the victims, their families, their medical condition, and 
the heroes. This is the only occasion in which a communique was completely reproduced 
in all the documents that were included in this research. Nevertheless, it was not until the 
next day, on January 26, 1975, that the events designated in the communique as the ones 
provoking this action were explained. 
This article on the development of the investigation of this case and the status of 
the victims explains in a sentence what they called "the retaliation motive". After 
updating the condition of the victims -ten "remained hospitalized, three in critical 
condition", there are quotes from the Chiefofpolice warning that ''this might happen 
again", and another police officer that stated "Anybody who would put this amount of 
dynamite in a place where people were dining didn't care if they killed people." In a final 
38 The attack on Fraunces Tavern. 
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sentence the reporter explains that the deaths mentioned in the communique occurred on 
a rally celebrated in Mayaguez, Puerto Rico. "A few hours before the celebration was to 
start, one bomb was found and dismantled. But another went undiscovered and exploded 
in the crowd, resulting in the deaths and injuries" (The New York Times, 01/26/1975, p. 
45). The event that provoked this action at Fraunces Tavern that was so thoroughly 
covered, probably because of the extent of the damages, was remanded to a last sentence 
in the next day's paper after a full coverage on the status of the investigation and the 
injured. In this context, the strength and validity of their political claim is diminished. 
This pattern ofdiminishing the validity of the political claim by either excluding 
necessary information to understand it or by accompanying it with pernicious remarks is 
constant and pervasive in the media presentations ofFALN's political motivations. On 
October 27, 1975, there was another action in which authorship was claimed by FALN. 
On this occasion there were bombings of three buildings in downtown Chicago. In an 
article that starts by naming F ALN "an extremist Puerto Rican organization", The 
Chicago Tribune quotes from F ALN's communique: 
Today Armed Units ofFALN commemorate the anniversary of the October 30 
revolution in Puerto Rico against Yanqui (sic) domination. And it marks the first 
anniversary of the existence ofour organization by launching a simultaneously 
coordinated attack against Yanqui (sic) government and monopoly capitalistic 
institutions in New York City, Washington D.C., Chicago and Puerto Rico ...We 
demand immediate independence ofPuerto Rico and the unconditional release of 
the five Puerto Rican Nationalist prisoners (The Chicago Tribune, 10/28/1975, p. 
11). 
The October 30th ''revolution" is an event mostly celebrated by nationalist groups 
in Puerto Rico. It commemorates an uprising that took place in Puerto Rico in the remote 
town ofJayuya. This and other events of the history of independence movements in 
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Puerto Rico are further discussed on Chapter I and Chapter III of this work. Here what is 
important is to mention that this event -the Jayuya uprising-- and its sequel, the attack to 
the House ofRepresentatives, provoked the arrest and imprisonment ofmore than a 
thousand people accused ofbeing nationalists or communists (Scarano, 1993). In spite of 
the repercussions of this historical event, it is not commemorated or even known by many 
Puerto Ricans, since it is often omitted from the official history. If it is an event mostly 
unknown to most Puerto Ricans, it is definitely going to be unknown to the average 
United States citizen, not ofPuerto Rican descent. Ifthe facts presented in the 
communique are not explained, then the political motivation has no meaning. 
Ifan unknown event is presented by a political organization --referred to as a 
"terrorist band" -- as their motivation behind their acts, then the claim loses validity, not 
only because it has no meaning for the reader but because it cannot conceal errors and 
half-truths. The presentation of the motivations, even when the media present those by re­
stating F ALN's own words, does not fulfill the goal ofdivulging a political message if it 
is obscured by the presentation ofdamaging remarks -like naming them terrorists-or of 
it is not understood by the reader. For example, in an article entitled "Puerto Rican Unit 
Says It Sets Bombs. Police Believe Underground Group Claim Blasts in Washington and 
Chicago", published in The New York Times, the FALN is presented as "a leftist 
underground group" and as "the terrorist band." After this extremely damaging 
introduction the political motivations are presented in a re-statement from one of the 
FALN's communiques: 
In a two-page message, headed "Communique No. 6," the F ALN said uprising by 
Puerto Rican nationalists on October 30, 1950. With rhetoric similar to other 
FALN statements, the group praised the government ofPremier Fidel Castro of 
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Cuba and declared: "Only a protracted, organized armed struggle can force the 
Yanqui (sic) invaders out ofPuerto Rico" (10/28/1975, p. 20). 
Both strategies are present here. First, they are presented as terrorists, affecting 
negatively the initial perception of the organization and influencing the reader's 
evaluation. These damaging remarks are complemented here by the reference to the 
political tone as "rhetoric" and by the mention ofFidel Castro. By these two references 
the reader gets the message that they are dealing with a communist group deserving the 
same evaluation as the Cuban government and its leader. Second, the mention of the 
political motivations is reserved to an allusion to the 1950's nationalist uprising. The fact 
that there is no explanation of the event they were commemorating or even of the 
political status ofPuerto Rico leave FALN's political claims as absent and concealed as if 
it was never exposed. 
5.3.3 Reporting Support and Being the Opposition 
Despite of the abundant information regarding the negative aspects ofFALN's 
actions and its investigation, there was large support for the organization and for their 
political agenda in Puerto Rico and the United States. As F ALN initially worked for the 
liberation ofPuerto Rican political prisoners, there was support organized for F ALN and 
there were other political groups supporting the issue of the independence ofPuerto Rico. 
The media occasionally covered this support. 
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In a very rare interview ofone of the supporters for the independence ofPuerto 
Rico39, Juan Mari Bras-a well known in Puerto Rico politician in favor of the 
independence ofPuerto Rico-carefully discusses the first bombings and places this 
action within the broader struggle for the independence of the island. On the occasion of 
a rally40 in support of independence for Puerto Rico that took place in New York city 
short after FALN's first action, Mr. Mari Bras says: "There is a diversity of forms and 
means by which the Puerto Rican people struggle for independence and national 
liberation. This is one of the means" (The Chicago Tribune, 10/28/1974, p. 5). There is 
nothing in these words that indicates reproach of the actors or the actions. The reporter 
however, qualifies Mr. Mari Bras' words in their introduction: 
A left-wing leader of the Puerto Rican independence movement said Sunday that 
terrorist bombings like those at five locations in Manhattan were one way of 
fighting for independence (The Chicago Tribune, 10/28/1974, p. 5). 
Thus the reporter calls the speaker "a left-wing leader" and puts words in Mr. Mari Bras' 
mouth by calling the actions ''terrorist bombings." In this way, the support shown by this 
individual is lessened and tainted. It is not a valid support since it comes from a 
communist and how could it be valid since he is talking about terrorism. 
Reporting on the same rally The New York Times does its part under the headline 
"20,000 Rally Here for Puerto Rican Independence. Speaker Tells newsmen 'I do not 
Condemn' Recent Bombings." Here the article reports the ample support shown for this 
activity. The focus is on the number ofpeople present in the rally and the identity of 
some well-known attendants. In spite of the generally positive coverage, one of the main 
39 The word rare is used here because, as it will be shown here, the supporters although sometimes 
mentioned were not commonly interviewed. 
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issues exposed in the rally-support for the independence ofPuerto Rico-- was presented 
in this article in a considerable negative manner, as the focus of the statement shifts to the 
violent action of the nationalist political prisoners. 
Nearly 20,000 people crowded into Madison Square Garden yesterday for a 
cheering, chanting, festive rally for Puerto Rican independence, in which the 
portraits of five Puerto Ricans jailed for a 1950 attempted assassination of 
President Harry S. Truman and the 1954 shooting in the House ofRepresentatives 
were draped from the arena ceiling (The New York Times, 10/28/1974, p.35). 
There are two other occasions when the supporters ofFALN and/or their political 
goals made an appearance in the media -when the arrests started and during the trial. 
Before the wave ofarrests in 1980, when most ofFALN members were taken into 
custody, a small group ofPuerto Rican supporters of the independence ofPuerto Rico, 
and sometimes leaders themselves ofother groups, were arrested in an attempt by the FBI 
to gather information about FALN. One of the people arrested during this time was 
someone identified in the media as Mr. Perez. This arrested individual expresses support 
for the independence ofPuerto Rico, but his support is tainted by the fact that he is 
expressing it under arrest and by his description as a former leader of another 
independence movement. 
Mr. Perez, a former "defense minister" for a Puerto Rican militant organization 
called the Young Lords, was charged with possession ofweapons, which the 
police said they had seized Wednesday night in the Bronx apartment where he 
was arrested...Mr. Perez declared: "This is part of a Government plot to suppress 
the Puerto Rican independence movement ...I'm for the independence ofPuerto 
Rico" (The New York Times, 8/5/1977, p. 1). 
40 This rally was very well attended. Reports on this rally inform an approximate attendance of20,000 
people. Amongst the speakers in this rally were very well known people like Jane Fonda and Angela Davis. 
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In this context, the support is not that significant, the person expressing support in under 
arrest at the time and he is himself a former leader. 
During the trial on 1980, a considerable number of supporters showed up at every 
hearing and during the trial stage. These supporters were sometimes mentioned in the 
media, although never interviewed. On April 6, 1980, The Chicago Tribune reports: 
Earlier about 70 demonstrators appeared at the Evanston police station at about 
11 :30 am Saturday to protest the arrest ofTorres and the 10 others. The protesters, 
most of them Latinos, communicated with those arrested by shouting to them. 
The demonstrators chanted, ''Not with prison, not with bullets, the struggle 
won't be stopped," and held banners reading, "Independence and Socialism for 
Puerto Rico" and "Support and Defend the Armed Clandestine Movement" (The 
Chicago Tribune, 04/06/1980, p. 1). 
This generous coverage presents a group of supporters that were present in defense of the 
F ALN members arrested. Their support extended beyond the individuals, and covered the 
political goals of freedom for the island. All these elements were presented to the reader 
in this article, and it was possible to get a message of a political group arrested for 
political reasons. But, the reporter did not stop there and he added the following sentence 
to the last paragraph: 
Security was reported tight at the police station, with armed officers stationed on 
the roof and inside the station, and watching from the outside (id.). 
Thus, F ALN members and their supporters were so dangerous that they deserved this 
impressive display of security. This image ofdangerousness reduced, once again, the 
positive effect that the presentation ofpolitical support could have had on the public. 
The same exhibition of support was experienced during the actual trial, when the 
demonstrators showed their support outside the courtroom. A couple of articles included 
coverage of the supporters (The Chicago Tribune, 04/08/1980, p. 3; The New York Times, 
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04/08/1980, p. A12; The Chicago Tribune, 07/29/1980, p. 3). This coverage was mostly 
short and to the point: "As the trial got under way, a group of about 35 protesters paraded 
in front of the Criminal Courts building demanding freedom for the suspects" (The 
ChicagoTtribune, 07/29/1980, p. 3). 
FALN's detractors also made an appearance in media's coverage. The most 
interesting point in this part is that many times those detractors were the reporters or 
newspaper's editors themselves. It has been shown before how political and moral 
evaluations ofFALN's members and activities are presented in an indirect manner, like 
when F ALN members are called terrorists or when their actions are described as actions 
designed to kill. In this section, other approach is presented, when the media assumes a 
position in direct opposition to the F ALN and breaks their neutral appearance. 
Right after F ALN's first action, the editors of The New York Times took it upon 
themselves to explain the broader situation ofPuerto Rico and the context ofFALN's 
actions, and they did so while expressing their very particular position on the issue. In the 
first paragraph the editors explain to the general population how damaging for the 
independence movement F ALN's actions are. 
The five bombs exploded in Manhattan over the weekend will damage the cause 
of independence for Puerto Rico far more that they damaged the banks and other 
properties in the target areas. It is worth nothing that the official Independence 
party ofPuerto Rico, which polled only 4 per cent in the last elections, promptly 
dissociated itself from the bombings and also disavowed the Puerto Rican 
independence rally in Madison Square Garden yesterday (The New York Times, 
10/28/1974, p. 30, section L+). 
Thus the editors made an effort to gather information on the political status ofPuerto 
Rico and offered a very particular and not so neutral political analysis. Arguing that 
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FALN's actions do not represent the political preference ofPuerto Rican voters and that 
in contrast their actions will damage the struggle for the independence of the island, the 
editors attack F ALN's political motivations. Hence, F ALN is not only pursuing a non­
supported cause but it also harms the ones that do support it. F ALN's actions and their 
political motivations are not valid or legitimate. 
The Times editors went on to diminish the continuous support for the 
independence of the island by the United Nations, by disregarding it as the actions of 
communist countries. The editors argue that these actions were upheld with the sole 
intention ofraising attention to the issue at a moment were the United Nations is about to 
make a report on colonial territories. They argue that anti-American-communist countries 
advance this position and that they do not influence Puerto Rican voters. In fact, they say, 
"it is doubtless frustration at their inability to persuade fellow Puerto Ricans in open 
debate at home that provokes extremist groups to resort to such tactics as bombings and 
carefully-stacked independence rallies in New York" (The New York Times, 10/28/1974, 
p. 30, section L+). 
Apparently these views reflect a consensus among the editors of the two 
newspapers studied in this research. The editors of The Chicago Tribune a year after the 
Times editorial exposed their opinions. They attack the F ALN, their cause, the United 
Nations and the Puerto Rican independence movement. 
Puerto Rican nationalists, linked to the recent bombings here and in New York 
City and Washington, are few in number. Their cause, independence from the 
United States, has so little appeal in Puerto Rico itself that in a 1967 referendum 
their option attracted 4,205 votes, in contrast to 425,081 for commonwealth status 
and 273,315 for statehood. 
About the only place where Puerto Rican nationalists can muster much 
support is in the General Assembly of the United Nations, which in December, 
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1973, passed one of its inconsequential resolutions affirming the island's right to 
be independent. With the Cuban ambassador leading the chorus, a majority of 
U.N. voters demonstrated that they would rather be against the United States than 
for what most Puerto Ricans want (The Chicago Tribune, 10/29/1975, p. 2, 
section 2). 
The attack on the cause for independence is consistent in the media accounts. One 
of the interesting things of The Chicago Tribune piece is that it presents a position that is 
not against a so-called terrorist group that has acted against US properties, but it is 
actually against the independence ofPuerto Rico altogether. Independence is a legitimate 
status alternative that goes to the polls at every election and that is a valid political 
aspiration with a long history. The editors assume a position in opposition to the 
independence formula and to anyone that supports it, this including the United Nations. 
In a very irritated tone the editors described the United Nations resolutions as 
"inconsequential.'' 
Besides these strong pieces where the editors of leading newspapers express 
freely their position regarding F ALN and its cause, most reporters reflected their position 
in a subtler manner. Beyond the indirect criticisms, the most common way of expressing 
opposition was attacking the cause for independence by arguing that it was an 
unsupported political alternative. For example, in The New York Times the following 
remark appeared: "Despite the rhetorical fervor of the F ALN demands for independence, 
the cause has drawn dwindling support in Puerto Rico over the last 20 years, with parties 
favoring independence never able to gain as much as 10 percent of the popular vote" (The 
New York Times, 08/04/1977, p. B6). 
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5.3.4 Comparison with Other Groups 
Finally, the last aspect considered in this chapter about political motivation, is the 
comparison ofFALN with other political groups or movements. The idea is to identify 
FALN's political motivations by the association of them with other known political 
actors. Political rather than criminal motivations are presented in an indirect fashion by 
comparing the groups with other political movements. 
Question number 15 of the protocol reads: 
Are there any comparisons with other political groups or movements? 
a. Yes. 
b.No. 
Out of 59 documents analyzed, 47 (79.6%) did not include any comparison to 
other political groups, and 12 (20.3%) did include a comparison. These comparisons were 
sometimes in a direct manner and others were indirect references, some to other Puerto 
Rican organizations, and some to other known political movements. 
In an article about FALN's first public action on October of 1974, when the 
reporter is trying to identify the F ALN, the group is related to other Puerto Rican 
organization called M.I.R.A.: ''The previous terrorist organization that said it was 
involved in bombings here was a group that called itselfM.I.R.A., whose letters stood for 
revolutionary independence movement" (The New York Times, 10/30/1974, p. 28). There 
is no additional information on this group, however this sentence offers the necessary 
information to understand the message that F ALN is a terrorist organization as this 
M.I.R.A. was. 
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Another direct comparison found in the media accounts was one to the 
Symbionese Liberation Army. The argument is clear in the sense of applying to FALN 
the same negative public opinion that this organization had at the moment. As it is shown 
in the following quote, the reporter presents both groups as small and its members as 
having psychological problems. 
But FALN is an army only in the sense that the "Symbionese Liberation Army" of 
Patty Hearst days was an army. It is a tiny group ofcharacters with abnormal 
psychologies. FALN has almost nothing in common with liberation fighters with 
a constituency (The Chicago Tribune, 04/08/1980, p. 2 section 2). 
In a more indirect manner, FALN was also related to the Black Panthers. It is 
indirect since the relation is established by the intermediate relation of a third 
organization. In an article reporting the arrests ofone Puerto Rican suspected ofbeing 
member or having information ofFALN, the arrested individual is supposedly a former 
leader of a Puerto Rican organization known as the Young Lords. This organization is 
then compared to the Black Panthers. "The group, called the Young Lords, considered 
themselves a sort ofPuerto Rican equivalent of the Black Panthers, and they adopted a 
paramilitary style ofdress, a leftist philosophy and strident ethnic pride" (The New York 
Times, 08/05/1977, p. Al 1). 
By direct and indirect comparisons with other political groups an assumption of 
political activity is presented rather than a criminal intention. This is very important since 
it is contradictory with the criminalization process. It is contradictory in theory, but in 
practice it works towards the same effect ofcreating a negative and reproachable image 
deserving ofcontrol and punishment. 
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5.4 Some Concluding Remarks 
This chapter studied FALN's political motivations. As we discussed in Chapter II, 
the literature on the topic suggests that for a group organized for political reasons, the 
most important aspect for them is their political motivations. The F ALN made public 
their commitment to the independence ofPuerto Rico every chance they got, particularly 
in their public statement -communiques. 
The law and the media approached the issue ofFALN's political motivations in 
different ways but with a common characteristic. This is, even when FALN's political 
motivations were more present in the media than in the legal documents analyzed, in both 
cases, F ALN's political motivation were presented in such a way that it lost absolute 
legitimacy. 
The law, through its actors, did not present FALN's motivations in the majority of 
the cases. Only 35.13% of the documents contained reference to FALN's political 
motivations, and 86.5% of the documents made no reference to the political, economic, 
or social situation ofPuerto Rico. The legal documents that did contain a reference to 
FALN's motivations or the situation ofPuerto Rico did so in a way that it de-legitimized 
those political motivations. In this chapter four main ways in which de-legitimization was 
accomplished were identified: vilifying the motives by emphasizing tactics; vilifying 
motives by stigmatizing the subjects; imposing guilt by association; and, disclosing 
political motivations as an unwanted aftereffect. 
The media documents reflected a significantly higher number ofdocuments with 
mentions ofFALN's political motivations. That is, 57.6% of the documents did contain 
mention to F ALN's motivations. On the other hand, for the broader question about the 
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general situation ofPuerto Rico, 84.7% reflected no mention of the situation ofPuerto 
Rico. When these two results are considered together, we have the effect of lessening the 
importance of those motivations by not presenting necessary information to understand 
the political issues presented by the FALN. This is, if the reader does not know that 
Puerto Rico is a territory of the United States, it will make no sense for him/her to 
mention that the F ALN wants the independence for Puerto Rico. 
Moreover, there were other ways in which the presentation ofmotivations acted 
against the F ALN in terms ofbeing presented in such a way that those motivations 
seemed invalid. Often their political motivations were accompanied in the media with 
negative and judgmental statements. These negative statements attacked everything from 
the main motive -independence for Puerto Rico-- to the grammatical errors in the 
communiques or heavy accents. In some other occasions the media assumed a very active 
role in the critique to F ALN's motivations, when it engaged in a discussion about those 
motivations in editorial sections. 
This chapter showed the contradictory importance ofpolitical motivations for the 
groups involved in this issue. For the F ALN political motivations are vital. For the law 
and for the media, political motivations were pieces of information that either did not 
needed to be disclosed or when disclosed had to be qualified. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE FEAR FACTOR 
One of the first reactions to news about terrorists and terrorism is fear. The notion 
of terrorism brings about images ofdeath and destruction, thus logically fear is a certain 
response. The literature on media and political movements41 suggests that often media 
provoke sentiments of fear ofpolitical actors and activities that in turn affects social 
reaction to them. 
Media characterizations have important effects in how the public is going to react 
to such political groups and their activities. Altheide argues that not only the media has 
the power to define what and ''who is to be feared", but also that these are elements that 
could make people react with fear and pressure agents of social control to react toughly 
(Altheide, 1997, pp. 665). The way in which groups are defined and interpreted 
determines the way in which these are going to be handled. While freedom fighters are 
seen with respect and approval, terrorists are feared and condemned. This in turn justifies 
or, according to Altheide, even compels harsh treatment. 
41 See Chapter II. 
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In this chapter we will have the opportunity to explore the way in which media 
and the law play with the fear factor. It will be interesting to observe the way in which 
media exhorts sentiments of fear by suggesting imminent or possible danger to the public, 
or perhaps by recalling dangerous events. Since the data on media includes events 
previous to the arrests and following, it will be possible to discover any changes or 
tendencies. Moreover, it will be possible to explore the possibilities ofmedia influence 
on legal treatment. 
On the introductory chapters it was discussed how the legal treatment to F ALN 
members was extremely hard in comparison to individuals accused of similar offenses42• 
Through the study of the legal documents included in this research it will be possible to 
observe if fear was an element utilized by the legal actors in the process against the 
FALN. If it was an important element, it will be possible to draw inferences about 
justification of severe treatment. 
On the contrary, the political prisoners will argue that their acts were aimed to the 
government of the United States as a legitimate response to the illegal, colonial, 
subjugation ofPuerto Rico. They would present themselves as freedom fighters whose 
only target was the government and not the public, for that reason they were not to be 
feared but respected and supported. 
The protocol contains two questions that address the issue of fear in different 
ways. The first question, question number 16, directly attacks the issue and it reads as 
follows: 
42 See comparison in sentences on Chapter II. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
162 
Is there any mention ofpossible danger to the public? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
Any reference to previous or possible future activities that could cause injuries, death, or 
property damage was counted as a Yes in this question. It was also counted as a Yes, any 
recollection or mention of dangerous tactics that could generate emotions of fear in the 
reader. 
As it was argued before, fear of danger to the public could justify harder treatment 
by the state. Question number 17 approaches this topic: 
Are there any policy or handling suggestions? 
a. jail time 
b. psychological treatment 
c. death penalty 
d. stricter surveillance to other groups or individuals 
e. stricter immigration laws 
f stricter surveillance to F ALN 
g. other 
h. none 
6.1 FALN's Side: Did They Intend to Create Fear? 
The F ALN presented itself as a political organization whose aim was to liberate 
Puerto Rico from its colonial domination. They presented themselves as a group working 
towards its people, and their struggle as part of their work for the betterment ofPuerto 
Rican's social conditions. They never presented their organization or their work as a 
menace to society at large, but as part of that legitimate political work. 
During the 1970's and the beginning of the '80s, the prisoners were involved in 
community, union, student and political struggles in Puerto Rico and one in the 
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United States. They fought for the people's right to high quality and free 
education. They worked to create community institutions such as alternative 
education programs, child-care centers, health centers, housing cooperatives, 
recreational facilities and political organizations .. .ln summary they challenged the 
U.S. political system in many ways (Arm the Spirit, 1995). 
The targets for their actions were not regular people or civilians, but major 
corporations and the government. Their actions were regularly planned as symbolic 
actions targeting buildings and government sites at time when no people could be injured. 
This was so, that in over 100 bombings, that the F ALN took responsibility for, only 5 
people died. At least this is the argument ofOscar Lopez as cited by Ronald Fernandez: 
"'The evidence will show you that we have a deep respect for human life, that we care for 
human life.' To Oscar the proofwas in the result of the bombings: How could the F ALN 
violence be characterized as 'indiscriminate' if, in 120 bombings, 'very few people have 
died.' Obviously, when it attacked banks, could have slaughtered people if it chose to do 
so" (Fernandez, 1994, p. 207). 
The argument is that if in so many actions only five people died, in fact four died 
in just one action -Fraunces Tavern--, then it is clear that the F ALN did not intend to 
represent a danger to people in general. The F ALN has always sustained that they did not 
intentionally target civilians only corporations and government sites. In that sense, people 
should not feel fear because they were not in danger. About their targets, F ALN states: 
Invoking the right under international law to use all means available does not 
mean we used them with no respect for human life, even when colonialism is a 
disrespect (sic) for the human life of a nation, a crime perpetrated against all 
citizens, regardless. It has always been the practice and purpose of groups 
participating in the independence struggle to take all possible measures to ensure 
that innocent people are not harmed. Our actions, for the most part symbolic, have 
had the objective of focusing the attention of the U.S. government on the colonial 
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conditions ofPuerto Rico, and not ofcausing terror to the citizens of the U.S. or 
Puerto Rico (Torres, 1996, p. 2). 
Thus, the FALN insists that their struggle is against the U.S. government and U.S. 
corporations and not against the people of the United States. Moreover, they sustain that 
their actions were designed not to harm people and not to cause terror. In that sense, 
people should not fear them. Yet, people did die as a result of their actions. About this 
result, FALN says: 
However, that is not to deny that in all liberation processes, there are always 
innocent victims on all sides. In the case ofPuerto Rico, there are fewer caused by 
those who struggle for independence in comparison with other liberation 
movements, taking into consideration as well the disproportionate size of 
contenders. In our case, as with all those who seek justice, errors are committed. 
We learn from those errors with a sense of self-criticism, always in the context of 
our just cause, seeking to end colonialism, a crime against humanity (Torres, id., 
p. 2). 
Victims are evaluated by the F ALN as errors in their struggle and not as the 
purpose of their actions. F ALN was, as it was exposed in previous chapters, defined and 
labeled as a terrorist organization, and presented as an organization that designed actions 
in order "to kill people". Here, the F ALN is arguing that they were not terrorist, but 
fighters for the independence ofPuerto Rico who did not intend to cause any deaths, on 
the contrary that self-criticize because of those deaths. Deaths are, then, understood by 
them as errors and not as purpose. This is what they think differentiate them from 
terrorists. They regret committing those errors, they regret causing terror: 
There should be no doubt in anyone's mind that we -like all genuine freedom 
fighters and revolutionaries -do regret any loss of life on all sides of the conflict, 
especially of any innocent civilian, but also on those engaged in belligerence. We 
do regret loss of life, because we prize human life very highly (Torres, id., p. 3). 
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It is because they do not aim civilians, and do regret any deaths, that they call 
themselves freedom fighters and reject those who call them terrorists. To cal them 
terrorists is seen by them as an strategy of the state to infringe fear on people and it is 
only the result of them being the opposition and not a reflection ofwhat F ALN really is. 
Alejandrina Torres on 1985 told the court: "The U.S. government labels me a terrorist 
because I am willing to engage in armed struggle to free my nation. Yet, if I were a 
mercenary who fought with the contras in Nicaragua, President Reagan would call me a 
freedom fighter. Clearly the issue is not how I am fighting but what I am fighting or and 
who I am fighting against" (cited in Fernandez, 1994, p. 203). 
Contrary to what the F ALN thought of themselves and their actions, the law and 
the media portrayed an image ofdanger to society at large. 
6.2 Law: Did it Play the Fear Game? 
On previous chapters it has been shown how the law named or labeled the F ALN 
and its members prior, during and after the trial. Words as terrorists and cold-blooded 
criminals were used to describe and define F ALN members. Words like secret and 
clandestine were used to describe and define F ALN as an organization. These words have 
the effect of creating an image of the subjects as being dangerous and evil people. This 
image often provokes sentiments of fear amongst the audience. This chapter will further 
explore this topic of fear and how the legal actors used this technique -infringement of 
fear. 
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The protocol contained one question that directly addresses the issue of fear. For 
question 16 ("Is there any mention ofpossible danger to the public?") nine documents 
were found containing direct mentions ofpossible danger43• This is 24% of the legal 
documents. 
The second question included in the protocol regarding this topic responds to 
Altheide's proposition that fear could influence agents of social control toward harsher 
treatment. With this question any suggestion of social control policy or handling was 
counted. Out of the 37 legal documents studied, only three (.08%) directly suggested any 
policy or handling alternative. Specifically, one suggested long jail time and two 
suggested stricter methods of surveillance to F ALN member and followers. 
In spite of these apparent low numbers Altheide's proposition cannot be discarded 
yet. The documents studied in this part come precisely from those that Altheide suggests 
would be influenced. The legal actors -prosecutors, judges, law enforcement agents-are 
those that, according to Altheide, would be influenced and not the ones doing the 
influencing. For that reason, theoretically this question when applied to legal actors may 
not provide any useful information. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to see how the legal actors use the fear factor when 
targeting their audience --jurors, judges, legal decision's readers. In these cases, the legal 
actors used fear as a mechanism to support their specific argument. To better see this use, 
43 As it was explained before, this question includes direct suggestions ofdanger as well as accounts of 
previous dangerous acts. 
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each quote will be preceded by an explanation of the source, the speaker and the possible 
audience. 
One of the documents that initiated the criminal procedures against F ALN is the 
sworn affidavit by FBI Agent Hahn, Unit# 005. As it was mentioned before, Agent Hahn 
I 
is a self- proclaimed expert on FALN and other Puerto Rican independence movements. 
Hahn in this affidavit introduces FALN and explains in detail FALN's history and modus 
operandi. The information provided by Agent Hahn was constantly used and quoted on 
latter documents. 
This affidavit was initially filed in support of a request for authorization for the 
use of special methods of surveillance. Thus, the document was directed to a judge as a 
support document for the prosecutor's request. 
This is how Hahn introduces F ALN in his statement: 
The FALN publicly emerged on October 26, 1974 when the group claimed credit 
for five bombings that occurred downtown New York City. Although these initial 
attacks were symbolic in nature and seemingly not designed to injured people, 
such was not the case in the F ALN next attack which occurred on December 11, 
197 4. In this instance the group used a false report of a dead body in an apartment 
building to induce police into a "booby trap" explosive device that detonated 
leaving a young policeman, Angel Poggi, maimed and permanently disabled. The 
group's next action occurring on January 24, 1975, was even more ruthless and 
resulted in four deaths, over 60 injuries, and extensive property damage. (Unit # 
005, page 3). 
Hahn presents the organization by stating their previous acts. The usage ofpositive and 
sympathetic language when he makes references to the policeman, "a young policeman, 
Angel Poggi" versus the negative and judging language that he uses to describe F ALN 
actions, presents an image ofgood versus evil. The victim even has a name, so the reader 
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can identify and suffer his loss. F ALN on the other hand is a faceless group, whose 
actions are "ruthless". 
Thus, Hahn clearly is trying to present the worst possible image for the judge to 
grant the petition for stricter methods of surveillance44• The technique he uses is to 
present a fearful group capable of ruthless acts that deserve to be treated roughly. The last 
quote shows how Hahn defines the organization by stating F ALN's previous acts. The 
basis he uses to argue that those acts were committed by F ALN is precisely that the group 
had assumed responsibility for their acts. This was FALN's practice, they would send an 
anonymous communique to the media assuming responsibility for the action and 
explaining its motivation45• But Hahn did not expose FALN's political motivation, he 
only states the facts, the acts. 
Hahn not only used FALN's assumption ofresponsibility on communiques, but 
also adjudicates responsibility to other acts. Following the same pattern, Hahn presents to 
the judge some ofFALN's acts: 
The FALN made its presence known in Chicago, Illinois, on June 15, 1975 when 
they claimed credit for the two powerful bombs that detonated in the downtown 
Loop area. In October, 1975, the FALN attempted to display their strength by 
simultaneously exploding bombs in New York City, Washington, D.C., and 
Chicago. During the following year, the F ALN detonated several more devices in 
New York and Chicago, causing property damage and injuring innocent 
bystanders. For some unexplained reason, however, they did not claim credit for 
these incidents (Unit #002, page 4). 
According to Hahn, we have to assume that F ALN claimed credit for some of their acts 
and not for others, the rationale for this is unknown though. In spite of that, the method is 
44 The prosecution was requesting permission to use video equipment to record the interior of a suspected 
safe house. 
45 For more on this practice see previous chapter. 
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the same, to define F ALN by their fearful actions and to feel sympathy for the victims, 
which is accomplished by the use of terms like "innocent bystanders" to refer to those 
victims. 
This tactic of introducing FALN with somewhat detailed statements of their 
actions and its effects, was repeated by most of the latter legal actors. Prosecutors and 
appellate court judges presented the organization by emphasizing the action and its 
effects, in this manner creating an image of frightful actors. Several of the appellate court 
decisions included this kind of statement as the base or introduction for damaging 
decisions for the defendants (F ALN's members and affiliates). 
Judge Posner on United States ofAmerica vs. Alejandrina Torres, et. al., 751 F.2d 
875, introduces FALN in this way: 
The FALN is a secret organization ofPuerto Rican separatists that has been trying 
to win independence for Puerto Rico by tactics that include bombing buildings in 
New York City, and Washington. The bombs are assembled and shared, and 
members of the organization meet in safe houses rented under false names. The 
bombings have killed several people, injured many others, and caused millions of 
dollars ofproperty damage (Unit# 031, paragraph 13). 
The initial phrases on this quote and those on Hahn's statements are almost identical. The 
construction of the sentences are very similar, the presentation of the name (FALN) and 
then an account of actions and damage or victims. 
The argument is then built upon the base of an image of dangerous individuals. 
Hahn was pursuing to convince a judge to authorize special surveillance, and Judge 
Posner is trying to justify that same type of treatment. In this case, Judge Posner is faced 
with an appeal from an order of an inferior judge to suppress the videotapes of the safe 
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houses obtained with the methods authorized after Hahn's affidavit. Judge Posner then, 
builds on Hahn's strategy and constructs an image of evil that he then uses to justify the 
use of those videotapes. The following excerpt shows how Posner uses that evil image for 
that purpose. 
But we do not think there can never be a case where secretly televising people in 
private places is reasonable. The facts of the present case argue against so 
absolute an approach. The F ALN has the plans, the materials, and the know-how 
to kill in mass. A sophisticated as well as lethal practitioner or urban terrorism, it 
meets to plan its operations and assemble bombs in safe houses leased under false 
names. Alert to the possibility that its safe houses might be bugged by the FBI, it 
takes effective steps to defeat this form of electronic surveillance, making it 
highly resistant to conventional methods oflaw enforcement even as enhanced by 
modem techniques ofoverhearing conversations. We do not think that the Fourth 
Amendment prevents the government from coping with the menace of this 
organization by installing and operating secret television cameras in the 
organization's safe houses (Unit# 031, paragraph 32). 
Clearly Judge Posner creates an image of evil individuals and organization to 
justify the use of special surveillance even in possible violation ofconstitutional rights. 
The rationale seems to be that the evil nature of this people, their ability to avoid 
conventional modes of surveillance and their potentiality to damage others, justifies the 
use of the most invasive mechanisms. The strategy seems to be to create an image of 
frightful individuals to then justify severe treatment, which tends to support Altheide's 
proposition. 
The same type of structure was used in most of the appellate cases. The judge 
introduces the organization and its members as fearful actors that have committed several 
acts causing several damages or injuries, establishing the base over which a decision was 
made. It happens in United States ofAmerica vs. Jose Rodriguez, 803 F .2d 318, in Matter 
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of Special February 1975 Grand Jury, 565 F. 2d 407, and in USA vs. Alejandrina Torres, 
et. al., 751 F.2d 875. It also happens in Matter ofArchuleta, 561 F. 2d 1059, where Judge 
Meskill says: 
On January 24, 1975, a bomb exploded in Fraunces tavern, a restaurant in New 
York City. Four people were killed, and fifty-three were injured. A group known 
as Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional, or "FALN", which seeks 
independence for Puerto Rico, claimed responsibility for this act of terrorism. 
Finding then against the defendants. 
The justification for severe treatment based on an image ofdanger and sentiments 
of fear was also found in more direct and overt manners. Some documents show 
specifically the way in which fear was used as the determining argument in favor of such 
treatment. Particularly Hahn's affidavit in support of a request for the use of special 
surveillance technology shows how this element was used. Hahn builds upon a detailed 
and morbid depiction ofcold-blooded, well organized, fearless individuals: 
That individuals engaged in violent criminal activity in furtherance of the goals of 
the F ALN would continue that conduct long after the arrest and incarceration of 
Mendez46 and his co-defendants was made clear by many of the defendants ... As 
defendant Luis Rosa said "there will be many more Fraunces Taverns and many 
more Sabana Secas" [ where a bus loaded with unarmed navy personnel were 
ambushed by machine guns killing two and wounding nine ]47• As Carmen 
Valentin said " ...we are confident that all those that have partaken in this illegal 
and vicious trial will not be exempted for the righteous and just revolutionary 
procedure. There will soon be judges, marshals, members of the jury, prosecutors, 
agents, all ofyou -some ofyou will be walking on canes and wheelchairs. 
Revolutionary justice can be fierce. Mark my words (Unit #005, page 11). 
46 Freddie Mendez is an ex FALN member who cooperated with the state and became their most important 
informant. 
47 F ALN did not take credit for this action. This action took place in Puerto Rico and the island-based 
organization Los Macheteros took credit of this action. 
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Hahn is using menacing statements, supposedly coming from the defendants (he makes 
no reference as to when or where these statements were made), to support the 
authorization of invasive surveillance methodologies. Without entering into the justness 
or not of the request, which is not the purpose of this research, what it is pointed out here 
is the use of fear as the justification for harder treatment. 
Fear was constructed, in some occasions, by labeling the actors, creating a stigma 
based on the recollection ofprevious acts, modus operandi, associations, or sometimes on 
some kind of"criminal nature". The base is presented and the conclusion is insinuated. 
For example, on his opening statement, State Attorney Michael Ficaro presents to the 
jury an image, a picture ofruthless terrorists upon which he concludes that these people 
are "capable of anything". 
Your Honor, Judge Mahon, Mr. Shabat, ladies and gentlemen. FALN, Fuerzas 
Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional Puertorriquefta, The Armed Forces for the 
National Liberation ofPuerto Rico. Whether you use the anachronism (sic), 
Spanish, English, it means the same thing. Terrorist and terrorism. It means 
people who will do anything, including the spilling ofblood, for the cause they 
want. (Unit #006, State of Illinois vs. Carlos Torres. et.al., Trial Transcript, June 
29, 1980). 
The logic is simple, these people are terrorists and that means they will do anything for 
their cause ( cause that is not presented). The stigma is imposed and conclusions are 
drawn. 
These conclusions are strong and extremely damaging. They go from indirect 
insinuations ofhazard to concluding statements of imminent danger and deadly purpose. 
Like when Hahn comments on one of the attacks and concludes intentions based on the 
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act itself: "It was clear that this bombing was designed to kill people and was anything 
but 'symbolic' in nature" (Unit #005, page 3). 
The bases for these conclusions are, as it was suggested before, previous acts, 
"criminal nature", associations, and modus operandi. The following quote demonstrates 
how operates the relying on modus operandi. On an affidavit in support of application for 
interception oforal communication, Special FBI Agent Jeffrey C. Hayes develops his 
argument for the need of this surveillance based on FALN practices. 
As Freddie Mendez has advised, F ALN members routinely study photographs 
they have obtained of agents, police officers and ofa prosecutor in order to know 
their enemies. They are heavily armed and weapons trained. They talk regularly 
about killing law enforcement officers and their bombs have maimed many. They 
have spoken of automatic death to police undercover agents. (Unit #002, page 
11). 
These images of fear are also constructed on the basis of association. In the last 
chapter it was discussed how the law used the association with other political actors as a 
way of attributing negative evaluation to the FALN and its political goals (see Chapter 
V). This "guilty by association" type of argument was also used to generate images of 
fear. In a quote examined before48, it is shown how these images were constructed based 
on associations, in this case on association with the content of some books found in a safe 
house allegedly in control ofFALN members. 
Among the items discovered in Milwaukee, Wisconsin was a page from a book. 
The book is called the Anarchist Cook Book. It is a book which contains recipes 
for making a bomb, incinerary devices for altering weapons. It is a book designed 
to tell people how to kill. And from this book was found among other papers of 
the F ALN this last page. It is this last page, ladies and gentlemen, that best 
describes the people that are here on trial. 
48 See Chapter IV. 
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The page reads: Allow the fear and loneliness and hatred to build inside you, 
rather than diminish in time. Allow your patience to torture material file the seeds 
ofconstructive revolution (sic). Allow your love of freedom to overcome the false 
values placed on human life, for the only method to communicate with the enemy 
is to speak on his own level, using his own terms. Freedom is based on respect, 
and respect must be earned by the spilling ofblood. (Unit #006, State of Illinois 
vs. Carlos Torres, et.al., Trial Transcript, June 29, 1980). 
This quote comes from the opening statement of the state trial. The prosecutor is alleging 
that this excerpt of this unknown book should be used as a description of the defendants' 
state ofmind and beliefs. Apparently the logic here is that if they owned this book, they 
must believe what it says. It would be interesting to know if this was the only book found 
at this safe house or if there were others, if all said the same thing, otherwise how this 
could be argued. 
Finally, Mr. Shabat, Assistant State Attorney, in his closing statement sums up 
perfectly the way in which the labeling and creation of an image of fear can develop on 
conclusions ofpurpose and future actions. Addressing the jury, Mr. Shabat rounds up the 
prosecution's case in the following manner: 
Do not forget that one who conspires to commit robbery with others, as well as 
those others, and those who would in furtherance of their conspiracy arm 
themselves, as they have done, are always potential murderers in every step they 
take during the planning and commission of that conspiracy in pursuance of their 
objectives. Because when they arm themselves with these angles ofdeath, and 
that's exactly what they are, they are fully capable ofnot only fulfilling the 
promise of their conspiracy but other unlawful acts as well. (Unit #030, page 
241). 
Apparently the argument is if they were capable ofX, they should be capable ofY, and 
for that reason they should be controlled. 
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6.3 Fear in the Making: Media's Use of the Fear Factor 
In the introduction to this chapter it was argued that the media plays an important 
role on the creation of sentiments of fear in relation to subjects of their reports. According 
to the literature studied and to our theoretical propositions49 the media acts as a generator 
ofcultural images and understandings ofreality. Included in these social understandings 
would be the understandings of criminal or political actors. The cardinal distinction 
between those two groups may have an impact on the way in which social actors react to 
them. In other words, social reaction and consequently social control regarding a specific 
group is affected by the way that group is constructed (Altheide, 1997). 
In this section we are going to explore if the media utilizes a technique of fear to 
approach the subjects of this research. Moreover, we will examine the proposition that 
there is a relationship between the use of fear and the toughening of social control 
measures against those constructed as to be feared (Altheide, 1997). The focus on 
damages and injuries as well as discussions of''what could have happened?" are 
approaches that will be closely attended in order to uncover tendencies of treatment 
and/or intentions of influencing or inciting fear among audiences. 
There are two questions included in the protocol that target the topic of this 
chapter. Question number 16 directly explores the presence ofcomments or arguments of 
possible danger to the public. This includes direct remarks of danger as well as indirect 
approaches like detailed descriptions ofdamages and injuries or coverage focused on the 
victims. And question number 17 targets the other proposition of influence on social 
control. This question concretizes the possible direct influences in handling alternatives 
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like jail or stricter surveillance. It is important to stress that theoretically this influence 
does not have to be so direct as to specifically suggest how to handle them or to argue in 
favor of stricter control measures. The indirect aspect could be analyzed by a close 
reading of the actual articles. For that reason specific quotes are included in this section. 
To question number 16 the results were quite different from those found for the 
legal documents. Contrary to the 24% ofdirect mentions ofdanger for the public found in 
the legal documents, out of the 59 media documents included in this research 27 
contained mentions ofdanger. That is 45. 7% of the documents included a direct mention 
ofdanger. 
The results for question number 17 also reflect a difference from those on the 
legal documents. In contrast to an astoundingly low .08% of legal documents including 
direct policy or handling suggestions, the media documents contained a variety of 
suggestions in 20% of the news stories. The media documents contained a total of 13 
documents making any kind ofpolicy or handling suggestions. Included in these are four 
(4) documents suggesting incarceration Gail time), seven (7) suggesting strict 
surveillance, and two (2) actually suggesting the imposition of the death penalty. 
Besides the specificities of the answers to the protocol's questions, the way in 
which the media in their coverage of the F ALN and their actions used elements of fear, 
could be approached as a whole. In other words, ifwe take the actual words and phrases 
used to talk about this issue, we can discover tendencies or patterns that could be lost 
otherwise. In this process I have identified four different ways in which the media incites 
feelings of fear among the readers. These ways or tendencies are a focus on damages and 
49 See Chapter II. 
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negative effects, a discussion ofwhat could have happened, the construction of 
conspiracy theories, and finally the suggestion ofhandling or control mechanisms. 
6.3.1 Focusing on Damages 
The way in which the issue of the F ALN actions is approached could influence 
the way in which the readers feel about the group. For example, if the focus is on the 
political motivations of the group or even on their identification, the reader could feel 
assured to try to understand the group or their claims. On the other hand, if the article 
focuses on the extent of the damages or the negative effects that the actions had, the 
reader may feel apprehension and be less willing to understand the issues at hand in a 
political fashion. For example, when an article commences by stating: "Four persons 
were killed and at least 40 injured", the message is affected by this initial shocking 
statement the rest of the article is affected or even tainted from the starting point. Of 
course, this is probably the effect that the reporter is going after, after all, that is the news 
that is going to attract readers. 
The way in which a topic is approached could affect the way in which information 
is received. There is a tendency in the documents of the media to present the topic with a 
focus on damages and negative effects. In 1975, when The New York Times reported the 
action against Fraunces Tavern in New York they published a very long article full with 
pictures of the injured victims and property damages. The frightening descriptions and 
details of the damages were presented like a horror short story. The article starts this way: 
A thundering explosion believed by the police to have been detonated by Puerto 
Rican nationalists ripped through a 10th-century annex to historic Fraunces Tavern 
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in lower Manhattan yesterday afternoon, killing four people and injuring at least 
44 others" (The New York Times, 01/25/1975, p. 1). 
This tragic tone of the lead paragraph is followed by four paragraphs ofhorrifying 
descriptions of the impact, the damages and the victims. The article includes a list of the 
names of the four persons killed and stories of the injured. The article also contained a 
discussion of the identity of the FALN and the content of the communique. Nevertheless, 
this occupies just two paragraphs within a long article full of tragic descriptions. 
Perhaps because the attack on Fraunces Tavern resulted in four deaths and several 
injuries, or perhaps for a sincere feeling ofvulnerability, after this action the coverage 
made a shift toward emphasizing danger and fear. The tone in the articles following the 
event on Fraunces Tavern (as will be shown later on this chapter) is tragic, resentful and 
fearful. The article discussed before is exemplary of the type ofmedia articles during this 
time. 
On January 26t\ 1975, The New York Times published an article about the 
developments on the police investigation of the Fraunces Tavern incident. Under the 
headline "Police Seeking 2 in Tavern Blast", an initial report on this investigation is 
offered. Nevertheless, the focus rapidly changes and contrary to what the headline would 
suggest, the focus moves from the actual investigation to an update on victims' 
conditions and a wide array ofopinions about the dangerousness of this organization. The 
elements of this article on the discussion ofpossible future events are discussed in the 
next section. Here, it is important to analyze the way in which the article emphasizes the 
damages in their coverage ofany F ALN related topic, in this case the developments of 
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the investigation. The following quote shows how the emphasis is on the effects rather 
than on the causes, the quote exemplifies the tone of the whole article. 
Ten of the injured remained hospitalized yesterday, three in critical condition. The 
casualty toll in the lower Manhattan explosion was the highest of any political 
bombings here in recent years (The New York Times, 01/26/1975, p. 1). 
It is relevant to add that the coverage of the developments of the investigation 
took about two paragraphs of the 25-paragraphs article. The rest was dedicated to a report 
on the victims and opinions from law enforcement agents in regard to the future of the 
organization and the possibilities ofmore actions. In this context, the message tends to be 
in terms of the damages that the F ALN caused, which resulted in the highest casualty toll 
in recent years. Thus, the organization's image is presented as a menace to society at 
large. 
This general tone of exposure to danger continues as a constant in most of the 
media articles studied in this research. As was suggested before this could have been a 
consequence of the effects of the Fraunces tavern attack. The apparent consensus was that 
this event demonstrated the F ALN's fatal intentions and capabilities. A law enforcement 
agent reflects on the bombings and concludes: "Some of the others, like the Fraunces 
Tavern one, were designed to kill" (The New York Times, 10/28/1975, p.l) while others 
were intended to promulgate a message. 
Probably because of the actual effects or perhaps because of the target of this 
action, the Fraunces Tavern incident was perceived by many as proofof the F ALN's 
criminal nature and their ruthless approach to their struggle. This event was used by 
many, the media included, to show the dangerousness of the organization: 
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It was the tavern blast that dramatically underscored the group's potential for 
mayhem. Diners in the crowded restaurant, a historic landmark, where George 
Washington bade farewell to his officers, were buried from their tables. One man 
was decapitated, and other victims staggered bleeding into the streets (The New 
York Times, 08/04/1977, p. B6). 
The subject matter ofmedia accounts was not only about what actually happened, 
but about could have happened. 
6.3.2 Only Imagine What Could Have Happened! 
Another way in which fear could be induced on audiences is by suggesting what 
could have happened. A reflection upon what actually happened and a suggestion of 
further or future effects characterize this method. In this sense the organization is judged 
by their actions and its effects and by some imaginary-possible effects. The logic seems 
to be that if they were capable ofX and X caused Y, then they are capable ofA which 
could cause B, for which we should act in order to prevent B and fear that B could 
happen. 
An article published in The New York Times just after FALN's first public action 
gives the perfect example of this approach. The article starts by explaining the events, the 
time of the explosions and the locations. The next step is to report the effects. And so 
they do, not without suggesting what could have happened: "No one was injured, 
although passers-by and night shift workers were nearby" (The New York Times, 
10/27/1974, p.1). So, there were no injuries, but there could have been. 
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The organization is judged by what they actually caused and what they could have 
caused. As if giving warning ofpossible danger, the media engaged in a speculatory 
frenzy against the F ALN. These processes, especially after the Fraunces Tavern event, 
were characterized by indirect suggestions ofpossible future actions. As in the quote 
above, the media would express the possible dangers that the organization could have 
caused, and also it would reproduce what others thought the organization was capable 0£ 
The following quote shows how the media builds an argument ofcharacter upon 
speculations ofdanger. 
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional, or F.A.L.N., the latest terrorist group 
arising from the Puerto Rican independence liberation movement, departs from 
the style of earlier Puerto Rican political organizations in a macabre way, 
according to police. As one official said yesterday: "They seem to want to kill 
people" (The New York Times, 01/25/1975, p. 10). 
The F ALN then, is a terrorist organization that ''wants to kill people." This 
conclusion ofcharacter is based on the fact of the event itself ( the event ofFraunces 
Tavern) and its effects. These conclusions were attained with disregard ofwhat the 
organization was saying in their communiques, contrary to presenting an image of 
political actors engaged on calculated action for political reasons, the media was 
presenting an image ofdangerous terrorists with murderous intentions. And without any 
considerations for human life, as shown in the following statement from a law 
enforcement officer which was reported and not contested by The New York Times: 
"Anybody who would put this quantity ofdynamite where people were dining didn't care 
if they killed people" (The New York Times, 01/26/1975, p. 1). 
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The media reproduced these statements without contesting the information or the 
judgements. That alone would be enough to argue that the media was joining in the 
process of criminalizing these subjects by presenting images of dangerousness and 
creating sentiments of fear. Yet the media did not just quote others making these types of 
arguments, but in occasions made the conclusions itself. In an editorial piece The 
Chicago Tribune's editorial group offered the public the following: 
The worldwide epidemic of terrorism exploded in Chicago Monday morning, a 
startling reminder that our position far from any international border or from any 
spectacularly sore spot gives us no immunity from bombings. This assault was on 
Chicago's nerves rather than on its blood, though even the most restrained 
terrorist cannot be sure that the bomb he set will injure only property and not 
people, as was fortunately true here this time. As ofthis writing, these bombers, 
who claim to be members ofa Puerto Rican nationalist group, are still at large 
(The Chicago Tribune, 10/28/1975, p.2). 
The image presented by the editorial board of The Chicago Tribune is one of 
imminent danger for the people of the United States. They argue that these events had 
showed that the United States is vulnerable to terrorist actions. Moreover, although this 
time there were no casualties, there is no way that they could be safe if terrorist actions 
are to happen since no terrorist can guarantee the target of its actions. Even worse, the 
bombers are still free, the danger is out there. It is this kind ofargument that will develop 
into a direct suggestion ofhow to control the threat (Altheide, 1997). This topic will be 
discussed in the next section. 
Speculations about the nature, character and disregard for human life were 
supported by so-called experts on terrorism that were being cited during that time. In a 
long article about terrorist psychology entitled "Inside the terrorist mind" an expert 
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elaborates on the nature of terrorists. His arguments confirm what the editorial group of 
The Chicago Tribune had maintained and what that law enforcement agent had stated: 
terrorists target people not just property. About why they target people, the expert states: 
Innocents are assaulted for many reasons. No target is easier to hit and incurs in 
less cost. Nothing attracts more attention. Panic spreads most rapidly when 
random murders occurs because one who imagines himself a possible victim 
knows that no action he takes, no status he assumes can provide security (The 
Chicago Tribune, 11/02/1975, p.l section 2). 
The assertion that "panic spreads most rapidly" when people feel they are possible 
victims can have a self-fulfilling effect. And this is precisely the reaction that could be 
provoked ifpeople believe they could be in direct danger, and they are most likely to feel 
that way if law enforcement agents and the media are telling them they are. If they tell 
people that "Despite 'wide investigations' into F.A.L.N., Chief Cottell warned that there 
'might be more bombings"' (10/28/1975, p.l), people will react accordingly. 
The image of danger presented in the media during this time had two possible 
effects. On the one hand, a creation ofhysteria characterized by suggestions of 
conspiracy theories and a call for harsh prosecution and severe sentencing. Although here 
I can do no more than reveal patterns, the prosecution statements after the sentencing 
hearing on 1980 surely suggests that fear and an image ofdanger helped in the process: 
"Deputy State's Attorney Michael Picaro said Tuesday the 11 were 'the heart of the 
organization' and presented 'the most clear and present danger to the people of this 
county, this state, and this country"' (The Chicago Tribune, 08/27/1980, p. 8, section 2). 
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6.3.3 About Conspiracy Theories and a General Sense ofHysteria 
The general atmosphere after the first year of actions claimed by the F ALN was 
one that could be called ofhysteria, ifwe understand the term as defined by the 
Merridian-Webster Dictionary-"behavior exhibiting overwhelming or unmanageable 
fear or emotional excess." Media coverage was characterized by numerous references to 
the possible dangers and the creation of elaborated conspiracy theories that did nothing 
but demonstrate ignorance about the organization and a profound fear ofwhat it was 
capable of. This atmosphere could create an interest in swift action, including 
persecution, surveillance, prosecution and sentencing. The actual call for increasing the 
intensity of security and particular handling approaches is going to be discussed in the 
next section. However, as a logical extension of the sense ofhysteria, several elements 
point to the possible effects of this generalized feeling of fear. 
Since 1975, just a year after FALN's first action, the media started to elaborate 
theories of the origin and plans of the F ALN and their members. The theories about the 
future plans of the organization were mostly related to the identification ofpossible 
targets, like known politicians or personalities. The ones about origins often linked the 
F ALN and its members to unpopular people or countries like Cuba. 
The following quote shows how the media supported by state authorities created 
relationships between the F ALN and the Cuban government. 
In recent months, Latin-American intelligence experts in Washington have 
disclosed a close alliance between the Puerto Rican terrorists, who seek 
independence for the island commonwealth, and the Cuban government. Senate 
investigators have obtained evidence that 135 Puerto Ricans from the United 
States have being trained in Cuba in guerilla warfare, sabotage, and the use of 
explosives (The Chicago Tribune, 10/29/1975, p. 23). 
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The selection of Cuba as an ally in the middle of the Cold War reinforces the sense of 
fear toward the organization. It also works as a way to impose new and additional sources 
ofantipathy toward the F ALN by transferring generalized feelings ofhatred against Cuba 
totheFALN. 
This association of the F ALN with Cuba was a strong theme in media stories. The 
sources for this alleged alliance were diverse. The last quote states that the source for this 
information was an unidentified group of"Latin-American intelligence experts", and 
another unidentified source, some "senate investigators." The New York Times also 
makes this association in an article published on October 28, 1975. The source here is 
different from the ones cited on The Chicago Tribune: "An investigation last January and 
February by The New York Times discovered that the roots of the terrorist group go back 
to 1966, when it was organized in Cuba and that it operated under different names here 
and in Puerto Rico until last year" (The New York Times, 10/28/1975, p. 1). Now the 
source is allegedly the newspaper itself. 
The generation of theories about the origin of the organization seems to develop 
into theories ofpossible new actions and target/victims during the period of the arrests 
and trials (1980). During this time the media presented several theories about other 
unclaimed actions, about why the members of the organization were in Evanston when 
they were arrested and about what was their next action. For example The Chicago 
Tribune presents a theory about some "terrorist" threats that were not claimed as the work 
of any known group, but that apparently the F.B.I. had related to the F ALN in some 
unknown way. "The Federal Bureau of Investigations has said that the organization's 
members were behind several threats to Pope John Paul II during his visit to the US last 
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fall" (The Chicago Tribune, 04/05/1980, p. 5). This in spite of the strong catholic roots of 
the Puerto Rican nationalist movement and that the F ALN had never identified the 
church or any religion as a possible target. 
Besides threatening the Pope's life, the FALN was also accused ofhaving bomb 
factories in Milwaukee (The Chicago Tribune, 04/07/1980, p. 1) and Chicago (The 
Chicago Tribune, 04/10/1980, p. 1 ). There were also rumors ofa plan to attack the 
Democratic or Republican Convention, one or both. In spite of admitting to have no 
evidence to support these allegations, the law enforcement agents used as sources of the 
information did not abandon the conspiracy theories around the organization. 
He said [FBI agent], however, that this did not mean the FALN would not try 
such scheme to get nationwide publicity. He suggested that such a plan might have been 
behind FALN invasion of the Carter-Mondale headquarters here. The invaders apparently 
wanted a list ofDemocratic Convention delegates (The Chicago Tribune, 04/08/1980, p. 
3). 
The argument seems to be that even if there is no information or specific evidence 
to relate the F ALN with these acts, they are capable of anything, and since they are 
capable of anything they should be investigated in relation to any imaginable outrageous 
act. The list ofpotential actions was long and despite the FBI admission ofhaving no 
evidence, the media continue to report this possible action in relation to F ALN. In this 
indirect way, the media was blaming the organization for all those actions mentioned. 
The Chicago Tribune summarized what they called "later developments": 
• It was learned that the Secret Service is working with the FBI to determine 
whether the terrorist group poses any threat to President Carter or Vice-President 
Mondale. So far no direct danger to either man has been uncovered. 
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• Documents found in the Jersey City bomb factory mentioned New York City's 
Madison Square Garden and the date August 11. The Democratic National 
Convention opens there that day. The Jersey City apartment is only 20-minute 
drive from Madison Square Garden. However, nothing found in the apartment 
outlined a plot against the convention (The Chicago Tribune, 04/10/1980, p. 1). 
Thus, although there is no evidence the reader gets the message that the organization is 
being investigated in relation to a possible danger to the most important political figure of 
the country -the President-and the Democratic Convention. Despite the official 
information that there is no evidence linking the F ALN to these allegations, the media 
still reports it as a real possibility. Moreover the media sometimes justifies the absence of 
evidence in order to support the unsubstantiated allegations: ''Nothing was found in the 
apartment that outlined a plot against the convention, but investigators said any plot 
would not be committed to paper this far in advance" (The Chicago Tribune, 04/11/1980, 
p. 1). 
Not only the F ALN seemed to have being blamed for any possible terrorist action 
during their time, but also there were theories about why they were in Evanston at the 
time they were arrested. On April 3rd 1980, eleven individuals were arrested in Evanston 
Chicago. These people were later identified by the police as members of the FALN. At 
the time of their arrest several weapons were confiscated from the van they were found. 
The authorities did not have information about the reason they were there or what were 
they about to do. The speculations were numerous. The most common one was that they 
were in a secret meeting -The Chicago Tribune called it "an unprecedented F ALN 
meeting" -- planning a major crime. 
Authorities believe the Evanston meeting was called to prepare for a major crime, 
such as a robbery of a bank or armored car to replenish the group's treasury, or a 
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raid on an armory or police station to obtain weapons (The Chicago Tribune, 
04/11/1980, p. 1 ). 
In other words, they did not have the vaguest idea why they were there so they stated any 
possibility they could imagine. 
The intensity of the hysteria and the fear-inflicting coverage-could have had 
detrimental effects for the F ALN and for many other Puerto Ricans that were ethnically 
or politically associated with the group. It has been shown before how ethnicity became 
one of the most important elements of identification for the FALN. For that reason, many 
Puerto Ricans, especially those associated with the independence movement could have 
been related to the organization's activities and been targeted for undeserved persecution. 
The media reported during this time several indicators ofpossible pernicious 
effects. For example, The Chicago Tribune reported as early as 1975, that the police was 
investigating a group ofPuerto Ricans that had visited Cuba during that time: "Chicago 
police seeking leads to the person who bombed three downtown buildings were 
attempting Tuesday to trace the movements of a dozen Puerto Rican activists here who 
have made a series ofclandestine trips to Cuba in recent months" (The Chicago Tribune, 
10/29/1975, p. 23). It is interesting how the phrase used is "trace the movements", 
because it would indicate intense surveillance and persecution. Another interesting aspect 
of the last quote is that the people the police are following are "Puerto Rican activists". 
This category is sufficiently broad as to include any Puerto Rican that supports the 
independence movement. 
The broader the categories ofpeople investigated the more possibilities of 
inclusion ofpeople as possible suspects based on discriminatory criteria. Ethnicity and 
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political idiosyncrasies could have been the main elements of inclusion. The following 
quote shows how many of the witnesses could have been influenced by these 
discriminatory elements in their identification of the subjects. Here, it is reported that a 
witness who identified two of the suspects as having participated in a raid were not the 
persons he had identified in some photographs, or something to that effect (the article is 
very confusing to this aspect). 
An earlier identification ofTorres and another of the arrested persons as having 
taken part in that raid was made in error by a campaign worker who viewed pictures of 
the suspects, according to police. After viewing the suspects in person in a lineup, the 
worker decided that Pagan and two others were participant in the raid, not the persons in 
the photographs he had viewed (The Chicago Tribune, 04/07/1980, p. 1). 
Hence, media's frenzied coverage could have led to many errors that were 
ethnically driven. There are several examples of this possible consequence, but they are 
difficult to establish because the evidence is indirect. However, the evidence is stronger 
with regard to the role of the effect of fear and hysteria influencing the severity of the 
prosecution and following sentencing. About this, the construction of the articles mostly 
suggests the relationship of fear with the severity of treatment. 
The Chicago Tribune reports the result of the state trial against F ALN members. 
The main source for this article is the prosecutor of this case. After quoting him saying 
that the prosecuted F ALN members presented danger to the citizens of the United States, 
they move to report further state actions against the subjects-"federal prosecutors also 
are considering taking the unusual step ofcharging them with sedition" (The Chicago 
Tribune, 08/27/1980, p. 8, section 2). 
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In a report on the sentencing for the federal trial, The Chicago Tribune reproduces 
several statements from prosecutors and the judge that suggest that the trial was far from 
a neutral process, but one that was influenced by fear and anger. On February 1981, the 
eleven FALN defendants were sentenced to "prison terms ranging from 55 to 90 years" 
(The Chicago Tribune, 02/19/1981, p. 1). The prosecutors had solicited the imposition of 
the maximum sentences based on the dangerousness of the defendants/FALN. "Margolis 
and W. Jones, assistant U.S. Attorneys, had urged McMillen [the judge] to impose the 
maximum sentences under the law, charging that the defendants were guilty of 'savage 
acts' and an 'insane wave ofviolence"' (The Chicago Tribune, 02/19/1981, p. 1). The 
argument apparently convinced the judge whom during the trial and sentencing hearing 
made several statements that showed a strong sentiment of anger against the defendants: 
In his statements to the judge, [Elizam] Escobar linked the F ALN cause to the 
American Revolution and said George Washington was a conspirator in the eyes 
of the British. To which McMillen replied: "If George Washington had been 
captured by the British, he would have been executed. That, in fact, is the penalty 
that should be imposed on you (The Chicago Tribune, 02/19/1981, p. 1). 
The suggestion ofmore severe sentences seems unreasonable given the fact that 
they were receiving such lengthy sentences. The effect of fear seemed to influence the 
severity of the treatment and social control. The previous quotes suggest this influence 
but in an indirect manner. There were, however, instances in which the media reported 
direct suggestions of stringent treatment/social control. 
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6.3.4 "Hunt Them Down and Lock Them Up": On Influencing Social Control 
It was reported earlier in this chapter that approximately 20% of the media 
documents included a direct suggestion ofhandling methods. These data by itself do not 
necessarily support the theoretical proposition of an influence on handling methods, at 
least not as direct suggestions. The advantage of a qualitative approach to content 
analysis is that it allows for a deeper study of the data. The numbers do not demonstrate 
the extent to which the suggestions of control found could have affected social reaction. 
Nevertheless, the sources and the context bring additional elements to the analysis, for 
example, the person expressing the suggestion or the moment in which it was made could 
make a difference in terms of the influence a specific suggestion may have. In this section 
we discuss the strength of these social control suggestions as to propose influence and/or 
pressure to state agents in terms of social/state control. 
Since the first action in 1974, media reported requests for an increase in vigilance 
and security measures. The New York Times informs: ''meanwhile the Police Department 
broadcast appeals for increased vigilance, urging officers on patrol to give special 
attention to buildings that might be targeted for further attacks that a Puerto Rican 
nationalist group said it had made" (The New York Times, 10/28/1974, p. 35, section L+). 
This call for intensification of surveillance came from different sources. The last 
quote presents the police itself for this initiative. But in addition to the police, other actors 
were insisting in control mechanisms. A very vocal actor in this process was New York 
City's Mayor at the moment, Mayor Beame. On the occasion of one ofFALN's actions, 
Mayor Beame calls for an increase in vigilance but also suggests punishment. Mayor 
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' 
Beame "issued a statement expressing his outrage over 'this senseless act of terror' and 
pledging relentless police action 'to hunt down the killers and bring them to justice"' 
(The New York Times, 01/25/1975). This was in 1975, and two years later Mayor Beame 
had extended his views: 
At City Hall, Mayor Beame announced he was sending a telegram to Governor 
Casey and to legislative leaders asking that the Legislature be called back into 
session to enact a law providing the death penalty for terrorists (The New York 
Times, 08/05/1977, p. 1). 
The request for increase in control was based on the actions themselves, like the 
ones we quoted before, and on the fear of future actions. The rationale seems to be that 
since we fear this will happen again we should intensify control in order to avoid that 
possibility. Like the following: " 'We are concerned that this might happen again,' Chief 
Sullivan said. That is why we have assigned so many men to solve this case as soon as 
possible"' (The New York Times, 01/26/1975, p. 1). 
The fear ofpossible future actions was the root or base for the suggestion ofan 
increase in control, even when that control implied the limitation ofcivil liberties. Fear is 
so strong of an argument that it even superseded the importance of the protection of 
political rights. Consider the following media report ofremarks by Mayor Daley 
(Chicago's mayor). Mayor Daley had promoted the use ofwhat was called "police spies" 
to infiltrate political organizations in order to control the F ALN. In response to criticism 
received, Mayor Daley used the fear factor as the argument in support. Although the 
media was apparently involved among those criticizing the Mayor, here The Chicago 
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Tribune presents Mayor Daley's response and his supporters. Since it does not present the 
critic's side, the article is one-sided and in apparent support. 
Mayor Daley, speaking in regards to the bombings of three downtown buildings 
Monday, said that efforts to contain violence by radical groups have been shifted 
by a campaign ofcriticism and charges against police. 
"You need security, surveillance, and infiltration to stop them [ violent 
radicals]" (The Chicago Tribune, 10/28/1975, p. 11). 
And the FBI supported the Mayor by arguing: 
"People have to decide what they want", one agent said. "Ifpeople don't want 
dissident groups infiltrated, then they have to realize it will be tougher to catch the 
bombers" (The Chicago Tribune, 10/28/1975, p. 11). 
So, ifyou fear F ALN, and you should, then you have to agree to this extreme measure, or 
you will have more bombings. 
The previous quotes are statements reproduced in the media but originated from 
other sources. The argument here is that the media present these statements as truthful 
statements because they are reported in an uncontested manner. The media then indirectly 
echoes those arguments. Yet, that is not the only way in which media reproduces calls for 
an increase and intensification in control mechanisms. On some other occasions, the 
media itself produces those arguments. For example, the editorial board of The Chicago 
Tribune, goes overboard to get involved in those suggestions of control. 
Foremost is the need to be resolute in condemnation, and determined in efforts to 
arrest, prosecute, convict, and sentence its perpetrators. Law enforcement, which 
cannot always be everywhere, should and will give high priority to solving 
terrorist incidents. They deserve this priority. Of all criminals, terrorists are 
among the most dangerous. Their crimes are premeditated and their victims may 
be and sometimes are killed, often by chance (The Chicago Tribune, 10/28/1975, 
p.2, section 3). 
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This time, the editors of The Chicago Tribune participate directly into the process of 
suggesting methods of social control. The calling for police action and prosecution 
demonstrate the way in which the media could have made an influence in the way in 
which the F ALN was treated or handled by the state. 
6.4 Some Concluding Remarks 
The F ALN presented itself as a political organization whose struggle was 
supported by the inalienable human right of self-determination. They presented 
themselves as freedom fighters in a legitimate struggle for the independence ofPuerto 
Rico. In their struggle they chose and designed their actions as to aim the government and 
not civilians. Their actions were political and not criminal. For those reasons, they were 
not to be feared but respected as the founding fathers of the United States are. 
The law, through its actors, on the contrary presented an image ofruthless and 
dangerous terrorists that needed to be controlled in order to maintain national security. 
Statements that focused on the negative effects of their actions (i.e. property damages, 
deaths and personal injuries) accompanied the presentation of the organization. 
Moreover, the F ALN was stigmatized as terrorists who are capable of anything possible. 
These images ofdanger were used as the basis for finding against the defendants in their 
trials, and as a justification for severe treatment. 
The media reflected a more extensive use of elements that could infringe fear 
upon the audience. In fact, contrary to what was found in the law documents, 45. 7% of 
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the media documents analyzed reflected a direct mention of danger to the public. 
However, the best way to understand the use of the fear factor by the media is by the 
identification of trends or patterns. In this chapter four tendencies were identified in 
which the media used fear. One of these tendencies was the focus on damages in media's 
coverage. Here, the media would report the specific news by focusing on the negative 
aspects of the story instead of focusing on motivations or other angles. Other way in 
which the media would fear, is by engaging in speculation about what could have 
happened and did not. Here, the media would suggest every possible terrible thing that 
could have happened, in this sense suggesting fear amongst the readers. This elaborated 
in practice in the creation ofcomplicated conspiracy theories and speculations about 
possible future targets, generating a general sense of fear and hysteria. Finally, the media 
would construct arguments based on that fear and conclude the need for specific methods 
of social control. In this sense directly participating in the process of criminalizing the 
FALN. 
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CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Between 1980 and 1985 more than a dozen Puerto Ricans were prosecuted and 
sentenced to prison terms ranging from 50 to 90 years. They were accused ofbeing part 
of an armed pro-Puerto Rican independence organization called Fuerzas Armadas de 
Liberaci6n Nacional or F.A.L.N. FALN had been claiming credit for a series of actions 
against U.S. government agencies and corporations since 1974. 
FALN claimed to be working towards the independence ofPuerto Rico. This 
political goal had been shared by many Puerto Ricans since the beginning of the U.S. 
presence in the island, and before that, during the Spanish domination. As many had 
shared the goal of independence, many also supported F ALN and its members when they 
were arrested, during the trials, and after being imprisoned. The support was manifested 
in different ways, such as an extensive campaign to liberate them from prison. This 
campaign finally succeeded when in September of 1999 eleven50 of those imprisoned for 
seditious conspiracy were released under a conditional clemency by President Clinton. 
The support for the F ALN members imprisoned was manifested in yet another 
manner. Several activists, lawyers and scholars assumed the responsibility ofdenouncing 
5°Four remain in prison. 
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the injustice of their imprisonment, the political repression against independence 
movements and the unjust conditions of incarceration for the Puerto Ricans. Arising from 
within these efforts was the argument that inspired this dissertation-that the F ALN as 
well as other Puerto Rican independence activists were subjected to a process of 
criminalization by the state. 
Previous studies present a view of the criminalization ofpolitical dissident groups 
as a unilateral and straightforward process by which the state repress political opposition 
as an attempt to maintain itself. This research proposes that the process ofcriminalization 
is a complex process that is carried out by two main institutions: the law and the media. 
The study of the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional, FALN, revealed that the 
process of criminalization is complex and consist of three main components and that the 
law and the media participate actively in that process. 
The three elements ofcriminalization are the following. First, the characterization 
or stigmatization ofpolitical dissident groups as criminals and terrorist-the law and the 
media present images of the political groups and its members as criminal and terrorists. 
Second, the law and the media in its treatment to the dissident groups de-politicize their 
activities by negating their importance or criticizing their political motivations or goals. 
The third element is the use of fear to justify social control, in other words the law and 
the media present images ofpossible danger to the public in order to justify mechanisms 
of social control. 
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7.1 The Stigmatization ofPolitical Actors and Their Activities 
The F ALN had presented their organization and themselves, through their 
communications before and after their imprisonment and through the words of their 
supporters, very differently than what the law and the media presented. They presented 
themselves primarily as Puerto Ricans committed to the betterment of the life conditions 
of the Latino community in the United States and to the solution of the colonial 
subjugation ofPuerto Rico. The main identity indicator, as they present themselves, is 
their ethnic identity. It is this identity that they and their supporters identify as the main 
motivation for their work. Their work towards the independence ofPuerto Rico 
constitutes the principal item on their political agenda, and it is their conviction that 
because they are fighters for the independence of colonized people they were entitled to a 
prisoners ofwar status. Their actions were a legitimate part of their struggle for self­
determination, and far from being terrorist actions. In sum, they conceive themselves as 
Puerto Ricans freedom fighters. 
In contrast, the law and the media called them terrorists and their actions 
abominable acts of terror. The main descriptive category found in the legal document was 
that of terrorists. In other words, when the law named the F ALN it was mainly as 
terrorists. Even on the two occasions when the phrase "independent activists" was used to 
name the F ALN this was modified by a label of terrorism. 
The label of terrorism was consistent throughout most of the legal documents. 
The term ''terrorist" was used as an adjective modifying the name of the group or as a 
substitute to the actual name. The most common way to introduce the organization found 
in the legal documents that were analyzed was by describing the organization as terrorist 
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and then presenting its name. The reader receives the message of the terrorist, violent and 
criminal nature of this organization even before knowing its name. 
It was found that the demonization of the actors is further elaborated by adding 
negative elements to their already bad position. Stigmatization and labeling in the process 
ofcriminalization works as follows: the law calls them terrorists and presents them in 
such a way to the audience that justifies treating them as terrorist and criminals. If they 
are criminals, they should be treated as criminals. 
Seven different ways ofnaming the F ALN members were found in the media 
accounts studied in this research. Those names or categories are freedom fighters, 
dissenters, communists or reds, maniacs or lunatics, extremists, independence activists or 
nationalists, and terrorists. The first three categories were found in one document. Two 
documents contained the category "maniacs or lunatics" and five contained the category 
extremists. But the most frequently used category was that of ''terrorists", with 69% of 
the categories so identified. The second most found category was "independence activists 
or nationalists." 
During the initial phases of the FALN's history in the media (1974-1975) the 
most common way in which the group was identified was as a nationalist group. In this 
way, the organization was presented as a group with a specific, defined political 
standpoint. At this point the F ALN was mainly called "a Puerto Rican nationalist 
organization." However, as time passed and the once unknown group surfaced more and 
more, the naming of the group moved from a rather neutral and informing way to a more 
judgmental and accusing one. The once "nationalist group" became the Puerto Rican 
terrorist organization. The style ofnaming and calling the organization as terrorists 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
200 
became almost standard. Different nouns followed the term "terrorist", but the prefix was 
consistent. 
Yet, the most common way of identifying the F ALN besides mentioning the name 
(F ALN) and then describing the organization as terrorists, was to substitute the name for 
a noun phrase -"a Puerto Rican terrorist group"-this is, a phrase that included an ethnic 
referent besides the stigma. At the more advanced phases of the coverage ofFALN, 
terrorist became the first name of the F ALN and the main description was as Puerto 
Ricans. 
7.2 De-politicization: Denying Legitimate Political Motivations 
Based mainly on devotion to their national origin, F ALN members assert that it 
was their nationalist sentiment what ultimately motivated them to engage in a struggle for 
the independence ofPuerto Rico. The political status ofPuerto Rico, the tradition of 
independence movements and the repression suffered by these groups are pointed out by 
the FALN and its supporters as part of that motivation. And these political motivations 
are essential for the definition of their work and their struggle. 
In spite of the importance that the F ALN put on their political stands, the law and 
the media either dismissed or misrepresented those political motivations. Most of the 
legal documents (64.9%) did not contain any reference to FALN's political goals. And 
the rest of the documents that did contain references approached the issue in such a way 
that resulted in a misrepresentation of those goals. 
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It was found that the vast majority of the legal documents (86.5%) contained no 
discussion of the political, historical or economic situation ofPuerto Rico. The results of 
the media analysis reveal very similar numbers, with 84.7% of the media accounts 
containing no discussion of the general situation of the island. 
Besides the very limited amount of information regarding F ALN's political 
motivations, it was found that the media engaged in a process ofde-legitimization of 
political motivations by failing to report F ALN's support, by accompanying reports of 
political motivations with negative statements, or by presenting opposition. The use of 
direct criticism and attacks on their political motivations by the media was mostly 
expressed as opposition to the cause of independence, which was invalidated by arguing 
that it was not a political status supported by most of the Puerto Rican voters. 
7.3 Fear and Social Control 
The FALN presents itself as a group ofPuerto Ricans legitimately fighting for the 
independence ofPuerto Rico. Accordingly, they understand their actions within the 
context of a valid struggle for self-determination. They maintain that the targets of their 
actions were not civilians but major corporations and the government. They state that 
their actions were designed not to harm people or to cause terror. Therefore, they 
conceive themselves as freedom fighters and not terrorists, their actions as political and 
not criminal. Thus, they are not to be feared but respected. 
In contrast, it was found that the law and the media present an image ofdangerous 
actors capable of anything, actors that need to be controlled ifpeace and security are to 
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be achieved. The analysis of the legal documents revealed that there were some 
tendencies identified regarding the use of fear. One of these tendencies was the use of 
fear to justify specific arguments, especially arguments about social control alternatives. 
Specific arguments about social control are then built upon the base ofan image of 
dangerous individuals that need to be controlled. The rationale seemed to be that the evil 
nature of the actors, in this case the FALN, and their potential to damage others justified 
intense methods ofcontrol. 
The image of fear was created by labeling the actors or creating a stigma based on 
a recollection ofprevious acts, by defining a modus operandi, or by suggesting some kind 
of criminal nature. These approaches produced damaging images of the F ALN and 
pointed to possible danger. It is the possibility of danger that justifies the application of 
severe methods ofcontrol. 
It was found that the media also presented images of fear and danger, and it did so 
in three different ways: a focus on damages and negative effects, a discussion ofwhat 
could have happened, and the construction ofconspiracy theories. In these ways the 
media created sentiments of fear that ultimately could justify severe mechanisms of social 
control. Yet, there were also found in the media direct suggestions of social control. In 
these cases the attempt to influence social control decisions was clear and direct 
The study of the media accounts ofF ALN also revealed the production of 
conspiracy theories and a general sense ofhysteria. Many theories appeared in the media 
accounts regarding F ALN's origin and associations as well as any number ofpossible 
actions. The most common origin and association of the organization presented in the 
media was with the Cuban government. Several articles suggested that F ALN's members 
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were trained in Cuba and that the Cuban government and Fidel Castro supported the 
organization. In terms of the speculations about future actions, the sky was the limit. 
From supposed plots to attack the Pope John Paul II to the existence ofbomb factories all 
over the mid-west, every imaginable evil action was attributed to the F ALN. 
It was found that the media reproduced calls for intensification ofmethods of 
social control in an uncontested manner. The call for the intensification of control and 
surveillance came from different sources. One of the most vocal actors in this process 
was New York City Mayor Beame, who calls for increase in vigilance but goes further 
and requests a very specific type ofpunishment -the death penalty. 
But the media did not restrict their contribution to the criminalization of the 
FALN to the uncontested publication of statements in which the speakers were requesting 
toughening of control; the media participated in a more direct manner. On some 
occasions the media itself directly contributed to the process by generating those 
arguments itself. For example The Chicago Tribune's editorial boards cried for action 
and states its absolute condemnation of the FALN and requested that the authorities 
should give top priority to the arrest and prosecution of this group. They based this 
request for action on statements about the dangerousness of terrorists. 
7.4 Conclusions 
It was the purpose of this study to examine the treatment given to the Fuerzas 
Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional, F ALN, by the United States. Supporters of the Puerto 
Rican independence movement had claimed that these independence activists had been 
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the subject of a particular form ofpolitical repression that they called criminalization. 
Based upon this proposition and on the works ofother studies in the area ofpolitical 
movements, a detailed theoretical model of criminalization was developed for this 
project. Our proposition is that the criminalization ofpolitical opposing groups is a 
complex process in which several institutions participate. In particular, it is argued here 
that the law and the media actively participate in that process. 
The study of the treatment received by the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n 
Nacional, FALN, from the law and the media reveals that both, the law and the media, 
acted in similar ways to criminalize this political opposing group. From this study we 
conclude that the process ofcriminalization ofpolitical dissenting groups is 
accomplished by three main elements. First by characterizing the actors as common 
criminals and terrorists, and their activities as crimes and acts of terrorism. Second, by 
de-politicizing their actions in the form ofdismissing or invalidating political 
motivations. And, finally by creating sentiments of fear that are used to justify or promote 
specific approaches to social control. 
The law and the media contribute to the process ofcriminalization ofpolitical 
opposition. The law treats political dissident's activities as criminal and terrorist acts 
deserving to be punished. Furthermore, the law does not treat these activities as political 
actions. The media utilize terms with strong negative connotations to describe political 
activities to the public. Terms like "terrorist attack" and "bombing", like the ones used in 
the case of the F ALN, present an image ofcriminal actions and places an emphasis on 
effects rather than on causes. This sets the stage and affects the public's interpretation 
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and evaluation of the acts described. The media then, contributes to the criminalization of 
the political opposing groups by presenting their actions as terrorist and criminal acts. 
The way in which the media refers to the actors presents a pre-established 
interpretation to the reader, influencing the way in which the public will react and 
understand political activists. The specific terms used to characterize the group influence 
its social interpretation. For example, to refer to a political organization as "independence 
activists or nationalists" is to recognize to some extent a political standpoint in a neutral 
and purely informative manner. The category does not present by itself a negative or 
positive evaluation of the organization. The category "terrorists", on the contrary, is 
judgmental and it presents a very negative image of those called as such. It does not even 
present a political stand but merely an accusation. Thus, when the law and the media 
characterize political actors as terrorists, as it did with the FALN, it imposes on the 
audience(s) negative judgments that influences social interpretation of those actors. 
The media accounts studied here showed a pattern of treatment and naming that 
changed with time. When an unknown organization claims responsibility of an event so 
important that it deserves front-page coverage, the media usually does not have many 
sources to choose from regarding the identity of the organization. At these initial phases 
neither the police nor the media have prior knowledge of the group. In this circumstance, 
the principal or the only source of information is the actual group's communication. That 
being the case, these initial accounts ofpolitical groups are mostly based on the group's 
communication and for that reason, the result usually reflects to a larger extent, the 
group's version of their identity and purpose. This initial treatment quickly changes in 
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order to accommodate the presentation of these actors with more newsworthy scandalous 
images of senseless terrorists. 
The rather neutral coverage of the actors at initial phases changes as the 
organizations become known and there are diverse sources of information. The 
characterization of the actors in the advanced phases ofcoverage tends to be more similar 
to the law's characterization. In this phase, the law and the media both coincide in 
naming the groups as terrorists and criminals. 
Once past the initial phases, the media tends to focus on a more standard 
characterization ofpolitical groups and looks for ways to consistently identify them. This 
naming is usually composed of a negative adjective, like terrorist, and by other forms of 
identification. In the case of foreign individuals or members ofan ethnic group or race, 
the main form of identification is that otherness. In the case of the F ALN we found that 
the terrorist label was mostly accompanied by a reference to the Puerto Rican identity. 
The Puerto Rican identification was the only part ofFALN's own definition of 
their organization that was adopted by the media. Despite the fact that the Puerto Rican 
identity was important for the F ALN's own description of themselves, the extensive use 
of the ethnic referent was accompanied by the terrorist label. This makes the 
identification prejudicial and discriminatory as it makes accusations and imparts negative 
associations for the people sharing that ethnic background. Thus, the combination of 
identification referents -ethnicity, race, or nationality plus the negative stigma-affects 
the evaluation of the groups as it relates the stigma with the other identification. 
By characterizing and naming political activists as terrorists the law and the media 
present an image ofcriminality that helps the process ofcriminalizing the acts and the 
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actors. A consistent denial and misrepresentation ofpolitical motivations complement 
this process ofnaming and stigmatizing political actors. In this way, political actors are 
not only presented as criminals but also detached from their political goals. 
The de-politicization ofopposing groups, then, is achieved by the silence 
regarding their political motivations and by invalidating those motives in its presentation. 
There are several ways in which the invalidation ofpolitical motivations within the legal 
documents is accomplished. One of those patterns identified in this research was called 
"vilifying the motives by emphasizing tactics." The patterns or tactics ofde-politicization 
occurs when the organization's motives are presented accompanied by a negative 
statement about the group's tactics. When negative statements regarding the political 
actors accompany the presentation ofpolitical motivations, another pattern occurs -
''vilification ofmotives by stigmatizing the subjects." In general, these techniques 
diminish or invalidate the opposing group's political motivations because either their 
practices are presented as reproachable or because the actors are. 
The presentation ofpolitical motivations is not a simple task when dealing with 
unfamiliar topics for the general public. For example, the particular political status of 
Puerto Rico is not information that the majority of the population of the United States 
necessarily has. For that reason, when isolated accounts of the FALN's political 
motivations are presented without an explanation of the situation behind those claims, the 
result is that the political motivations are not understood and become meaningless. 
Insufficient information regarding political motivations of the group is another way in 
which the law and the media de-politicize political organizations, especially those that are 
not known to the public. Thus, when the political motivations of groups are not explained 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
208 
or accompanied with information that put into perspective the situation motivating the 
actions, the political motivations lose validity as they are not understood by the audience. 
This is especially serious for ethnically based groups. 
This research revealed that the media covered FALN's political motivations to a 
greater extent than did the legal documents. This finding departs from the literature on 
the topic that suggests that there would be little media coverage regarding political 
motivations ofdissident groups. However, how effective is media's presentation of 
FALN's motivations ifit is not complemented by necessary information regarding those 
motivations? We conclude that the validity of a political motivation of a group is 
diminished if the audience does not understand that claim. It is inconsequential for a 
reader that a group committed an act in favor of the independence ofPuerto Rico, if the 
reader does not know that Puerto Rico is not an independent nation. Therefore, the fact 
that the law or the media do not provide necessary information for the understanding of a 
political claim facilitates the process of de-politicization ofpolitical dissident groups. 
The law and the media de-politicize political opposing groups by dismissing and 
misrepresenting political motivations in different ways. Also, political motivations are 
often silenced. Furthermore, when political goals are covered the approach results in 
prejudice of the group's image. The group's motivations are often followed by negative 
statements that diminish its validity. In these ways the law and the media eliminate or 
lessen the validity of the political motivations ofdissident groups. The combination of the 
two elements discussed -stigmatization and de-politicization-creates an image of a 
subject that is a terrorist and that has no legitimate cause. 
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The criminalization ofpolitical actors is completed with the production of images 
of fear and dangerousness. The law and the media both create images and generate 
feelings of fear by contributing to a sense ofdanger and alarm. Both actors (the media 
and the law) use these images and feelings of fear in support of their arguments and to 
promote ideas for social control. The request for increase in control is based upon 
stigmatization of the actors who are portrayed as cold-blooded killers and terrorists. It is 
also based on assumptions of future danger and suggestions ofvulnerability of the 
general public. The rationale seems to be that since they are dangerous and we fear them 
we should intensify control in order to protect our security. 
It is our conclusion that the F ALN was in fact subjected to a process of 
criminalization that led to their incarceration and the application of extremely severe 
sentences and pernicious conditions of incarceration. This research expands the 
proposition of the criminalization of the Puerto Rican independentistas and presents a 
complete model ofcriminalization ofpolitical dissident groups that encompasses three 
essential components. The three components -stigmatization, de-politicization, and use of 
fear-are present in the case of the FALN and the law and the media actively contribute 
to each of those components. 
We conclude that political opposition groups become criminalized by the law and 
the media through the three elements of the process ofcriminalization. Each element is 
essential in that process and without any of them a political actor may not be treated as a 
criminal. This is, a political actor is detached from what defines him/her as political and 
becomes a criminal or terrorist actor by the stigmatization as criminal, by the de­
politicization of their actions, and by his/her presentation as dangerous. 
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The theoretical understanding of the process ofcriminalization proposed in this 
research points to the evaluation of the law and the media as actors or agents that act on a 
cultural basis, or cultural hegemony. Both institutions act in accordance with that cultural 
conjuncture and are not understood as working in favor of specific interests. On the 
contrary, they are understood as acting within a cultural framework of social relations 
that are in turn produced and reproduced by its institutions. For that reason, it is not 
concluded that the law and the media acted jointly or intentionally, just that acted in 
certain ways that resulted in the criminalization of a political dissenting group. For that 
reason, this conclusion separates this research from previous studies that present an 
instrumentalist view of the state, in which the state represses political movements in its 
intent to maintain control. 
This research is based on the case of the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n 
N acional, F ALN. In spite of this specificity, the conclusions drawn by this research could 
be applied to the understanding ofother political dissident groups as they are processed 
by the law and covered in the media. The process of criminalization as presented here 
could be useful in the understanding of the treatment to dissident political groups and 
their actions, in particular groups treated as terrorists. As it was shown here for the case 
of the F ALN, many other groups labeled as ''terrorists" may be denied fair coverage and 
treatment by the law. The stigmatization of actors as terrorists, the invalidation of 
political motivations and the creation ofa general sentiment of fear and danger, may 
prevent a fair understanding ofpolitical actors and promote unfairly severe legal 
treatment. This is specially serious when the actors appear surrounded by generalized 
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sentiments of fear and anger, that are both produced and sustained by the law and the 
media. 
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